Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pin Ups, an adult entertainment business, brought this appeal from an order of the trial court denying its petition for an interlocutory injunction against the Board's "Hours of sale and operation" ordinances. As Pin Ups alleged a violation of free speech rights under the Georgia Constitution, the trial court erred in applying the rational basis test. Such laws could be upheld only "if it furthers an important government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and if the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Therefore, the court held that, inasmuch as the trial court made its ruling based upon an incorrect legal standard, the court must reserve its decision and the court remanded the case to that court for it to evaluate Pin Ups's request for injunctive relief using the correct legal standard. View "Great American Dream, Inc., d/b/a Pin Ups Nightclub v. DeKalb County, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants were indicted by a grand jury on charges of, inter alia, offering to assist and assisting in the commission of suicide in violation of OCGA 16-5-5(b). At issue was whether OCGA 16-5-5(b) was constitutional under the free speech clauses of the federal and state constitutions. OCGA 16-5-5(b) provided that any person "who publicly advertises, offers, or holds himself or herself out as offering that he or she will intentionally and actively assist another person in the commission of suicide and commits an overt act to further that purpose is guilty of a felony." The court held that the State has failed to provide any explanation or evidence as to why a public advertisement or offer to assist in an otherwise legal activity was sufficiently problematic to justify an intrusion on protected speech rights. Absent a more particularized State interest and more narrowly tailored statute, the court held that the State could not, consistent with the United States and Georgia Constitutions, make the public advertisement or offer to assist in a suicide a criminal offense. The court also concluded that OCGA 16-5-5(b) restricted speech in violation of the free speech clauses of both the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Accordingly, the order of the trial court holding otherwise was reversed.

Appellant challenged his conviction for violating a county ordinance regulating the volume of noise from "mechanical sound-making devices." Appellant contended that the provision was facially invalid under the free speech clause of the Georgia Constitution. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. V. The court held that the county drew the challenged provision of its ordinance deliberately and in response to specific concerns, and the county had offered good reasons for rejecting appellant's proposed alternatives. The court also held that the provision advanced a substantial government interest in the least restrictive way. Furthermore, the provision was content neutral and left open ample alternatives for communication. Therefore, the ordinance was a reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner speech regulation and appellant's facial challenge to it was without merit.

In November 2003, defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity of several crimes, including aggravated assault, and subsequently involuntarily committed to the Northwest Georgia Regional Hospital (hospital). In August 2009, the hospital petitioned the committing court for defendant's unconditional release, alleging that he no longer met "the civil commitment criteria under Chapter 3 of Title 37," OCGA 17-7-131(f). The committing court denied the petition and the Superior Court denied defendant's petition for habeas corpus. At issue was whether the habeas court erred in denying defendant's release where defendant met the standard for involuntary inpatient treatment. The court held that the evidence in the record supported the habeas court's finding that defendant was not entitled to unconditional release where defendant's personality disorders and his schizo-affective disorder qualified as mental illnesses under OCGA 37-1-1(12); where defendant's paranoid and antisocial personality disorders made him an imminent threat of harm to others if he were released; and where defendant had recently committed a violent act toward another patient.