Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Thomas Stephens, a 20-year-old, sought to carry a handgun in public beyond the limited ways allowed under Georgia law. Georgia law permits individuals aged 18 to 21 to possess long guns and carry them in public, and to possess handguns in specific locations such as their home, car, or place of business. However, carrying a handgun in public generally requires the individual to be 21 or older unless they have received military weapons training. Stephens challenged the statute that restricts public carry of handguns to those over 21, arguing it violates the Georgia Constitution.Stephens initially filed the lawsuit along with Georgia Second Amendment, Inc., which later withdrew its appeal, leaving Stephens as the sole appellant. The trial court dismissed Stephens's complaint, upholding the statute. The court reasoned that the statute was a reasonable safety measure and did not constitute a complete prohibition on the right to bear arms, citing longstanding precedent that allows the General Assembly to regulate the manner of bearing arms.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the statutory scheme did not violate the Georgia Constitution. The court emphasized that state statutes are presumed constitutional and that Stephens failed to meet the heavy burden of proving otherwise. The court also noted that the consistent construction of the right to bear arms under Georgia law, which allows the General Assembly to regulate the manner of bearing arms, has been upheld for over a century. Stephens's argument to reconsider and overrule this precedent was not compelling, and his constitutional challenge to the statute failed. View "STEPHENS v. STATE OF GEORGIA" on Justia Law

Antonio Wallace, convicted of felony murder in 2011, sought original autopsy photographs for his pending habeas case. He requested these photographs under the Open Records Act, but the District Attorney refused. Wallace then filed a motion in the superior court where he was convicted, arguing that his request fit within exceptions for "medical purposes" or "public interest" under OCGA § 45-16-27 (d).The trial court found Wallace's arguments unconvincing and denied his motion. Wallace was convicted in Ware County, and his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia in 2020. In 2021, he filed a habeas corpus petition in Wheeler County. In 2024, he filed a motion for limited disclosure of original trial exhibits, specifically the autopsy photographs, to Dr. Jan Gorniak, citing the poor quality of the copies he had.The trial court held a hearing where Wallace's counsel argued that the photographs were necessary to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The victim's sister opposed the disclosure. The trial court denied the motion, and Wallace appealed, raising the same arguments.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the disclosure of autopsy photographs was not for "medical purposes" as Wallace's intent was legal, not medical. Additionally, the court found that the disclosure was not "in the public interest" as the victim's family opposed it, and Wallace's arguments did not outweigh their privacy concerns. Thus, the District Attorney was not required to disclose the photographs. View "WALLACE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant, Quillian Donta Nelson, was arrested on June 5, 2020, in connection with the shooting death of Darwin Davis. He filed a pre-indictment demand for a speedy trial on August 7, 2020. However, he was not indicted until August 23, 2021. His original defense attorney filed a motion for a continuance in March 2022, and later, a notice of leave for personal reasons. The defense counsel eventually withdrew, and substitute counsel appeared in February 2023. The new defense attorney also filed several notices of anticipated leaves of absence. Nelson filed a motion for an out-of-time statutory demand for a speedy trial in July 2023, which was denied. He then moved to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy-trial grounds in October 2023.The trial court denied Nelson's motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that the length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial but attributing the delay to the COVID-19 pandemic and defense counsel's requested continuances. The court weighed the assertion-of-the-right factor against Nelson, noting his late assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and found no evidence of prejudice to his defense.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the trial court made several errors. The trial court failed to properly consider the length-of-the-delay factor, made clearly erroneous findings regarding the reasons for the delay and the assertion of the right, and misapplied the law concerning the prejudice factor. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further consideration of Nelson's motion to dismiss the indictment on constitutional speedy-trial grounds. View "NELSON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

