Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Henry Strickland contested the results of a city commissioner election in Waycross, Georgia, after losing to Alvin Nelson. Strickland argued that the election used an outdated 2005 map of voting districts instead of the correct 2011 map, resulting in 32 voters casting ballots in the wrong districts. The trial court agreed, finding that the use of the 2005 map could have affected the election outcome, which Nelson won by 18 votes. Consequently, the court vacated the election and ordered a new one to be held in November 2024 using the 2011 map.The trial court denied Nelson's motion to dismiss Strickland's petition for insufficient process and service of process and rejected Nelson's argument that the petition should be dismissed for lack of expeditious pursuit. The court found irregularities in the election due to the use of the 2005 map and ordered a new election. Nelson appealed the trial court's decision, and the Supreme Court of Georgia granted his request for a stay pending the appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's judgment. The Court held that the 2011 map was never effective because the required filings with the Secretary of State and the clerk of the superior court, as mandated by OCGA § 36-35-5, were never made. Since the 2011 map was not effective at the time of the election, there was no basis for the trial court's conclusion that enough illegal or irregular votes were counted to change or cast doubt on the election outcome. Therefore, Strickland's petition was rejected, and the trial court's order vacating the election was reversed. View "NELSON v. STRICKLAND" on Justia Law

Sherran Wasserman agreed to sell land in Franklin County to Anthony Pham, contingent on the approval of a conditional use permit by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. Pham applied for the permit to build and operate chicken houses, but the Board denied the application. Wasserman then sued the Board and the County, initially bringing multiple claims under state and federal law. She dismissed some claims, conceded others, and the trial court dismissed her remaining state-law claims due to sovereign immunity. This left two federal claims: one alleging the County violated Pham’s equal protection rights based on race, and another alleging a violation of Wasserman’s equal protection rights as a “class of one.”The trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, applying the federal doctrine of third-party standing, which allows a plaintiff to assert the rights of third parties. The court found genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on standing and the merits of Wasserman’s equal protection claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Wasserman lacked third-party standing and that her “class of one” claim failed as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether a plaintiff may rely on the federal doctrine of third-party standing to establish constitutional standing in Georgia courts. The court held that Georgia’s constitutional standing requirements, rooted in the common law and consistent precedent, do not allow a plaintiff to maintain an action by asserting only the rights of a nonparty. The court overruled its previous adoption of the federal doctrine of third-party standing, concluding that a plaintiff must assert her own legal rights to invoke the judicial power of Georgia courts. The judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WASSERMAN v. FRANKLIN COUNTY" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed a premises liability suit against Waffle House, Inc. and WH Capital LLC in October 2019. In April 2021, the defendants filed a motion for sanctions due to the plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with a discovery order. In July 2021, the plaintiffs dismissed their lawsuit without prejudice. In September 2021, the defendants filed a motion for attorneys' fees, arguing that the plaintiffs dismissed their lawsuit to escape sanctions. The plaintiffs then filed a renewal action. In July 2022, the trial court awarded the defendants $101,082 in attorneys' fees in the dismissed case.The plaintiffs sought to appeal the attorneys' fees award by filing an application for discretionary appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the application, concluding that because the plaintiffs had filed a renewal action, the case remained pending below, making the fee award a non-final order. Therefore, the plaintiffs were required to obtain a certificate of immediate review. The Court of Appeals relied on the case Eidson v. Croutch in its analysis.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the renewal action was a new case, not a continuance of the dismissed case. Therefore, the dismissed case was no longer pending below. The court held that under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), the order awarding attorneys' fees was a final judgment, and no certificate of immediate review was required. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the discretionary application and remanded the case for consideration of that application. View "COOK-ROSE v. WAFFLE HOUSE INC." on Justia Law

