Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In September 2014, Appellant Angelo Dennard was convicted of murder and associated crimes related to the shooting death of his estranged wife, Diana Cruz-Sagrero. On appeal, Dennard contended there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for two counts of cruelty to children in the third degree and that evidence of a prior felony conviction was wrongfully admitted. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dennard v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Demario Ware was convicted of felony murder during the commission of an armed robbery in connection with the shooting death of Vernon Forrest. On appeal, Ware argued the trial court erred when it gave the pattern jury instruction on felony murder instead of his requested instruction on proximate causation, and by replacing a juror during deliberations. The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed upon review of the trial court record and affirmed. View "Ware v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Nicholas Brooks was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Jason Blount. Appellant contended the evidence presented at his trial was legally insufficient to overcome his defense of coercion; the prosecutor committed misconduct by introducing into evidence an edited version of Appellant’s video-recorded police interview; and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of the recording and by inadequately informing him of his right to testify. The Georgia Supreme Court determined appellant’s claims were meritless, so it affirmed. View "Brooks v.Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellee DeJuan Spratlin was convicted of malice murder and a firearm offense in connection with the shooting death of Edward Cobb. The trial court granted Spratlin a new trial on the ground that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek the exclusion of testimony and comments about his post-arrest silence. The State appealed that ruling. The Georgia Supreme Court determined there was not a reasonable probability that, but for the limited deficient performance by Spratlin’s trial counsel, the jury at his trial would have reached a different result. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s order granting Spratlin a new trial. View "Georgia v. Spratlin" on Justia Law

In 2015, a jury found Appellee Dolonte Tedder guilty of murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Quleon Glass. In January 2017, Tedder filed a motion for new trial, which included arguments that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in several regards, that insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict on a count of criminal gang activity, and that the State committed a Brady violation. In September 2017, the trial court granted Tedder’s motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to introduce expert testimony that would have contradicted part of the State’s theory of the case. It did not rule on Tedder’s other enumerated grounds for a new trial. The State appealed that decision. The Georgia Supreme Court found the trial court erred in granting a new trial. Consequently, the Court reversed the order granting Tedder a new trial and remanded this case to the trial court for consideration of the remaining grounds for new trial set forth in Tedder’s amended motion. View "Georgia v. Tedder" on Justia Law

In one of first impression for the Georgia Supreme Court, the issue this case presented centered on the effect of the State’s delay in obtaining search warrants for data contained in electronic devices when those devices were originally seized in a warrantless, but lawful, manner by police. The trial court suppressed the evidence derived from the devices, relying on persuasive authority from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to find that the delay between the seizure of the devices and the issuance of the search warrants for the data contained in them was unreasonable and thus violated appellees’ rights under the Fourth Amendment and Georgia law. The State appealed that decision. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the analysis developed by the Eleventh Circuit was appropriate, the trial court’s findings of fact were supported by the record, and the trial court did not err in granting the motion to suppress. View "Georgia v. Rosenbaum" on Justia Law

Appellant Brisean Esprit was convicted of felony murder; appellant Mark Jones was convicted of malice murder. Both were convicted of a firearm offense in connection with the shooting death of Maximillion Stevenson. Esprit’s sole contention on appeal was that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly seek admission of statements favorable to Esprit that Jones made during Jones’s truncated attempt to enter a guilty plea just before trial. Jones’s sole contention was that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to similar transaction evidence. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded after review that both appellants’ contentions were meritless, so it affirmed the convictions in both cases. View "Esprit v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Deondray Yarn was convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the January 2014 shooting death of Monnie Brabham. On appeal, Yarn argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in granting continuances over Yarn’s objections; and (3) his trial counsel was ineffective in communicating a plea offer to Yarn. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Yarn v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Michael Licata's vehicle was stopped by police because it matched the description of a vehicle that had recently been in an accident and had significant front-end damage. Prior to the stop, sparks were coming off the asphalt as Licata had been driving on the vehicle’s rims. The police officer who ultimately arrested Licata approached Licata and confirmed with Licata that Licata had been involved in an accident. The arresting officer told Licata that he wanted to discuss the accident but he wanted to read Miranda warnings to Licata first. After doing so, the arresting officer asked Licata several questions about the accident. A short time later, the officer asked Licata to perform field sobriety tests. Licata complied and failed the tests. The officer then placed Licata under arrest for DUI less safe, read the implied consent warning, and asked Licata if he would submit to a breath test. Licata twice asked to call his attorney but was denied that request. Licata ultimately responded that he would not submit to a breath test. Following his arrest and prior to trial, Licata sought to suppress the results of his field sobriety tests and evidence that he refused to submit to the breath test. The trial court granted Licata’s motion, concluding that the field sobriety evaluations should have been suppressed because Licata was in custody and was not informed that he had a right to refuse to perform incriminating acts, a right protected by Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVI of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider what, if any, Miranda-type warning law enforcement must give before asking a suspect in custody to perform acts protected by Paragraph XVI, and whether a suspect in custody is entitled to the advice of counsel when asked to submit to a state-administered breath test. After its review of the record, the Court determined Licata was not actually in custody. Therefore, it affirmed the Court of Appeals’s ultimate conclusion that the field sobriety tests were admissible, without answering the first question. The Court declined to resolve the issue regarding the advice of counsel, because it was pertinent only to the the admissibility of Licata’s refusal to submit to a breath test, and this determination must be reconsidered in the light of our recent opinion in Elliott v. Georgia (Case No. S18A1204, decided February 18, 2019), wherein the Court concluded refusal evidence was inadmissible. Therefore, the Court of Appeals’ opinion regarding the admissibility of the refusal evidence was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Licata v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2014, Maria Matta-Troncoso and her husband, Mario Matta (“the Mattas”), sued Michael and Lakeisha Thornton, alleging that the Thorntons were liable under OCGA 51-2-71 for injuries that Matta-Troncoso sustained when the Thorntons’ dogs attacked her as she was walking her own dogs approximately two blocks away from the Thorntons’ rental house. The Mattas later amended their complaint by adding Gregory Tyner, the Thorntons’ landlord, alleging that he was liable under OCGA 44-7-142 for failing to keep the rental property in repair. Specifically, they alleged that Tyner failed to repair a broken gate latch that allowed the Thorntons’ dogs to escape the property and attack Matta-Troncoso. Tyner moved for summary judgment, and the trial court determined that although Tyner breached his duty to keep the premises in repair by failing to repair the broken gate latch, summary judgment was nevertheless warranted in his favor because the Mattas made no showing that the Thorntons’ dogs had ever displayed vicious propensities or that Tyner had knowledge of such tendencies. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, concluding the trial court erred in its analysis of whether Tyner had knowledge of the dogs’ vicious propensities. Citing OCGA 51-2-7, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because there was evidence that the dogs were unleashed in violation of a local ordinance, the Mattas were not required to produce evidence that “Tyner [was] aware of the dogs’ vicious propensities.” Furthermore, the appellate court concluded Tyner could be liable under OCGA 44-7-14 because that statute did not limit a landlord’s liability to injuries occurring on a leased premises, and that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Matta-Troncoso’s injuries “arose from” Tyner’s failure to repair the gate latch. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Tyner’s petition for certiorari to address a single question: Did the Court of Appeals err by reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Tyner? The Court answered that question in the affirmative, and therefore reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court determined there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tyner’s failure to repair the gate latch caused Matta-Troncoso’s injuries; summary judgment in Tyner’s favor was appropriate. View "Tyner v. Matta-Tronscoso" on Justia Law