Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case is whether the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (“EPD”) properly issued a permit to the City of Guyton to build and operate a land application system (“LAS”) that would apply treated wastewater to a tract of land through spray irrigation. Craig Barrow III challenged the issuance of that permit, arguing that, among other things, EPD issued the permit in violation of a water quality standard, Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 391-3-6-.03 (2) (b) (ii) (the “antidegradation rule”), because it failed to determine whether any resulting degradation of water quality in the State waters surrounding the proposed LAS was necessary to accommodate important economic or social development in the area. An administrative law judge rejected Barrow’s argument, finding that the rule required an antidegradation analysis only for point source discharges of pollutants and the LAS at issue was a nonpoint source discharge. The superior court affirmed the administrative ruling. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plain language of the antidegradation rule required EPD to perform the antidegradation analysis for nonpoint source discharges, and that EPD’s internal guidelines to the contrary did not warrant deference. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this matter to consider what level of deference courts should afford EPD's interpretation of the antidegradation rule, and whether that regulation required an antidegradation analysis for nonpint source discharges. The Court concluded the Court of Appeals was correct that the antidegradation rule was unambiguous: the text and legal context of the regulation showed that an antidegradation analysis was required only for point sources, not nonpoint sources. Therefore, the Court reversed. View "City of Guyton v. Barrow" on Justia Law