Christina Peterson, representing herself, challenged the qualifications of Valerie Vie as a candidate for probate court judge in Douglas County, Georgia. Peterson claimed that Vie had not been a resident of Douglas County for the required time to run for the office. Peterson initially filed a challenge with the local Board of Elections, which was denied. She then filed a petition for review in superior court, which was also denied. After the primary election, which Vie won, Peterson filed a second petition in superior court challenging the election results on the same grounds.The local Board of Elections held a hearing and denied Peterson's challenge. Peterson then filed a petition for review in the superior court, which was also denied. Peterson did not seek to stay the primary election and filed an application for discretionary appeal with the Supreme Court of Georgia, which was denied. Subsequently, Peterson filed a post-primary petition in superior court, which was dismissed on the grounds of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and mootness due to her failure to seek a stay of the primary election.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and dismissed Peterson's appeal. The court held that parties seeking to challenge election results must act with dispatch to resolve disputes before the election occurs. Peterson failed to expedite her challenges and did not seek a stay of the primary election. The court emphasized the importance of resolving election disputes promptly to avoid unnecessary expenses and ensure the finality of election results. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits of Peterson's claims. View "Peterson v. Vie" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC leased land from Whitaker Farms, LLC for a peach orchard. After being locked out of the leased premises, Fitzgerald Farms sued Whitaker Farms for damages. A jury awarded compensatory damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed the trial court’s ruling that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages. On remand, a second jury awarded punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that statements made during a settlement negotiation by Whitaker Farms’s Chief Operating Officer to Fitzgerald Farms’s owner were properly admitted under OCGA § 24-4-408.The trial court initially ruled that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. On remand, the trial court conducted a second jury trial focused on punitive damages, where the jury awarded $500,000 in punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. Whitaker Farms appealed again, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting statements made during a settlement negotiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the statements were admissible to show Whitaker’s intent and state of mind.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals’s judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the statements made during the settlement negotiation were inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-408. The Court concluded that the statements were offered to prove Whitaker Farms’s liability for punitive damages, which is not permissible under the statute. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the admission of the statements was harmful and if a new trial on punitive damages is required. View "Whitaker Farms, LLC v. Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

An attorney, Brian Steel, was found in contempt of court for refusing to disclose how he learned about an ex parte hearing involving a witness, the witness's counsel, and prosecutors in a case where Steel represented a defendant. The trial judge, Judge Glanville, repeatedly asked Steel to reveal his source, but Steel claimed the information was protected by attorney-client privilege and attorney work product. Judge Glanville held Steel in contempt and ordered him into custody, although Steel was later allowed to return to the courtroom.The Fulton County Superior Court initially found Steel in contempt and ordered him to be taken into custody. Steel argued that the information was privileged and that due process required Judge Glanville to recuse himself from the contempt proceedings. Despite these arguments, Judge Glanville sentenced Steel to 20 days in jail to be served on weekends and denied him a supersedeas bond.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that due process required Judge Glanville to recuse himself from the contempt proceedings. The court held that because the punishment was delayed and the alleged disobedience was directed toward the judge, a different judge should have presided over the contempt hearing. The court reversed the judgment of contempt imposed by the trial court. View "STEEL v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, who operate restaurants under franchise agreements, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition based on advice from their legal counsel. This led to the franchisor terminating the franchise agreements. The plaintiffs then sued their lawyers and law firms for legal malpractice and breach of written contracts for legal services, alleging that the lawyers' advice constituted malpractice. The defendants moved to dismiss both claims, arguing they were barred by a four-year statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-25.The trial court dismissed the legal-malpractice claims but denied the motion to dismiss the breach-of-contract claims. Later, it granted summary judgment for a subset of defendants, ruling that the breach-of-contract claims were also barred by the four-year statute of limitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the legal-malpractice claims and concluded that the breach-of-contract claims were duplicative and should be dismissed as well.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine which statute of limitation applies to breach-of-contract-for-legal-services claims and whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing these claims as duplicative. The Supreme Court concluded that such claims could be governed by either a six-year statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-24 or a four-year statute under OCGA § 9-3-25, depending on whether the breach arose directly from a written contract. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the breach-of-contract claims as duplicative without applying the proper motion-to-dismiss standard.The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, emphasizing that plaintiffs can pursue alternative theories of relief based on the same conduct. View "TITSHAW v. GEER" on Justia Law

