Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Alfred Moore was convicted in 2016 of first-degree burglary and other crimes, resulting in a total sentence of 45 years. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. Moore then filed a habeas corpus petition, later amended, arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the first-degree burglary count in the indictment. Moore contended that the indictment did not allege an essential element of first-degree burglary, specifically that he entered a "dwelling house" or a building "designed for use as [a] dwelling."The habeas court denied Moore's petition, concluding that the indictment was sufficient because it referenced the first-degree burglary statute. Moore appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, which granted his application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal, focusing on whether the habeas court erred in its ruling.The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the indictment failed to allege all essential elements of first-degree burglary, as it only mentioned that Moore entered a "business." The court determined that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a special demurrer to challenge the indictment. This failure was not a reasonable trial strategy, and it was reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the indictment had been challenged. The court also found that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue on appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the habeas court's denial of relief regarding Moore's first-degree burglary conviction and remanded the case with directions to vacate that conviction and grant appropriate relief. View "MOORE v. WHITE" on Justia Law

David Dajuanta Wallace was convicted of felony murder and a firearm offense related to the shooting death of Darius Bottoms. Wallace argued that the evidence was insufficient, that his due process rights were violated by being required to wear a leg iron and prison clothing during the trial, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.A Fulton County grand jury indicted Wallace and two co-defendants for various crimes, including felony murder and gang activity. Wallace pled guilty to some charges and went to trial on others. The jury found him guilty of felony murder and a firearm offense. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder and an additional five years for the firearm charge. Wallace's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the evidence was sufficient to support Wallace's convictions. The court held that the testimony of an accomplice was corroborated by other evidence, satisfying Georgia statutory law. Constitutionally, the evidence allowed the jury to find Wallace guilty as a party to the crimes rather than merely an accessory after the fact. The court also determined that any error related to Wallace wearing a leg iron was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given that the jury could not see the leg iron, Wallace used it strategically, and the strong evidence of his guilt.Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the court concluded that Wallace failed to show either deficiency or prejudice. The court affirmed Wallace's convictions and the trial court's rulings. View "WALLACE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Two former police officers, John Powell and Brian Scott, were indicted for violating their oaths of office under OCGA § 16-10-1. The indictment alleged that they failed to uphold the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by Brady v. Maryland by not conducting investigations into allegations of police misconduct. The officers filed a general demurrer, arguing that the indictment failed to adequately charge them with any offense against the laws of Georgia, and that the oath-of-office statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the case. The trial court denied the demurrer, concluding that the allegations would constitute conduct violative of the oaths of office taken by the officers.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the trial court's ruling on the general demurrer de novo. The court agreed with the officers that the trial court's ruling regarding the sufficiency of the indictment was erroneous, and their general demurrers should have been granted. The court found that the indictment alleged that the officers committed the crimes in a specific way that was legally impossible. The court concluded that the indictment against the officers could not withstand a general demurrer and reversed the trial court's denial of the general demurrers to the indictment. The court did not reach the officers' constitutional challenge or the speedy-trial issue also before them on appeal. View "POWELL v. STATE" on Justia Law

In 2003, Terry Harper and Emmanuel Ruiz were convicted by a jury of murder and related charges connected to the shooting deaths of Joe Luhrman, David Carty, and Tracy Glover in 2001. Harper appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to due process was violated due to the almost 20-year delay between his conviction and his direct appeal, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial after the State referenced a response he gave to police questioning that he contends was previously excluded and prejudicial, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorneys failed to obtain and introduce evidence that he was suffering a severe injury to his dominant hand at the time of the shootings.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision. The court applied the four-part balancing test from Barker v. Wingo to Harper's claim of a due process violation due to the delayed appeal. Although the court found that the delay was lengthy and Harper consistently asserted his right to appeal, it ultimately held that Harper failed to show actual prejudice from the delay. Regarding the mistrial motion, the court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as the jury was given prompt curative instructions, and the prosecutor acted in good faith. Lastly, the court denied Harper's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as he failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different if his medical records were introduced into evidence. View "HARPER v. STATE" on Justia Law

The lawsuit giving rise to this appeal challenged the Living Infants Fairness and Equality Act (“LIFE Act”), which regulated abortion procedures in Georgia. Although Appellees claimed at trial that the LIFE Act violated the due-process, equal-protection, and inherent-rights provisions of the Georgia Constitution, those claims were not ruled on below and were not part of this appeal because the trial court concluded that Appellees were entitled to relief on a different ground. Specifically, the trial court concluded that certain provisions of the LIFE Act were void ab initio because, when the LIFE Act was enacted in 2019, those provisions violated the United States Constitution as interpreted by then-controlling-but-since-overruled decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Here, the issue presented for the Georgia Supreme Court came from that ruling, and the Court concluded the trial court erred. "The holdings of United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the United States Constitution that have since been overruled cannot establish that a law was unconstitutional when enacted and therefore cannot render a law void ab initio." The judgment was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court to consider in the first instance Appellees’ other challenges to the LIFE Act. View "Georgia v. Sistersong Women of Color Reproductive Justice, et al." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed a superior court order granting a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Sheriff of Tift County, Gene Scarbrough, in this action brought by Sherrie McBrayer for the wrongful death of her husband, James McBrayer (“the decedent”). The Court of Appeals held that Scarbrough was immune from suit because McBrayer’s complaint did not show that the decedent’s death, which occurred while he was restrained in the back seat of a patrol car, arose from the sheriff’s deputies’ “use” of the patrol car “as a vehicle,” which, under Court of Appeals case law construing OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2, was a prerequisite for a waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries arising from the “negligent use of a covered motor vehicle.” In so holding, the Court of Appeals noted that McBrayer’s complaint did not allege “that the car was running; that any deputy was seated in the car; that any deputy was poised to start the car or transport the decedent to any location;” or that the deputies were otherwise “actively” using the patrol car “as a vehicle. McBrayer thereafter timely petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for certiorari review. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting the meaning of the word “use” in the phrase “use of a covered motor vehicle” by reading into OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2 the words “actively” and “as a vehicle.” Therefore, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McBrayer, et al. v. Scarbrough" on Justia Law

