Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brian Wedereit sued BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. ("BAC") for (among other things) breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure. BAC moved for summary judgment, and the trial court denied BAC's motion on Wedereit's claims for wrongful foreclosure, equitable relief, punitive damages and attorney fees. The trial court granted sua sponte partial summary judgment to Wedereit on his breach of contract claim because BAC allegedly failed to give proper pre-acceleration notice as required under Paragraph 22 of the Security Deed. BAC appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's sua sponte grant of partial summary judgment to Wedereit. The Supreme Court granted BAC's petition for certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held in its Division 1 that the issues resolved by the award to Wedereit of partial summary judgment were the same as those raised by BAC's motion for summary judgment, such that an award of partial summary judgment sua sponte to a nonmovant was permissible. The Supreme Court concluded that because the record did not support the conclusion that Wedereit carried his burden of proving that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on his breach of contract claim, the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment sua sponte to Wedereit. View "BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Wedereit" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the dismissal of Cecily Considine’s lawsuit against the receivers appointed in her separate lawsuit against her former business partner, Michael Affatato, on the ground that the receivers had official immunity. She alleged conversion, unjust enrichment, fraud and other claims over a dispute over the right to control the assets of "Model Master," a company Considine and Affatato created. The trial court appointed a receiver to preserve the company's property during the pendency of the litigation. Considine and Affatato executed a letter agreement with certified public accountant George Murphy and his firm, Murphy & McInvale, PC (M&M) as the court-appointed receiver. While the lawsuit against Affatato was pending, Considine filed suit against Murphy and M&M, alleging gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty based on their alleged mismanagement of the receivership. The receivers moved to dismiss, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction based on their official immunity as Considine's failure to obtain leave of the court in the Affatato matter prior to filing a lawsuit against Murphy and M&M. The trial court held a hearing, but Considine voluntarily dismissed her suit against the receivers before the trial court issued an order. Again without seeking prior approval, Considine filed the underlying suit to this appeal against the receivers, raising several claims including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, gross negligence, and willful and wanton misconduct. The receivers again moved to dismiss. The trial court granted the receivers' motion and dismissed Considine's suit. The Court of Appeals reversed on grounds that the trial court ruled on the motion to dismiss less than 30 days after it was filed, depriving Considine proper notice or opportunity to be heard. Furthermore, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal based on official immunity. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that this lawsuit against the receivers should instead have been dismissed on the ground that Considine failed to obtain leave from the trial court in her lawsuit against Affatato before filing a separate lawsuit against the receivers appointed in that case. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment on this ground, and therefore vacate the court’s discussion of immunity. View "Considine v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on recovery under an uninsured motorist (UM) insurance policy. Specifically, the issue was whether the burden of proof on summary judgment between the insured and the UM carrier was misallocated. The UM carrier denied coverage based on a claim that the at-fault driver was not "uninsured" as defined in the UM policy at issue here because the drive's liability carrier had not "legally denied" coverage. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in placing the burden of proof on the UM carrier in this instance, and therefore reversed. View "Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co. v. Castellanos" on Justia Law

In January 1992, Diversified Capital Management, Inc. leased premises designated as a grocery store to James Bostick. In August 1992, Diversified assigned its rights as lessor to Ingram Timber Enterprises, L.P. In October 2000, Bostick, with the approval of Ingram, subleased the property to CMM Properties, Inc. (“CMM”). The sublease was subject to all the terms of the original lease, referred to by the parties as the “master lease.” In June 2005, Ingram filed suit in superior court against CMM and three individual guarantors of the sublease (collectively “the CMM parties”), but not Bostick. Ingram claimed default under the terms of the master lease and sublease, and sought liquidated damages under the master lease. The trial court granted summary judgment to the CMM parties, finding that the purported liquidated damages constituted a void and unenforceable penalty. Ingram never appealed that final judgment. In January 2010, Ingram filed a complaint for rent and breach of contract against Bostick, seeking the same liquidated damages sought in the first suit. Then in November 2010, Bostick filed a third-party complaint against the CMM parties, claiming that if he was liable to Ingram, then the CMM parties were liable to him. The CMM parties moved