Gregory Haney and Ledarius Jackson appealed the denial of their respective motions for new trial after a jury found them guilty of malice murder, felony murder, and armed robbery in connection with the death of Gregory Smith. In Haney’s case, he argued the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient for the jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to each of the charged offenses and that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain opinion and identification testimony offered by two of the State’s witnesses. In Jackson’s case, he also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him by the State as to each count of the indictment. Additionally, he argued his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an objection, pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), to certain statements made by State witnesses who recounted statements made by Haney implicating Jackson in the crime and for failing to object to the introduction of an audio tape of a conversation between Jackson and his girlfriend. Finding no merit in any of these enumerations, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed both defendants’ convictions. View "Haney v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Demarcio Williams appealed his convictions for murder and attempted armed robbery in connection with the 2010 shooting death of James Akridge. Williams argued: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court erred in having improper communication with a juror; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict; and (4) the prosecutor improperly commented on his silence. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Williams’ convictions. View "Williams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Stevie Williamson appealed his convictions for malice murder, burglary, and other charges stemming from the July 2006 shooting death of George Rutten at Rutten’s home. On appeal, Williams: (1) challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to burglary and a felony murder count predicated on burglary; and (2) argued the trial court erred when it did not grant his motion to suppress certain custodial statements and evidence flowing therefrom. Williamson contended the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the jury could consider any prior consistent statements by witnesses as “substantive evidence” and it should have considered any statement made by the defendant “with great care and caution.” Williamson moved the Georgia Supreme Court to remand the case back to the trial court so that he could raise possible claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After review of the trial court record, and upon consideration of Williamson’s claims on appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to find that Williamson committed the crimes of which he was convicted, the trial court did not err in finding that his custodial statements were admissible, and none of the cited jury instructions were reversible error. Furthermore, the Court concluded Williamson was barred from raising in his direct appeal any claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because he did not raise them at the earliest possible moment. Therefore, the Court denied the motion to remand, and affirmed Williamson’s convictions. View "Williamson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In March 2017, defendant Stephen Turnquest was involved in a single-vehicle accident. The responding officer arrested Turnquest for DUI. After arresting Turnquest and before asking him to submit to a breath test, the officer read the age-appropriate Georgia implied consent notice pursuant to OCGA 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) but did not give Miranda warnings. Turnquest provided a breath sample. Turnquest was charged with DUI less safe, DUI per se, and failure to maintain lane. He filed a motion to exclude the results of the breath test on essentially two grounds: (1) Miranda warnings had to precede a request to perform a chemical breath test because, as was held previously by the Georgia Supreme Court, submitting to a breath test is an incriminating act that implicated the right against self-incrimination; and (2) the test results should have been suppressed because the implied consent advisement misled him by stating that if he refused the test, refusal could be used against him at trial and could affect his driving privileges. The trial court granted the motion on the basis that Miranda warnings had to precede an officer’s request for a breath sample from a suspect in custody. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on Paragraph XVI, OCGA 24-5-506 (a) (formerly OCGA 24-9-20), and the Supreme Court’s decision in Price v. Georgia, 498 SE2d 262 (1998), as well as several Georgia appellate decisions that Price relied on. The State appealed, asking the Supreme Court to overrule Price. After reviewing the language, history, and context of the Georgia Constitution, the Supreme Court determined Price was wrongly decided, “and because stare decisis considerations do not warrant retaining that precedent to the extent that it is contrary to our conclusion about the meaning of the Georgia Constitution and OCGA 24-5-506, we vacate the trial court’s order suppressing breath-test results for failure to give Miranda warnings.” The matter was remanded the trial court for consideration of arguments not previously considered because of the trial court’s suppression of the breath test evidence. View "Georgia v. Turnquest" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Jones was convicted of two counts of malice murder in connection with the shooting deaths of Forrest Ison and Alice Stevens. On appeal, he challenged the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of certain testimony, contended the trial court erred when it did not declare a mistrial, and claimed his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Jones’ convictions. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Willie Jones was found guilty by jury of felony murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Wayman Glenn James, Jr. On appeal, Jones argued: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain statements made by Jones’s non-testifying co-indictees; and (3) his trial counsel was ineffective. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Jones’ convictions for felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, but vacated his conviction for armed robbery, because that count of the indictment should have been merged into the felony murder count for sentencing purposes. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Otto Orr met Candice Nicole in June 2013; the couple married in February 2014 and Candice became pregnant. According to Candice, after they had been together for a few months, Orr started to drink heavily and would hit her when they argued. In October 2014, the couple had a baby boy. Candice testified that on January 26, 2015, before Orr left for work, he asked her to pick up some baby formula. When he returned home that evening and learned that she did not get the formula, they began to argue. Orr then became violent, striking Candice multiple times in front of their son, continuing to kick Candice until she asked if he was going to kill her. Orr then stopped, called his friends to pick him up and take him to his mother’s house, and left. Candice and the baby went to stay with her friend, who urged her to call 911. The responding police officer testified that when he arrived at the friend’s house, Candice’s face was swollen and looked like she had been punched “a considerable amount of times.” Orr was ultimately arrested two days later, and formally accused of family violence battery and cruelty to children in the third degree. The Georgia Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in this case to determine whether Georgia’s new Evidence Code abrogated a categorical rule announced in Mallory v. Georgia, 409 SE2d 839 (1991), which excluded evidence of a criminal defendant’s pre-arrest “silence or failure to come forward” to law enforcement on the ground that such evidence was always “far more prejudicial than probative.” The Supreme Court explained the new Evidence Code, which took effect on January 1, 2013, precluded courts from promulgating or perpetuating judge-made exclusionary rules of evidence like the one created in Mallory, and instead generally required trial courts to determine the admissibility of evidence based on the facts of the specific case and the rules set forth in the Evidence Code. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment in this case and remanded for further proceedings. View "Georgia v. Orr" on Justia Law

David Newman was convicted by jury on two counts of felony murder and aggravated assault, three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in connection with the shooting death of Jason Wood and for shooting at Candace Shadowens. Newman moved for a new trial, and the trial court granted the motion on the grounds that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury, sua sponte, on the use of force in defense of habitation ; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a charge on that defense. The State appealed. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the trial court erred in granting Newman’s motion for a new trial. View "Georgia v. Newman" on Justia Law

Appellant Jonah Lay was convicted of two counts of felony murder and a firearm offense in connection with the shooting death of Jason Abram. Appellant argued before the Georgia Supreme Court that: (1) the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) venue was not sufficiently proved; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to certain testimony; and (4) he was not given the proper amount of time for his closing argument. The Supreme Court rejected Appellant’s contentions, but because the trial court erred by entering convictions and sentences against him on two counts of felony murder for killing one victim, the Court vacated those convictions and remanded the case for resentencing. View "Lay v.Georgia" on Justia Law