George Metz visited the Paulding County Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Facility to film its operations for his YouTube channel. After crossing the Facility’s guard line, Metz refused to leave despite orders from Facility guards and Paulding County Sheriff’s deputies. He was arrested and charged with loitering near inmates and obstructing an officer. Metz filed a general demurrer, arguing that OCGA § 42-5-17 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, violating his due process rights. The trial court denied his demurrer, and a jury found him guilty on both counts. Metz’s motion for a new trial was also denied.Metz appealed, contending that the trial court erred in rejecting his as-applied challenge to OCGA § 42-5-17 and his request for a jury instruction on First Amendment rights as a defense. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the statute provided fair warning and sufficient specificity to prevent arbitrary enforcement. The court found that the statute’s terms, such as “desist” and “stand around,” had commonly understood meanings and that Metz had fair warning that his conduct was prohibited. The court also concluded that the statute provided sufficient enforcement standards to prevent arbitrary application.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that OCGA § 42-5-17 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Metz. The court also upheld the trial court’s refusal to give Metz’s proposed jury instruction on First Amendment rights, noting that the instruction was not applicable to the facts of the case, as the Facility was a nonpublic forum. Thus, the court affirmed Metz’s convictions. View "METZ v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Barron Brantley was charged with multiple serious offenses, including malice murder and rape, in connection with the sexual assault and murder of Alexis Janaé Crawford. While awaiting trial, Brantley made several incriminating phone calls from jail, which were recorded and monitored by the Fulton County Sheriff’s Office. The District Attorney’s Office reviewed these calls and intended to use three of them at trial. Brantley filed a motion to exclude these calls, arguing that their use violated his constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection, and that the calls contained inadmissible evidence.The trial court granted Brantley’s motion, ruling that the District Attorney’s access to the recorded calls violated Brantley’s privacy rights under both the state and federal constitutions, and his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The State appealed this decision, citing OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4) as the basis for its appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The court held that Brantley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his recorded jail calls, as established by precedent, and thus, the District Attorney’s access to these calls did not violate his privacy rights. Additionally, the court found that Brantley, as an incarcerated individual, was not similarly situated to nonincarcerated individuals, and the State had a rational basis for treating him differently, thereby not violating his equal protection rights. The case was remanded for the trial court to consider other grounds for excluding portions of the calls if Brantley still asserted them. View "THE STATE v. BRANTLEY" on Justia Law

Petitioner Deandre Arnold, an indigent pro se litigant, attempted to file a civil complaint with an affidavit of indigence through the Fulton County Superior Court’s mandatory e-filing system. His complaint was rejected because it lacked an order authorizing him to file using a waiver payment account. The Clerk’s office informed him that he needed to obtain an order authorizing indigent status by presenting the complaint in person before a superior court judge. Arnold, unable to travel the 25 miles to the Clerk’s office, argued that the Clerk’s policy violated OCGA § 9-15-2 and his constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case after Arnold filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the Clerk. Arnold contended that he had no adequate remedy other than filing an original petition in the Supreme Court because he could not appear in person to present a writ of mandanus and affidavit of indigence, and the Clerk would not accept such a filing by mail.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that it lacked original jurisdiction to grant the relief Arnold sought, as its authority to issue writs of mandamus is limited to matters related to its appellate jurisdiction. The Court determined that the case did not fall within its appellate jurisdiction and transferred the petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution. The Court of Appeals has the authority to grant writs of mandamus in aid of its jurisdiction and will decide whether to require the Clerk to accept Arnold’s affidavit of indigence and civil complaint by mail. View "Arnold v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Christine Dias was arrested in Fulton County on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. She refused to submit to a blood test after being read the statutory Implied Consent notice. Dias moved to suppress evidence of her refusal and challenged the constitutionality of OCGA § 40-6-392 (d), which allows such refusal to be admissible in court. The trial court ruled in her favor, declaring the statute unconstitutional and the refusal evidence inadmissible.The State Court of Fulton County's decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the constitutional question involved. The trial court had relied on precedents from Olevik v. State and Williams v. State, which established that a warrant is required for a blood draw unless there are exigent circumstances or consent. The trial court found no such circumstances in Dias's case and ruled that her refusal to submit to the blood test could not be used against her at trial.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Elliott v. State, which only precludes the admission of breath test refusals under Paragraph XVI of the Georgia Constitution. The court noted that the novel constitutional question of whether blood test refusal evidence is inadmissible on other grounds was not directly addressed by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further consideration of any other basis for excluding the blood-test refusal evidence. View "THE STATE v. DIAS" on Justia Law