for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, res judicata, based on the judgment in the first lawsuit. Before the trial court ruled on the summary judgment motion, Ingram and Bostick entered into a consent judgment, which provided that Ingram was entitled to judgment in excess of $1 million, but that Ingram would not attempt to collect such judgment. Instead, the consent judgment would be satisfied by Bostick pursuing the case against the CMM parties. The trial court granted the CMM parties' motion for summary judgment, finding that res judicata precluded the suit; that the remedy provisions of the master lease were void and unenforceable penalties; and that under the terms of the consent judgment between Ingram and Bostick there was no real threat of liability for Bostick, and thus, no secondary liability to be recovered by the third-party action. Bostick appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that he was not a party to the first lawsuit, therefore, it could not preclude him in the second. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and as to the issue of res judicata, finding that Bostick and the CMM parties were privies, and therefore, that Bostick was bound by the judgment in the first lawsuit. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the appellate court's analysis and conclusion were "fatally flawed" because they were premised "on a basic misconception of the doctrine of res judicata:" as a privy of the CMM parties, the doctrine could not be applied against Bostick because of the lack of an adversarial relationship in regard to the prior litigation. "Even if Bostick was not deemed to be such a privy of the CMM parties, res judicata is not properly asserted against him by the CMM parties so as to preclude Bostick's third-party complaint because Bostick was not involved in the initial suit brought by Ingram." The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Bostick v. CMM Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

The owner of Mamilove, LLC, and its officers, sisters Michele and Lorraine Reymond sought rescission of a franchise agreement and damages for claims related to their negotiations for, and ultimate purchase of, a daycare franchise. The named defendants were the franchisor, Legacy Academy, Inc., and its officers, Frank and Melissa Turner (collectively “Legacy”). Ten years after they signed the franchise agreement at the heart of this dispute, the Reymonds alleged Legacy fraudulently induced them to sign the agreement by providing false information about the historical earnings of existing Legacy Academy franchisees. They sought to rescind the franchise agreement and recover damages for claims based on alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). After a jury trial, the trial court denied Legacy's motion for a directed verdict as to all of the Reymonds' claims. The jury found in the Reymonds' favor, and awarded $750,000 in damages plus attorney fees. Legacy appealed, raising various challenges, including a challenge to the trial court's ruling on its motion for directed verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying Legacy's motion for a directed verdict as to fraud, negligent misrepresentation and a violation of the RICO statute. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals who affirmed the trial court with regard to these claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Legacy Academy, Inc. v. Mamilove, LLC" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in “Fisher v. Gala,” (754 SE2d 160 (2014)) to determine if that the appellate court properly held that, in a professional malpractice action, when a plaintiff files a complaint accompanied by an affidavit from a person not competent to testify as an expert in the action, OCGA 9-11-9.1 (e) permits the plaintiff to cure this defect by filing an amended complaint with the affidavit of a second, competent expert. Finding that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the pleading could be so amended, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. View "Gala v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Husband-appellee Rex Reynolds filed for divorce from appellant-Wife Dorothy Reynolds, alleging that she was a non-resident of Georgia, and that she could be served by publication. Husband subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and served Wife with this motion at her last known address in Barnesville. Thereafter, the court granted Husband’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered a final judgment and decree of divorce between the parties. Several months later, Wife, proceeding pro se, filed a verified motion to set aside the final judgment and decree of divorce, contending that Husband did not practice due diligence for service by publication; Husband knew at the time he filed his complaint that Wife resided within Georgia; and Husband committed a fraud upon the court by alleging that Wife was a non-resident. Husband, proceeding pro se, filed a response, in which he stated that Wife was located “mostly in Jones County,” and her non-resident status in his complaint and affidavit was a “typo.” He further questioned how Wife could be deemed a non-resident when her address was in Barnesville. Wife appeared pro se for a hearing on her motion to set aside and was instructed by the court to seek the assistance of counsel. Wife subsequently appeared with counsel for a hearing on her motion to set aside, but no hearing was held. Instead, the court issued an order denying Wife’s motion to set aside. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting Husband's judgment of divorce based on an insufficient affidavit of service. