Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Markisha Lattimore obtained a judgment exceeding $20 million against Kim Brothers Kickin’ Kids, LLC. Instead of collecting directly from Kickin’ Kids, Lattimore initiated garnishment actions against twelve financial services companies, including RBC Global Asset Management (U.S.), Inc. (Global), using a garnishment summons form for financial institutions. Global, a registered investment advisor, did not respond to the summons, leading Lattimore to move for a garnishment default judgment for the full amount. Global claimed it did not receive the motion and did not respond. The State Court of Fulton County entered a default judgment against Global.The State Court of Fulton County denied Global’s motion to set aside the default judgment. The court ruled that Global was a financial institution, that Lattimore used the correct summons form, and that Global waived any defect in the form used. Global argued that it was not a financial institution as defined by the statute and that the incorrect summons form invalidated the garnishment action, thus failing to establish personal jurisdiction. The court also ruled that Global could not challenge the constitutionality of the default judgment in its motion to set aside.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Global, as a registered investment advisor, did not meet the statutory definition of a financial institution. Therefore, Lattimore used the wrong summons form, rendering the garnishment invalid and failing to obtain personal jurisdiction over Global. The court concluded that the State Court of Fulton County abused its discretion in denying Global’s motion to set aside the default judgment. The judgment was reversed. View "RBC GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT (U.S.) INC. v. LATTIMORE" on Justia Law

In this case, Georgia voters challenged the qualifications of presidential electors certified by two independent candidates for President, Dr. Cornel West and Claudia De la Cruz. The challengers argued that these electors were required to file nomination petitions signed by a number of qualified Georgia voters to have their candidates placed on the ballot. Since none of the electors filed such petitions, the challengers contended that the independent candidates should not appear on the ballot for the November 2024 General Election.The Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially agreed with the challengers, concluding that the electors had not met the qualification requirements under Georgia’s Election Code. However, the Secretary of State overruled the ALJ’s decisions, determining that the electors had qualified under Georgia law. Subsequently, two different superior court judges reversed the Secretary’s decisions, agreeing with the ALJ that the electors had not filed the necessary nomination petitions and thus had not qualified to place their candidates on the ballot.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that each presidential elector for an independent candidate is required to file a nomination petition in their own name under OCGA § 21-2-132 (e). The Court found that since no electors for West or De la Cruz had filed such petitions, they had not qualified as candidates for presidential elector. Consequently, the Court affirmed the superior courts' decisions, which concluded that neither West’s nor De la Cruz’s electors satisfied the statutory requirements for their candidates to appear on Georgia’s ballot for President.The Court also addressed procedural issues, including the dismissal of the Georgia Republican Party’s appeal due to lack of party status in the lower court and the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party. The Court affirmed the superior court’s orders regarding the remedies, including the posting of notices at polling places to inform voters of the disqualification of the candidates. View "Al-Bari v. Pigg" on Justia Law

The Catoosa County Republican Party (CCRP) and its executive officers attempted to prevent certain candidates from qualifying for the May 2024 Republican primary for county commission seats, citing a statute that mandates candidates follow their party's procedural rules. The CCRP's local rules required candidates to be pre-approved by the County Committee and present a notarized affidavit at the time of qualifying. On March 4, 2024, four candidates filed petitions against the CCRP Defendants, alleging they were denied the right to qualify despite meeting statutory requirements. They sought temporary restraining orders and injunctions to prevent the CCRP from blocking their qualifications.The trial court issued temporary restraining orders on March 5, 2024, and later denied the CCRP Defendants' motions to lift the orders and dismiss the petitions. The court ruled that the CCRP's rules were not enforceable and ordered that the candidates be allowed to qualify. The CCRP Defendants filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia, recognizing it had jurisdiction over election contests.The Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that parties seeking to challenge election results must act with urgency and exhaust all avenues to resolve disputes before the election. The CCRP Defendants failed to expedite their appeal and even requested delays. The court reiterated its long-standing precedent that it will not review challenges to candidate qualifications once the election has occurred, especially when the challenging party has not acted promptly. The court's decision underscores the importance of finality in election results and the need for challengers to litigate their claims with dispatch. View "CATOOSA COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY v. HENRY" on Justia Law

The case involves family members of drug abusers suing wholesale distributors of prescription medications. The plaintiffs alleged that the distributors violated state and federal laws by failing to report suspicious orders of controlled substances, which led to the drug abusers' addictions and subsequent harm to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought damages under the Georgia Drug Dealer Liability Act (DDLA) and other legal theories.The case was initially tried in a lower court, where a jury returned a verdict in favor of the distributors. The plaintiffs then moved for a new trial, arguing that a juror was dishonest during the selection process and introduced extraneous prejudicial information during deliberations. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, leading to the current appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. The plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new trial and in refusing to instruct the jury on willful blindness. The distributors cross-appealed, arguing that if the judgment was vacated, the DDLA should be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. The court held that the trial court was authorized to credit the juror's testimony over the plaintiffs' evidence and that the jury was properly instructed on the relevant legal issues. The cross-appeal was dismissed as moot. View "CARDINAL HEALTH INC. v. POPPELL" on Justia Law