Evelyn-Natasha La Anyane was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol less safe and other traffic offenses. During a traffic stop, she was read the statutory implied-consent warning and consented to a blood test, which revealed a blood alcohol content above the legal limit. La Anyane argued that Georgia’s implied-consent statutory scheme is unconstitutional, claiming it coerces drivers into consenting to blood tests by falsely stating that refusal can be used against them at trial. She also contended that the trial court made evidentiary errors by not allowing her to cross-examine an expert with a study on field sobriety tests and by admitting evidence of her blood alcohol content.The trial court denied La Anyane’s motion to suppress the blood test results and admitted the evidence at trial. The jury found her guilty of all charges. La Anyane appealed, arguing that the implied-consent warning was unconstitutionally coercive and that the trial court made evidentiary errors.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that the implied-consent warning was not unconstitutionally coercive. The court found that the warning did not state that consent was mandatory and that the statement about refusal being used at trial was not false. The court also determined that La Anyane’s consent to the blood test was freely and voluntarily given, making the search valid under the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, her as-applied and facial challenges to the implied-consent statutory scheme failed.Regarding the evidentiary issues, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the study on field sobriety tests due to lack of proper foundation and in admitting evidence of La Anyane’s blood alcohol content, as it was relevant to the DUI less safe charge and not unfairly prejudicial. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "LA ANYANE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

James Christopher Jones was charged with murder after police identified her using cell phone location history obtained through search warrants. The warrants allowed police to get an anonymized list of devices near the victim’s home during the murder and identifying information for relevant devices. Jones moved to suppress this evidence, arguing the warrants violated the Fourth Amendment due to lack of probable cause and particularity. The trial court denied the motion, and Jones appealed.The trial court found the warrants were supported by probable cause and were sufficiently particular. The first warrant was based on evidence that the suspect used a cell phone near the victim’s home, and the second warrant, obtained after analyzing the anonymized data, identified a specific device linked to the suspect. The court concluded that the affidavits provided a fair probability that the location data and identifying information would yield evidence of the crime. The court also found the warrants were particular enough, specifying the crime, date, time, location, and a reasonable 100-meter radius.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the warrants were supported by probable cause, as the suspect was seen using a cell phone near the crime scene, and the location data was likely to help identify the suspect. The court also found the warrants met the particularity requirement, as they provided specific guidance on the information to be accessed and avoided unfettered discretion. The court rejected Jones’s arguments about overbreadth and lack of particularity, noting that the warrants were appropriately tailored to the investigation and did not authorize a general search. The judgment was affirmed. View "JONES v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Terry Griffin was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of her boyfriend, Wesley Hudson, in their shared apartment. Griffin was present at the scene and arrested immediately. During the trial, her counsel initially pursued a self-defense strategy but later shifted to arguing for a lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter after Griffin decided not to testify. The jury found Griffin guilty on all counts, including malice murder and felony murder.Griffin filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that her trial counsel violated her Sixth Amendment rights by abandoning her self-defense claim in favor of voluntary manslaughter without her consent, citing McCoy v. Louisiana. The trial court denied her motion, concluding that Griffin had not shown an "intransigent and unambiguous objection" to her counsel's strategy shift and that her counsel did not concede her guilt to the charges.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Griffin's claim under McCoy failed because she did not make a clear and persistent objection to her counsel's strategy, as required by McCoy. The court noted that Griffin's plea of "not guilty" and her counsel's initial self-defense argument did not amount to the type of "vociferous insistence" and "adamant objection" seen in McCoy. Therefore, the court concluded that Griffin's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated, and her conviction was upheld. View "GRIFFIN v. THE STATE" on Justia Law