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Reynolds v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Appellants Holly and Polly Stubblefield, and appellees Loxley and William Stubblefield, are sisters and brothers. The sisters were residents of Florida; the brothers lived in Mississippi. Together, the siblings were officers, directors and shareholders of three closely held corporations, Scarlett & Associates, Inc., Parnell & Associates, Inc., and PJ & Associates, Inc. Scarlett was a Georgia corporation with its registered agent in Forsyth County. Parnell and PJ were Mississippi corporations with registered agents in Fulton County. In 2013, the brothers withdrew large sums of money from one of the corporations without board approval. The brothers notified the sisters of these withdrawals, asserting the sisters were entitled to receive equal amounts. However, the sisters took the position that the withdrawals were unlawful. The sisters notified the brothers that the three corporations would hold board meetings in Biloxi, Mississippi, and that the brothers were required to attend the meetings in person. The brothers did not appear at the meetings and the sisters voted to remove them from their positions as officers and directors of the three corporations. The brothers brought suit against the sisters and the corporations in Forsyth County. The primary question presented by this case was whether appellants were subject to personal jurisdiction in this state under the Georgia Long-Arm Statute. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that appellants were indeed subject to the Georgia statute, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Stubblefield v. Stubblefield" on Justia Law

In 2008, decedent Grady Williams Stevens was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer and was given approximately four weeks to live. He began a strenuous regimen of pain medications to provide him relief during his last weeks, and his daughter, Sherry Ray, began caring for him at her home. On September 17, 2008, the decedent signed a will naming Ray as executrix and sole beneficiary and signed two deeds conveying certain real property to the decedent's brother, Propounder Thomas Stevens and his sister. The decedent died in October. The attorney who had prepared the decedent's will and the two deeds subsequently filed the will with the probate court. Ray never submitted the will for probate because she believed it to be the result of Propounder's undue influence over her father, that her father lacked the requisite mental capacity to understand what he was signing, and that her father would have wanted his estate, including the property he conveyed by the two deeds he signed before his death, to pass equally to her and her only sibling, Shane Stevens. Approximately nine months after the decedent died, Propounder submitted the will for probate and sought appointment as administrator of the estate. Ray and Shane Stevens filed caveats to the petition. Caveators claimed that Propounder Stevens exerted a predominant and undue influence on their father to induce him to sign the will and deeds and that their father lacked testamentary capacity at the time he signed the will because he was heavily medicated and possessed insufficient mental capacity. The probate court issued an order denying Propounder's petition to probate, finding that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity. Propounder appealed to the superior court, which denied Caveators' motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of fact remained. Caveators then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Propounder lacked standing to probate the will, which the court denied. After a bench trial, the court issued an order finding that the will was valid, the decedent did not lack testamentary capacity, and Propounder did not exert an undue influence over the decedent. After the court denied their motion for new trial, Caveators appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that the court erred by denying their motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The Supreme Court found the Propounder did not have standing to offer the will for probate because he was not an "interested person" as required by OCGA 53-5-2. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Ray v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Following an injury in October 1999, Employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Shortly thereafter, Employer began paying the first of 32 payments of temporary total disability benefits. Twelve of the payments were untimely under the terms of the workers’ compensation statute. Employee returned to work in June 2002 and his benefits were suspended at that time. Nearly eight years later, employee demanded payment of the statutory penalties due on the 12 late payments. Employer refused the demand, asserting it was time barred. Employee sought a hearing and an order requiring employer to pay the penalties. The administrative law judge determined employee’s claim was a “change in condition” claim under OCGA 34-9-104, and, therefore, barred under the two-year limitation period set forth in OCGA 34-9-104 (b). The Appellate Division of the State Board and the superior court agreed. The Court of Appeals granted employee’s application for discretionary review and reversed the judgment of the superior court, finding employee’s claim for statutory penalties was not governed by any limitation period and, therefore, was not time barred. The question presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the proper statute of limitations for a claim of statutory penalties for late benefits payments in workers’ compensation cases under OCGA 34-9-221 was the general statute of limitations, OCGA 34-9-82, rather than the change in condition statute of limitations, OCGA 34-9-104 (b). The Court answered that question in the affirmative. View "Marta v. Reid" on Justia Law