Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John McKnight filed a lawsuit against Anthony Love seeking damages from a vehicular accident. On November 13, 2019, both parties were driving on I-20 in DeKalb County when traffic slowed, and McKnight stopped his vehicle. Love, driving behind McKnight, failed to stop in time and collided with McKnight's vehicle. McKnight sustained injuries and his truck was damaged. Love was cited for following too closely and pleaded guilty to the offense. McKnight sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as litigation expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11, alleging that Love acted in bad faith by being distracted, possibly using his cell phone at the time of the accident.The trial court denied Love's motion for partial summary judgment on the claim for litigation expenses, finding sufficient evidence to create a jury question regarding bad faith. The evidence included Love's cell phone records and McKnight's testimony suggesting Love was distracted. The trial court also denied Love's motion for summary judgment on claims of negligence per se but granted it on claims for punitive damages and stubborn litigiousness. Love did not challenge the negligence per se rulings, and McKnight's appeal on punitive damages and stubborn litigiousness was rejected by the Court of Appeals.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis. The Court held that mere violations of traffic laws do not constitute bad faith under OCGA § 13-6-11. Bad faith requires intentional wrongdoing or reckless disregard of known harmful consequences, which is more than mere negligence. The Court found insufficient evidence of bad faith to support a claim for litigation expenses and reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's denial of Love's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of bad faith litigation expenses. View "LOVE v. MCKNIGHT" on Justia Law

In 2020, Georgia ratified an amendment to its Constitution waiving sovereign immunity for actions seeking declaratory relief from unlawful acts by the State or local governments. This amendment included a procedural requirement that such actions must be brought against and in the name of only the State or the relevant local government, or they would be dismissed. The case at hand questions whether a complaint that does not comply with this naming requirement can be cured by dropping or adding parties to avoid dismissal.Warbler Investments, LLC sued the City of Social Circle, its mayor, and three City Council members in their individual capacities, alleging unlawful rezoning of Warbler's property and violations of the Open Records Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the complaint violated the naming requirement of the Georgia Constitution. Warbler then moved to amend the complaint to drop the individual defendants, which the trial court allowed. However, after the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in State v. SASS Group, LLC, which mandated dismissal of cases not complying with the naming requirement, the City renewed its motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the case despite the amendment.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the procedural defect of not complying with the naming requirement could be cured by amending the complaint to drop or add parties. The court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity was not affected by the initial failure to comply with the naming requirement, and the amended complaint, which complied with the requirement, should not be dismissed. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded. View "WARBLER INVESTMENTS, LLC v. CITY OF SOCIAL CIRCLE" on Justia Law

Dr. Armin Oskouei, owner of two medical facilities, filed a defamation lawsuit against defense attorney Zachary Matthews. Oskouei alleged that Matthews made defamatory statements suggesting that Oskouei performed illegal surgeries. Matthews moved to strike the lawsuit under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, which allows for the dismissal of claims that infringe on free speech when there is no probability of the plaintiff prevailing. The trial court denied Matthews’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Oskouei could not establish a probability of prevailing because he had not shown that Matthews acted with actual malice.The trial court found that Matthews’s statements arose from protected activity but concluded that Oskouei had a probability of prevailing on his defamation claims. The court noted that a reasonable jury could infer that Matthews did not have a good faith basis for his statements. The Court of Appeals, however, determined that Matthews’s statements were conditionally privileged and that Oskouei had not shown actual malice, as required to defeat the privilege.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to address whether a plaintiff must show actual malice to defeat a conditional privilege defense. The court concluded that the actual malice standard does not apply in such cases. Instead, under OCGA § 51-5-9, a plaintiff must show that the defendant used the privilege as a pretext for private malice, meaning the statement was made with ill will or intent to injure. The court vacated the Court of Appeals’s opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court also overruled several other cases that had incorrectly applied the actual malice standard to conditional privilege defenses under Georgia law. View "OSKOUEI v. MATTHEWS" on Justia Law

