Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Dontarious Burke was convicted of malice murder and armed robbery for the shooting death of Kentrell Jones. The incident occurred on November 27, 2019, and Burke was indicted on March 1, 2021. His trial was severed from his brother DeMarcus Burke's trial. Burke was tried by a jury from October 19 to 20, 2021, and found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder and an additional 20 years for armed robbery. Burke filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court on May 6, 2024. He then filed a timely notice of appeal.The trial court denied Burke's motion for a new trial, and he appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Burke raised several claims, including a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the cumulative effect of errors requiring a new trial. The trial court had admitted testimony from police officers about information obtained from non-testifying witnesses, which Burke argued violated his Confrontation Clause rights. However, because Burke did not raise this objection at trial, the Supreme Court reviewed it for plain error and found none.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Burke's claims and found that none of them warranted a reversal of his convictions. The court held that Burke's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated, as the testimony in question did not clearly and obviously violate established law. Additionally, the court found that Burke's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance, as the decisions made by counsel were within the bounds of reasonable trial strategy. Finally, the court determined that there was no cumulative error that would require a new trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Burke's convictions. View "BURKE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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In 2022, the Georgia General Assembly enacted House Bill 839 (HB 839), which incorporated the City of Mableton within unincorporated Cobb County and provided for the creation of one or more community improvement districts (CIDs) within Mableton. Deidre White and other residents of Cobb County challenged the constitutionality of HB 839, arguing that it violated the "Single Subject Rule" of the Georgia Constitution by creating more than one unit of government, specifically Mableton and the CIDs.The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that HB 839 did not violate the Single Subject Rule, as the creation of CIDs within Mableton was germane to the overall objective of incorporating the city. The Appellants then appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's dismissal. The court held that HB 839 did not violate the Single Subject Rule because the creation of CIDs within Mableton had a logical and natural connection to the incorporation of the city. The court also rejected the argument that the ballot question for HB 839 contravened the precedent set in Rea v. City of LaFayette, as the creation of CIDs was related to the single objective of establishing Mableton. Thus, the court concluded that HB 839 was constitutional and upheld the trial court's decision. View "WHITE v. CITY OF MABLETON" on Justia Law

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Tico Holloway was convicted of malice murder and related crimes in connection with the shooting death of Mercedes Dejesus Antunez-Flores and violent crimes against N.H. and M.H. The crimes occurred on August 17, 2019. Holloway was indicted on multiple counts, including malice murder, felony murder, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. A jury found Holloway guilty of all counts except armed robbery. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for malice murder, with additional concurrent sentences for other charges. Holloway's motion for a new trial was denied, and he appealed.The trial court, Cobb County, denied Holloway's motion for a new trial. Holloway argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his malice murder conviction and that the trial court made errors. He claimed the evidence did not disprove his self-defense argument beyond a reasonable doubt. Holloway also contended that the trial court erred by allowing the medical examiner to testify remotely via videoconference, which he argued violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Additionally, he claimed that errors in the Spanish-to-English interpretation of M.H.'s testimony violated his right to a fair trial.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support Holloway's malice murder conviction, as the jury was entitled to reject his self-defense claim. The court also found no plain error in allowing the medical examiner to testify remotely, noting that Holloway had consented to this procedure. Finally, the court concluded that Holloway waived his claim regarding the interpretation errors by agreeing to the procedure used during the trial. View "HOLLOWAY v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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Sherran Wasserman agreed to sell land in Franklin County to Anthony Pham, contingent on the approval of a conditional use permit by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. Pham applied for the permit to build and operate chicken houses, but the Board denied the application. Wasserman then sued the Board and the County, initially bringing multiple claims under state and federal law. She dismissed some claims, conceded others, and the trial court dismissed her remaining state-law claims due to sovereign immunity. This left two federal claims: one alleging the County violated Pham’s equal protection rights based on race, and another alleging a violation of Wasserman’s equal protection rights as a “class of one.”The trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, applying the federal doctrine of third-party standing, which allows a plaintiff to assert the rights of third parties. The court found genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on standing and the merits of Wasserman’s equal protection claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Wasserman lacked third-party standing and that her “class of one” claim failed as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether a plaintiff may rely on the federal doctrine of third-party standing to establish constitutional standing in Georgia courts. The court held that Georgia’s constitutional standing requirements, rooted in the common law and consistent precedent, do not allow a plaintiff to maintain an action by asserting only the rights of a nonparty. The court overruled its previous adoption of the federal doctrine of third-party standing, concluding that a plaintiff must assert her own legal rights to invoke the judicial power of Georgia courts. The judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WASSERMAN v. FRANKLIN COUNTY" on Justia Law

