Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The owner of Mamilove, LLC, and its officers, sisters Michele and Lorraine Reymond sought rescission of a franchise agreement and damages for claims related to their negotiations for, and ultimate purchase of, a daycare franchise. The named defendants were the franchisor, Legacy Academy, Inc., and its officers, Frank and Melissa Turner (collectively “Legacy”). Ten years after they signed the franchise agreement at the heart of this dispute, the Reymonds alleged Legacy fraudulently induced them to sign the agreement by providing false information about the historical earnings of existing Legacy Academy franchisees. They sought to rescind the franchise agreement and recover damages for claims based on alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). After a jury trial, the trial court denied Legacy's motion for a directed verdict as to all of the Reymonds' claims. The jury found in the Reymonds' favor, and awarded $750,000 in damages plus attorney fees. Legacy appealed, raising various challenges, including a challenge to the trial court's ruling on its motion for directed verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying Legacy's motion for a directed verdict as to fraud, negligent misrepresentation and a violation of the RICO statute. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals who affirmed the trial court with regard to these claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Legacy Academy, Inc. v. Mamilove, LLC" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in “Fisher v. Gala,” (754 SE2d 160 (2014)) to determine if that the appellate court properly held that, in a professional malpractice action, when a plaintiff files a complaint accompanied by an affidavit from a person not competent to testify as an expert in the action, OCGA 9-11-9.1 (e) permits the plaintiff to cure this defect by filing an amended complaint with the affidavit of a second, competent expert. Finding that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the pleading could be so amended, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. View "Gala v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Husband-appellee Rex Reynolds filed for divorce from appellant-Wife Dorothy Reynolds, alleging that she was a non-resident of Georgia, and that she could be served by publication. Husband subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and served Wife with this motion at her last known address in Barnesville. Thereafter, the court granted Husband’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered a final judgment and decree of divorce between the parties. Several months later, Wife, proceeding pro se, filed a verified motion to set aside the final judgment and decree of divorce, contending that Husband did not practice due diligence for service by publication; Husband knew at the time he filed his complaint that Wife resided within Georgia; and Husband committed a fraud upon the court by alleging that Wife was a non-resident. Husband, proceeding pro se, filed a response, in which he stated that Wife was located “mostly in Jones County,” and her non-resident status in his complaint and affidavit was a “typo.” He further questioned how Wife could be deemed a non-resident when her address was in Barnesville. Wife appeared pro se for a hearing on her motion to set aside and was instructed by the court to seek the assistance of counsel. Wife subsequently appeared with counsel for a hearing on her motion to set aside, but no hearing was held. Instead, the court issued an order denying Wife’s motion to set aside. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting Husband's judgment of divorce based on an insufficient affidavit of service. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Reynolds v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Appellants Holly and Polly Stubblefield, and appellees Loxley and William Stubblefield, are sisters and brothers. The sisters were residents of Florida; the brothers lived in Mississippi. Together, the siblings were officers, directors and shareholders of three closely held corporations, Scarlett & Associates, Inc., Parnell & Associates, Inc., and PJ & Associates, Inc. Scarlett was a Georgia corporation with its registered agent in Forsyth County. Parnell and PJ were Mississippi corporations with registered agents in Fulton County. In 2013, the brothers withdrew large sums of money from one of the corporations without board approval. The brothers notified the sisters of these withdrawals, asserting the sisters were entitled to receive equal amounts. However, the sisters took the position that the withdrawals were unlawful. The sisters notified the brothers that the three corporations would hold board meetings in Biloxi, Mississippi, and that the brothers were required to attend the meetings in person. The brothers did not appear at the meetings and the sisters voted to remove them from their positions as officers and directors of the three corporations. The brothers brought suit against the sisters and the corporations in Forsyth County. The primary question presented by this case was whether appellants were subject to personal jurisdiction in this state under the Georgia Long-Arm Statute. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that appellants were indeed subject to the Georgia statute, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Stubblefield v. Stubblefield" on Justia Law