Henry Strickland contested the results of a city commissioner election in Waycross, Georgia, after losing to Alvin Nelson. Strickland argued that the election used an outdated 2005 map of voting districts instead of the correct 2011 map, resulting in 32 voters casting ballots in the wrong districts. The trial court agreed, finding that the use of the 2005 map could have affected the election outcome, which Nelson won by 18 votes. Consequently, the court vacated the election and ordered a new one to be held in November 2024 using the 2011 map.The trial court denied Nelson's motion to dismiss Strickland's petition for insufficient process and service of process and rejected Nelson's argument that the petition should be dismissed for lack of expeditious pursuit. The court found irregularities in the election due to the use of the 2005 map and ordered a new election. Nelson appealed the trial court's decision, and the Supreme Court of Georgia granted his request for a stay pending the appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's judgment. The Court held that the 2011 map was never effective because the required filings with the Secretary of State and the clerk of the superior court, as mandated by OCGA § 36-35-5, were never made. Since the 2011 map was not effective at the time of the election, there was no basis for the trial court's conclusion that enough illegal or irregular votes were counted to change or cast doubt on the election outcome. Therefore, Strickland's petition was rejected, and the trial court's order vacating the election was reversed. View "NELSON v. STRICKLAND" on Justia Law

Sherran Wasserman agreed to sell land in Franklin County to Anthony Pham, contingent on the approval of a conditional use permit by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. Pham applied for the permit to build and operate chicken houses, but the Board denied the application. Wasserman then sued the Board and the County, initially bringing multiple claims under state and federal law. She dismissed some claims, conceded others, and the trial court dismissed her remaining state-law claims due to sovereign immunity. This left two federal claims: one alleging the County violated Pham’s equal protection rights based on race, and another alleging a violation of Wasserman’s equal protection rights as a “class of one.”The trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, applying the federal doctrine of third-party standing, which allows a plaintiff to assert the rights of third parties. The court found genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on standing and the merits of Wasserman’s equal protection claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Wasserman lacked third-party standing and that her “class of one” claim failed as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether a plaintiff may rely on the federal doctrine of third-party standing to establish constitutional standing in Georgia courts. The court held that Georgia’s constitutional standing requirements, rooted in the common law and consistent precedent, do not allow a plaintiff to maintain an action by asserting only the rights of a nonparty. The court overruled its previous adoption of the federal doctrine of third-party standing, concluding that a plaintiff must assert her own legal rights to invoke the judicial power of Georgia courts. The judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WASSERMAN v. FRANKLIN COUNTY" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed a premises liability suit against Waffle House, Inc. and WH Capital LLC in October 2019. In April 2021, the defendants filed a motion for sanctions due to the plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with a discovery order. In July 2021, the plaintiffs dismissed their lawsuit without prejudice. In September 2021, the defendants filed a motion for attorneys' fees, arguing that the plaintiffs dismissed their lawsuit to escape sanctions. The plaintiffs then filed a renewal action. In July 2022, the trial court awarded the defendants $101,082 in attorneys' fees in the dismissed case.The plaintiffs sought to appeal the attorneys' fees award by filing an application for discretionary appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the application, concluding that because the plaintiffs had filed a renewal action, the case remained pending below, making the fee award a non-final order. Therefore, the plaintiffs were required to obtain a certificate of immediate review. The Court of Appeals relied on the case Eidson v. Croutch in its analysis.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the renewal action was a new case, not a continuance of the dismissed case. Therefore, the dismissed case was no longer pending below. The court held that under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), the order awarding attorneys' fees was a final judgment, and no certificate of immediate review was required. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the discretionary application and remanded the case for consideration of that application. View "COOK-ROSE v. WAFFLE HOUSE INC." on Justia Law