A group of property owners sued Columbia County over stormwater drainage issues that caused damage to their property. The property, purchased in 1996, contained a metal pipe used in the County's stormwater system. Over the years, heavy rains caused the pipe to fail multiple times, leading to significant property damage. The property owners sent a notice to the County in October 2013, outlining their claims, but the County declined to make repairs. The property owners then filed a lawsuit in March 2014, seeking damages and an injunction to prevent further damage.The trial court found in favor of the property owners, ruling that the County maintained a nuisance that amounted to a taking without just compensation. The court awarded damages and issued a permanent injunction against the County. The County appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed some parts of the trial court's decision and vacated others. The Court of Appeals vacated the damages award for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice and reversed the award of attorneys' fees. However, it upheld the injunction against the County.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the injunction, ruling that it exceeded the bounds of the Georgia Constitution's limited waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court directed the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to consider a new injunction within the constitutional limits. The Supreme Court also concluded that it should not have granted certiorari on the issue of damages for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice, as the Court of Appeals' ruling was specific to the facts of this case and did not establish a general rule of law. The petition for certiorari on this issue was therefore denied. View "Satcher v. Columbia County" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a medical malpractice and hospital negligence claim filed by Jami Lynn Golden against Floyd Healthcare Management, Inc. Golden visited Floyd Emergency Care Center in July 2016, complaining of abdominal pain, fever, chills, and nausea. Despite a computer-generated sepsis alert, Golden was discharged with instructions to follow up in two to three days. Her condition worsened, and she was later admitted to Redmond Regional Medical Center Intensive Care Unit in septic shock. As a result, Golden suffered necrosis that required the amputation of parts of her fingers and toes.Floyd Healthcare Management moved to dismiss Golden's claim, arguing that the five-year medical malpractice statute of repose had expired. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the repose statute was tolled by the "Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency" issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the repose statute was not tolled by the emergency order.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the emergency order did indeed toll the repose statute, and that there was no impediment in the federal or Georgia Constitutions for the statute of repose to be tolled. The court concluded that Golden's claims were not time-barred, and that the application of the emergency order to toll the repose statute did not violate Floyd Healthcare Management's due process rights. View "GOLDEN v. FLOYD HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, INC." on Justia Law

In October 2022, Starship Enterprises of Atlanta, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Gwinnett County, challenging a 2015 county ordinance regulating "Adult Establishments." Starship, which owns two stores in Gwinnett County, had previously filed a similar lawsuit in 2017, which it voluntarily dismissed. The county, however, maintained its counterclaim, and the trial court granted the county a permanent injunction restraining Starship from "regularly making more than 100 sexual devices available for sale" at each of its locations. Starship appealed the decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction against Starship.In the second lawsuit, Starship invoked a constitutional amendment that waives sovereign immunity for certain lawsuits, including lawsuits against a county for declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed Starship’s lawsuit, holding that it was barred by sovereign immunity and by res judicata. Starship appealed to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the novel constitutional question involved.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that although the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity applied to Starship’s lawsuit, the suit was barred by res judicata. The court found that Starship's lawsuit sought relief from the county's prospective acts of enforcement, which will occur after January 1, 2021, and therefore the county’s sovereign immunity was waived under the constitutional amendment. However, the court also found that the lawsuit was barred by res judicata because the constitutional matters Starship now sought to raise could have been raised in the previous lawsuit. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the lawsuit. View "STARSHIP ENTERPRISES OF ATLANTA, INC. v. GWINNETT COUNTY" on Justia Law

In 2020, Albert Omstead contracted BPG Inspection, LLC to inspect a property he and his wife, Jessique Omstead, intended to purchase. The contract included a one-year limitation clause preventing Mr. Omstead from suing BPG Inspection or its employees more than one year after the inspection. After the inspection, the Omsteads purchased the property. Over a year later, Mr. Omstead died when a retaining wall on the property collapsed. Mrs. Omstead filed a wrongful death suit against BPG Inspection and one of its inspectors.The trial court found the one-year limitation unenforceable, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted review to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in approving the one-year limitation and whether the limitation is void as against public policy.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court found that the one-year limitation was enforceable and not void as against public policy. The court rejected Mrs. Omstead's arguments that the limitation only applied to contract claims and not claims involving bodily injury or wrongful death, that the limitation functioned as a “contractually-effectuated statute of repose,” and that the limitation impermissibly voided “professional standards of conduct.” The court concluded that the one-year limitation did not violate OCGA § 13-8-2 (b) and was not void as against public policy. View "OMSTEAD v. BPG INSPECTION, LLC" on Justia Law

David and Catherine Floam, residents of Cobb County, Georgia, sought a declaratory judgment against the Cobb County Commission, arguing that the Commission had unconstitutionally altered district boundaries that had been established by the General Assembly in 2022. The Floams argued that the Commission's amendment, which changed their voting district, exceeded the County's Home Rule powers under the Georgia Constitution. The trial court ruled in favor of the Floams, finding that the Commission's amendment did indeed exceed its Home Rule powers.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court found that while the Floams had constitutional standing to challenge the Commission's amendment, they did not demonstrate any uncertainty regarding their future conduct that warranted declaratory relief. The court concluded that the Floams' claim was an attempt to enforce accrued rights and guide the future conduct of the defendants, which is insufficient to state a claim for declaratory relief. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, without reaching the merits of the constitutional arguments. View "COBB COUNTY v. FLOAM" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled on an appeal by Allison Crary, who challenged three orders from a revocation proceeding. The orders were: denial of a motion to declare a grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional, denial of a motion for a contempt citation against Khristel and Frank Clautice, and denial of a motion for attorney fees and expenses.The case involved a minor child, with Crary having sole legal and physical custody. The Clautices, the child's maternal grandparents, had been granted visitation rights under a consent order. Crary later petitioned to revoke this order and for a contempt citation against the grandparents for non-compliance. She also sought to declare the grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional and asked for attorney fees and expenses.The Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the appeal regarding the constitutionality of the grandparent visitation statute as moot, since the trial court had already revoked the grandparent visitation order on other grounds. The court also affirmed the trial court’s orders denying Crary’s contempt motion and motion for attorney fees and expenses. The court noted that Crary had not provided evidence at the hearing to support a contempt finding, and that the trial court was not required to hold a hearing or take evidence before denying the motion for attorney fees and expenses. View "CRARY v. CLAUTICE" on Justia Law