In 2008, decedent Grady Williams Stevens was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer and was given approximately four weeks to live. He began a strenuous regimen of pain medications to provide him relief during his last weeks, and his daughter, Sherry Ray, began caring for him at her home. On September 17, 2008, the decedent signed a will naming Ray as executrix and sole beneficiary and signed two deeds conveying certain real property to the decedent's brother, Propounder Thomas Stevens and his sister. The decedent died in October. The attorney who had prepared the decedent's will and the two deeds subsequently filed the will with the probate court. Ray never submitted the will for probate because she believed it to be the result of Propounder's undue influence over her father, that her father lacked the requisite mental capacity to understand what he was signing, and that her father would have wanted his estate, including the property he conveyed by the two deeds he signed before his death, to pass equally to her and her only sibling, Shane Stevens. Approximately nine months after the decedent died, Propounder submitted the will for probate and sought appointment as administrator of the estate. Ray and Shane Stevens filed caveats to the petition. Caveators claimed that Propounder Stevens exerted a predominant and undue influence on their father to induce him to sign the will and deeds and that their father lacked testamentary capacity at the time he signed the will because he was heavily medicated and possessed insufficient mental capacity. The probate court issued an order denying Propounder's petition to probate, finding that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity. Propounder appealed to the superior court, which denied Caveators' motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of fact remained. Caveators then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Propounder lacked standing to probate the will, which the court denied. After a bench trial, the court issued an order finding that the will was valid, the decedent did not lack testamentary capacity, and Propounder did not exert an undue influence over the decedent. After the court denied their motion for new trial, Caveators appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that the court erred by denying their motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The Supreme Court found the Propounder did not have standing to offer the will for probate because he was not an "interested person" as required by OCGA 53-5-2. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Ray v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Following an injury in October 1999, Employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Shortly thereafter, Employer began paying the first of 32 payments of temporary total disability benefits. Twelve of the payments were untimely under the terms of the workers’ compensation statute. Employee returned to work in June 2002 and his benefits were suspended at that time. Nearly eight years later, employee demanded payment of the statutory penalties due on the 12 late payments. Employer refused the demand, asserting it was time barred. Employee sought a hearing and an order requiring employer to pay the penalties. The administrative law judge determined employee’s claim was a “change in condition” claim under OCGA 34-9-104, and, therefore, barred under the two-year limitation period set forth in OCGA 34-9-104 (b). The Appellate Division of the State Board and the superior court agreed. The Court of Appeals granted employee’s application for discretionary review and reversed the judgment of the superior court, finding employee’s claim for statutory penalties was not governed by any limitation period and, therefore, was not time barred. The question presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the proper statute of limitations for a claim of statutory penalties for late benefits payments in workers’ compensation cases under OCGA 34-9-221 was the general statute of limitations, OCGA 34-9-82, rather than the change in condition statute of limitations, OCGA 34-9-104 (b). The Court answered that question in the affirmative. View "Marta v. Reid" on Justia Law

n November 2005, Appellant Richard Mitchell obtained title to property located in Alpharetta and executed a security deed in favor of MERS, who subsequently assigned the security deed to Wells Fargo as trustee. The property was foreclosed upon after Appellants Richard (and his wife Deborah) became delinquent on their mortgage payments. Wells Fargo purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Since that time, Appellants admitted that they made numerous "dilatory filings," proceeding pro se, in state, federal, and bankruptcy courts. In May 2010, Mitchell filed a complaint against Wells Fargo; Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the complaint and moved for a bill of peace pursuant to OCGA 23-3-110 against Mitchell as a measure to end Mitchell's "meritless filings" in state court. The trial court issued an order granting Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because Mitchell had not properly served Wells Fargo. The court also granted Wells Fargo's motion for a bill of peace, finding that the records of Fulton County courts reflected "nothing less than repeated and contemptuous behavior in the courts of this State" and that the lengthy history of filings in federal court showed a pattern of behavior by Mitchell consistent with his state filings. The court permanently enjoined Mitchell from filing any pleading or complaint related to the foreclosure and eviction from the property at issue for a period of five years unless Mitchell first received written approval from the court. Mitchell moved to set aside the order granting the bill of peace, which the court denied. The Mitchells appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit against Wells Fargo. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law