This appeal presented only a discrete and important threshold question to the underlying case: whether the Georgia Constitution required a plaintiff to establish some cognizable injury to bring a lawsuit in Georgia courts, i.e., to have standing to sue, separate and apart from the statutory authorization to bring suit. The Georgia Supreme Court found T. Davis Humphries, as a private citizen, had standing to assert a claim for injunctive relief against her local county government for its planned removal of a Confederate monument in alleged violation of OCGA § 50-3-1. But the other plaintiffs — the various Sons of Confederate Veterans entities — did not show that they were members of the communities the governments of which they sought to sue, and they alleged no other cognizable injury sufficient to establish their standing. The Court of Appeals was therefore wrong to affirm the dismissal of Humphries’s complaint for a lack of standing as to her claim for injunctive relief, but it was right to affirm the dismissal of the complaints filed by the various Sons of Confederate Veterans groups. The Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether Humphries had standing for her claim for damages under OCGA § 50-3-1, because the cause of action that statute purported to create had not yet arisen; by the statute’s terms, the cause of action arose only upon the occurrence of conduct prohibited by the statute, and that conduct had not yet occurred. View "Sons of Confederate Veterans, et al. v. Henry Cty. Bd of Commissioners" on Justia Law

On March 25, 2021, Georgia Governor Kemp signed into law Senate Bill 9 (“SB 9”), which created from the former Augusta Judicial Circuit two new judicial circuits: the Columbia Judicial Circuit, and the Augusta Judicial Circuit. The judicial circuit split, which was slated to become effective on July 1, 2021, was briefly stayed by three lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of SB 9. The lawsuits were filed in the Superior Court of Richmond County, one by Columbia County citizen Willie Saunders and two by the nonprofit, voting advocacy organization, Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. (“BVMF”). At the heart of each of these suits was a claim that Columbia County officials sought to form their own judicial circuit as a racially discriminatory reaction to the election of District Attorney Jared Williams in November 2020. These appeals and cross-appeals arose from the trial court’s July 13, 2021 final judgment addressing the merits of the appellants’ challenges to SB 9 in each of the three suits. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court rejected the appellants’ challenges to SB 9, declaring it “valid and enforceable” and allowing the circuit split to proceed. However, The Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment as to BVMF and remanded those cases to the trial court with instruction that they be dismissed because BVMF lacked standing to pursue its actions. As to Saunders, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of his appeal because Saunders failed to challenge the trial court’s dispositive ruling dismissing the defendants he sued. Thus, the Supreme Court also vacated the judgment as to Saunders’ complaint and directed the trial court to dismiss his action upon remand. View "Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. v. Kemp" on Justia Law

Georgia law generally required a person to apply for and receive a valid weapons carry license from a probate judge before carrying a handgun or other weapon in public. The General Assembly identified specific categories of people to whom “[n]o weapons carry license shall be issued,” including people with certain criminal convictions. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a probate judge could deny an application for a weapons carry license under OCGA 16-11-129 based on a determination that the applicant’s criminal history records report failed to show the outcome of an arrest that could have resulted in a disqualifying conviction. Applying the plain language of the statute, the Court concluded that a probate judge had no such authority. It therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision to the contrary. View "Bell v. Hargrove" on Justia Law

In 2016, Priscilla Savoy, individually and as executor of her mother’s estate, filed suit against her sisters Eleanor Bowen and Margaret Innocenti (collectively “defendants”) contending that they colluded to appropriate funds from their mother’s estate for their own use. The defendants were served with the summons and complaint on June 20 and 22, 2016. On July 20, 2016, the defendants filed in the trial court a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, which was supported by a sworn affidavit executed by Bowen denying the factual allegations raised in the complaint. When the defendants did not answer the complaint within 30 days of service, as required by OCGA § 9-11-12 (a), the case “automatically [became] in default,” OCGA 9-11-55 (a). The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to address the following question: To show a proper case for opening default under OCGA 9-11-55 (b), must the defendant provide a reasonable explanation for the failure to file a timely answer? The Court answered that question in the negative and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals which held to the contrary. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bowen v. Savoy" on Justia Law