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Ammon Sumrall was convicted in October 1992 by a DeKalb County jury of felony murder, armed robbery, and other crimes related to the shooting death of Wade Barrett, Jr. on April 7, 1991. He was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences plus five additional years. Over 30 years later, Sumrall filed a pro se petition in the Superior Court of DeKalb County seeking retroactive first-offender treatment based on an amendment to OCGA § 42-8-66. He also filed a motion to declare the statute unconstitutional.The trial court initially dismissed Sumrall’s petition and motion, but later vacated this order and issued an amended order. The amended order dismissed the petition for failing to obtain the necessary consent from the prosecuting attorney and denied the motion to declare the statute unconstitutional, citing a lack of standing and insufficient supporting arguments.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The court held that Sumrall failed to meet the statutory requirement of obtaining the prosecuting attorney’s consent before filing his petition for retroactive first-offender treatment. The court also found no merit in Sumrall’s argument that the prosecuting attorney’s inaction constituted implied consent. Additionally, the court upheld the trial court’s denial of Sumrall’s motion to declare OCGA § 42-8-66 (a) (1) unconstitutional, concluding that Sumrall did not demonstrate a clear and palpable conflict with the Georgia or United States Constitutions. The court emphasized that the statute did not deprive Sumrall of his right to access the courts or to be heard. View "Sumrall v. State" on Justia Law

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Tabitha Wood was convicted of malice murder and other crimes after killing her fiancé, Leroy Kramer. Wood claimed self-defense, citing a history of Kramer’s violence towards her and presented expert testimony that she suffered from battered person syndrome. Kramer’s body was found in their shared home two months after his death, and Wood was indicted on multiple charges, including malice murder and concealing the death of another. The jury found her guilty on all counts, and she was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, with additional sentences for other charges.Wood appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not allowing her to introduce testimony about Kramer’s violence towards other women under OCGA § 24-4-405 (b) and that this exclusion violated her constitutional right to a complete defense. The trial court had ruled that Wood could testify about her knowledge of Kramer’s violent acts to show her state of mind but could not introduce extrinsic evidence of specific acts through other witnesses. Wood’s motion for a new trial was denied, and she appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony about Kramer’s prior acts of violence under Rule 405 (b), as a victim’s violent character is not an essential element of self-defense. The court also found no plain error in the trial court’s application of the evidentiary rules, concluding that Wood’s constitutional rights were not violated. The court affirmed Wood’s convictions. View "Wood v. State" on Justia Law

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The Georgia Association of Club Executives (GACE), representing adult entertainment clubs, challenged the constitutionality of a 1% tax on gross revenue imposed on adult entertainment establishments that offer nude dancing and serve alcohol. The tax was intended to fund the Safe Harbor for Sexually Exploited Children Fund, aimed at helping child victims of sexual exploitation. GACE argued that the tax was a content-based regulation of speech, failing both strict and intermediate scrutiny, and that the definition of "adult entertainment establishments" was overbroad.The trial court upheld the tax, applying intermediate scrutiny and finding that the tax was content-neutral, aimed at addressing the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments, such as prostitution and child exploitation. The court concluded that the tax furthered an important governmental interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest without unnecessarily burdening protected expression. GACE appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the tax was content-neutral and satisfied intermediate scrutiny. It found that the tax was aimed at addressing the negative secondary effects associated with adult entertainment establishments, rather than suppressing the content of the expression. The court also concluded that the tax was narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in combating child exploitation and that the burden on speech was minimal. Additionally, the court rejected GACE's overbreadth challenge, finding that the definition of "adult entertainment establishments" was not substantially overbroad relative to the statute's legitimate sweep. View "Georgia Association of Club Executives, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