Christina Peterson, representing herself, challenged the qualifications of Valerie Vie as a candidate for probate court judge in Douglas County, Georgia. Peterson claimed that Vie had not been a resident of Douglas County for the required time to run for the office. Peterson initially filed a challenge with the local Board of Elections, which was denied. She then filed a petition for review in superior court, which was also denied. After the primary election, which Vie won, Peterson filed a second petition in superior court challenging the election results on the same grounds.The local Board of Elections held a hearing and denied Peterson's challenge. Peterson then filed a petition for review in the superior court, which was also denied. Peterson did not seek to stay the primary election and filed an application for discretionary appeal with the Supreme Court of Georgia, which was denied. Subsequently, Peterson filed a post-primary petition in superior court, which was dismissed on the grounds of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and mootness due to her failure to seek a stay of the primary election.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and dismissed Peterson's appeal. The court held that parties seeking to challenge election results must act with dispatch to resolve disputes before the election occurs. Peterson failed to expedite her challenges and did not seek a stay of the primary election. The court emphasized the importance of resolving election disputes promptly to avoid unnecessary expenses and ensure the finality of election results. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits of Peterson's claims. View "Peterson v. Vie" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC leased land from Whitaker Farms, LLC for a peach orchard. After being locked out of the leased premises, Fitzgerald Farms sued Whitaker Farms for damages. A jury awarded compensatory damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed the trial court’s ruling that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages. On remand, a second jury awarded punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that statements made during a settlement negotiation by Whitaker Farms’s Chief Operating Officer to Fitzgerald Farms’s owner were properly admitted under OCGA § 24-4-408.The trial court initially ruled that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. On remand, the trial court conducted a second jury trial focused on punitive damages, where the jury awarded $500,000 in punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. Whitaker Farms appealed again, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting statements made during a settlement negotiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the statements were admissible to show Whitaker’s intent and state of mind.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals’s judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the statements made during the settlement negotiation were inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-408. The Court concluded that the statements were offered to prove Whitaker Farms’s liability for punitive damages, which is not permissible under the statute. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the admission of the statements was harmful and if a new trial on punitive damages is required. View "Whitaker Farms, LLC v. Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

An attorney, Brian Steel, was found in contempt of court for refusing to disclose how he learned about an ex parte hearing involving a witness, the witness's counsel, and prosecutors in a case where Steel represented a defendant. The trial judge, Judge Glanville, repeatedly asked Steel to reveal his source, but Steel claimed the information was protected by attorney-client privilege and attorney work product. Judge Glanville held Steel in contempt and ordered him into custody, although Steel was later allowed to return to the courtroom.The Fulton County Superior Court initially found Steel in contempt and ordered him to be taken into custody. Steel argued that the information was privileged and that due process required Judge Glanville to recuse himself from the contempt proceedings. Despite these arguments, Judge Glanville sentenced Steel to 20 days in jail to be served on weekends and denied him a supersedeas bond.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that due process required Judge Glanville to recuse himself from the contempt proceedings. The court held that because the punishment was delayed and the alleged disobedience was directed toward the judge, a different judge should have presided over the contempt hearing. The court reversed the judgment of contempt imposed by the trial court. View "STEEL v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, who operate restaurants under franchise agreements, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition based on advice from their legal counsel. This led to the franchisor terminating the franchise agreements. The plaintiffs then sued their lawyers and law firms for legal malpractice and breach of written contracts for legal services, alleging that the lawyers' advice constituted malpractice. The defendants moved to dismiss both claims, arguing they were barred by a four-year statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-25.The trial court dismissed the legal-malpractice claims but denied the motion to dismiss the breach-of-contract claims. Later, it granted summary judgment for a subset of defendants, ruling that the breach-of-contract claims were also barred by the four-year statute of limitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the legal-malpractice claims and concluded that the breach-of-contract claims were duplicative and should be dismissed as well.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine which statute of limitation applies to breach-of-contract-for-legal-services claims and whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing these claims as duplicative. The Supreme Court concluded that such claims could be governed by either a six-year statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-24 or a four-year statute under OCGA § 9-3-25, depending on whether the breach arose directly from a written contract. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the breach-of-contract claims as duplicative without applying the proper motion-to-dismiss standard.The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, emphasizing that plaintiffs can pursue alternative theories of relief based on the same conduct. View "TITSHAW v. GEER" on Justia Law