Markisha Lattimore obtained a judgment exceeding $20 million against Kim Brothers Kickin’ Kids, LLC. Instead of collecting directly from Kickin’ Kids, Lattimore initiated garnishment actions against twelve financial services companies, including RBC Global Asset Management (U.S.), Inc. (Global), using a garnishment summons form for financial institutions. Global, a registered investment advisor, did not respond to the summons, leading Lattimore to move for a garnishment default judgment for the full amount. Global claimed it did not receive the motion and did not respond. The State Court of Fulton County entered a default judgment against Global.The State Court of Fulton County denied Global’s motion to set aside the default judgment. The court ruled that Global was a financial institution, that Lattimore used the correct summons form, and that Global waived any defect in the form used. Global argued that it was not a financial institution as defined by the statute and that the incorrect summons form invalidated the garnishment action, thus failing to establish personal jurisdiction. The court also ruled that Global could not challenge the constitutionality of the default judgment in its motion to set aside.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Global, as a registered investment advisor, did not meet the statutory definition of a financial institution. Therefore, Lattimore used the wrong summons form, rendering the garnishment invalid and failing to obtain personal jurisdiction over Global. The court concluded that the State Court of Fulton County abused its discretion in denying Global’s motion to set aside the default judgment. The judgment was reversed. View "RBC GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT (U.S.) INC. v. LATTIMORE" on Justia Law

In this case, Georgia voters challenged the qualifications of presidential electors certified by two independent candidates for President, Dr. Cornel West and Claudia De la Cruz. The challengers argued that these electors were required to file nomination petitions signed by a number of qualified Georgia voters to have their candidates placed on the ballot. Since none of the electors filed such petitions, the challengers contended that the independent candidates should not appear on the ballot for the November 2024 General Election.The Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially agreed with the challengers, concluding that the electors had not met the qualification requirements under Georgia’s Election Code. However, the Secretary of State overruled the ALJ’s decisions, determining that the electors had qualified under Georgia law. Subsequently, two different superior court judges reversed the Secretary’s decisions, agreeing with the ALJ that the electors had not filed the necessary nomination petitions and thus had not qualified to place their candidates on the ballot.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that each presidential elector for an independent candidate is required to file a nomination petition in their own name under OCGA § 21-2-132 (e). The Court found that since no electors for West or De la Cruz had filed such petitions, they had not qualified as candidates for presidential elector. Consequently, the Court affirmed the superior courts' decisions, which concluded that neither West’s nor De la Cruz’s electors satisfied the statutory requirements for their candidates to appear on Georgia’s ballot for President.The Court also addressed procedural issues, including the dismissal of the Georgia Republican Party’s appeal due to lack of party status in the lower court and the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party. The Court affirmed the superior court’s orders regarding the remedies, including the posting of notices at polling places to inform voters of the disqualification of the candidates. View "Al-Bari v. Pigg" on Justia Law

The Catoosa County Republican Party (CCRP) and its executive officers attempted to prevent certain candidates from qualifying for the May 2024 Republican primary for county commission seats, citing a statute that mandates candidates follow their party's procedural rules. The CCRP's local rules required candidates to be pre-approved by the County Committee and present a notarized affidavit at the time of qualifying. On March 4, 2024, four candidates filed petitions against the CCRP Defendants, alleging they were denied the right to qualify despite meeting statutory requirements. They sought temporary restraining orders and injunctions to prevent the CCRP from blocking their qualifications.The trial court issued temporary restraining orders on March 5, 2024, and later denied the CCRP Defendants' motions to lift the orders and dismiss the petitions. The court ruled that the CCRP's rules were not enforceable and ordered that the candidates be allowed to qualify. The CCRP Defendants filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia, recognizing it had jurisdiction over election contests.The Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that parties seeking to challenge election results must act with urgency and exhaust all avenues to resolve disputes before the election. The CCRP Defendants failed to expedite their appeal and even requested delays. The court reiterated its long-standing precedent that it will not review challenges to candidate qualifications once the election has occurred, especially when the challenging party has not acted promptly. The court's decision underscores the importance of finality in election results and the need for challengers to litigate their claims with dispatch. View "CATOOSA COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY v. HENRY" on Justia Law