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Appellant A. Thomas Jones challenged the City of Atlanta's imposition of charges through two ordinances, arguing that these charges, levied on the Department of Watershed Management (DWM) customers, are unlawful taxes. The ordinances in question impose a franchise fee on DWM's gross revenue and a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) on DWM's real property, with the collected sums deposited into the City's General Fund. Jones contended that these charges exceed the costs they purportedly cover and are instead used to generate general revenue, violating various constitutional and statutory provisions.The trial court initially dismissed Jones's suit on procedural grounds, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision in part. Upon remand, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, and Jones filed motions for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted the City's motion and denied Jones's motions, leading to this appeal. Jones argued that the trial court erred in its application of the standard of review and in its conclusions regarding the nature of the charges.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to treat Jones's allegations as true, particularly his claims that he paid the disputed charges, that the revenue generated from these charges grossly exceeded the associated costs, and that these costs were covered by other transfers from DWM to the City's General Fund. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case for further proceedings.However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Jones's motions for partial summary judgment. The Court concluded that Jones failed to demonstrate the absence of genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the charges were taxes or fees and whether the revenue generated exceeded the associated costs. The case was remanded for reconsideration of Jones's claims under the proper standard of review. View "Jones v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

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The appellants, including Congresswoman Nikema Williams, were arrested and charged under OCGA § 16-11-34.1 for allegedly disrupting official business of the Georgia General Assembly. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the statute is overbroad and vague, violating free speech protections under the Georgia Constitution. The appellants limited their challenges to subsections (a), (f), and (g) of the statute, which criminalize acts likely to disrupt legislative sessions or meetings, entering certain areas with intent to disrupt, and parading or demonstrating with intent to disrupt.The trial court dismissed the appellants' facial challenges and one appellant's as-applied challenge, and denied their motion for a permanent injunction. The court found the statute not facially overbroad or vague and ruled that the allegations did not support the as-applied challenge.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 is not facially overbroad or vague. It distinguished this case from State v. Fielden, noting that the statute in question is more narrowly tailored to legislative contexts and does not substantially infringe on protected speech. The court also found that the statute provides sufficient clarity to avoid arbitrary enforcement.Regarding the as-applied challenge by State Representative Park Cannon, the court concluded that her conduct, as alleged, did not fall under the prohibited acts of the statute. Therefore, her as-applied challenge failed. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the facial and as-applied challenges and the denial of the motion for a permanent injunction. View "Williams v. Powell" on Justia Law

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David Dajuanta Wallace was convicted of felony murder and a firearm offense related to the shooting death of Darius Bottoms. Wallace argued that the evidence was insufficient, that his due process rights were violated by being required to wear a leg iron and prison clothing during the trial, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.A Fulton County grand jury indicted Wallace and two co-defendants for various crimes, including felony murder and gang activity. Wallace pled guilty to some charges and went to trial on others. The jury found him guilty of felony murder and a firearm offense. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder and an additional five years for the firearm charge. Wallace's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the evidence was sufficient to support Wallace's convictions. The court held that the testimony of an accomplice was corroborated by other evidence, satisfying Georgia statutory law. Constitutionally, the evidence allowed the jury to find Wallace guilty as a party to the crimes rather than merely an accessory after the fact. The court also determined that any error related to Wallace wearing a leg iron was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given that the jury could not see the leg iron, Wallace used it strategically, and the strong evidence of his guilt.Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the court concluded that Wallace failed to show either deficiency or prejudice. The court affirmed Wallace's convictions and the trial court's rulings. View "WALLACE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law