Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Kevin Gibbs was convicted of aggravated assault upon a police officer and other offenses arising out of an encounter he had with a Smyrna police officer in 2013, commencing at a city park. Gibbs was behind the wheel of a car backed into a parking space in a remote area of the park when the officer drove his patrol vehicle into that same parking area. The officer testified at trial that he intentionally placed his vehicle at an angle so that it would not block Gibbs from leaving, and then he exited the patrol vehicle and approached Gibbs’s car. The Georgia Supreme Court found the record revealed that as the officer approached Gibbs’s car, Gibbs stepped on the accelerator, causing the car to lurch forward and strike the officer’s leg. Even after the officer drew his weapon and ordered Gibbs to stop and exit his vehicle, Gibbs again accelerated the car and struck the officer a second time. The officer dove out of the way while firing his weapon. The gunshot shattered the driver-side window and struck Gibbs. Gibbs then sped away from the park, let his passengers out, and then drove recklessly through heavy traffic while being pursued by patrol cars, ultimately colliding with another vehicle before being stopped by the police. One of the State’s witnesses at trial was a nurse at the hospital where Gibbs was admitted for treatment of his gunshot wound after being taken into custody. As part of the routine admitting process, the nurse questioned Gibbs about his medical history and made a written record of certain information he offered in response. The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court’s review was: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining the nurse’s testimony regarding Gibbs’s statement to her that he had used marijuana on the day of the crimes was admissible as intrinsic evidence; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Gibbs waived his right to argue that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony regarding his marijuana use because he failed to question trial counsel about that issue at the motion for new trial hearing. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that Gibbs waived his right to argue ineffective assistance of counsel, but nevertheless agreed the trial court’s denial of Gibbs’s motion for new trial was properly affirmed. View "Gibbs v. Georgia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Ted Robinson was found guilty of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, attempted armed robbery, possession of a firearm in commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in connection with the killing of Timothy Lee Buck. His amended motion for new trial was denied, and he appealed, asserting insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s failure to charge on corroboration of accomplice testimony, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Robinson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Ted Robinson was found guilty of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, attempted armed robbery, possession of a firearm in commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in connection with the killing of Timothy Lee Buck. His amended motion for new trial was denied, and he appealed, asserting insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s failure to charge on corroboration of accomplice testimony, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Robinson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Raymond McKoy was convicted of malice murder in connection with the shooting death of his estranged wife’s girlfriend, Lauren Hudson. Appellant argued the trial court erred in ruling journal entries he had written were admissible and erred in striking his direct testimony after he refused to submit to cross-examination. At trial, the defense argued that Appellant shot Hudson in self-defense because she pointed a gun at him. Appellant was the final witness called by the defense. He testified on direct examination, and the trial was then adjourned for the day. The next morning, with Appellant present but before the jury was brought into the courtroom, the prosecutor announced that he intended to use some entries from Appellant’s journals to impeach Appellant’s testimony. The defense argued that the journals, which were found in a bag in Appellant’s car, had been seized illegally. The State did not contend that they were legally seized, but argued that even illegally obtained evidence can be used for impeachment. After a lengthy discussion, the trial court ruled that the journals generally would be admissible, heard argument on a few specific entries the State wanted to introduce, and concluded that those entries would be admissible. After this ruling, Appellant refused to return to the witness stand to be cross-examined. The court said that if Appellant did not retake the stand, it would tell the jury to “totally disregard all of his testimony.” The Georgia Supreme Court determined the journals at issue here were never actually admitted into evidence due to Appellant’s decision not to testify on cross-examination. Thus any error the court may have made in that ruling in limine was not preserved for appellate review. Once Appellant withdrew his consent to be cross-examined as a witness, he could no longer be treated as a witness at all. The Supreme Court found the trial court clearly informed Appellant of the consequence if he refused to retake the stand, allowed Appellant to consult his counsel, and then asked Appellant to make an informed decision. Appellant elected not to retake the stand and thereby suffer the consequence of his testimony being excluded from the evidence he presented in his defense. Finding, therefore, no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction. View "McKoy v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Raymond McKoy was convicted of malice murder in connection with the shooting death of his estranged wife’s girlfriend, Lauren Hudson. Appellant argued the trial court erred in ruling journal entries he had written were admissible and erred in striking his direct testimony after he refused to submit to cross-examination. At trial, the defense argued that Appellant shot Hudson in self-defense because she pointed a gun at him. Appellant was the final witness called by the defense. He testified on direct examination, and the trial was then adjourned for the day. The next morning, with Appellant present but before the jury was brought into the courtroom, the prosecutor announced that he intended to use some entries from Appellant’s journals to impeach Appellant’s testimony. The defense argued that the journals, which were found in a bag in Appellant’s car, had been seized illegally. The State did not contend that they were legally seized, but argued that even illegally obtained evidence can be used for impeachment. After a lengthy discussion, the trial court ruled that the journals generally would be admissible, heard argument on a few specific entries the State wanted to introduce, and concluded that those entries would be admissible. After this ruling, Appellant refused to return to the witness stand to be cross-examined. The court said that if Appellant did not retake the stand, it would tell the jury to “totally disregard all of his testimony.” The Georgia Supreme Court determined the journals at issue here were never actually admitted into evidence due to Appellant’s decision not to testify on cross-examination. Thus any error the court may have made in that ruling in limine was not preserved for appellate review. Once Appellant withdrew his consent to be cross-examined as a witness, he could no longer be treated as a witness at all. The Supreme Court found the trial court clearly informed Appellant of the consequence if he refused to retake the stand, allowed Appellant to consult his counsel, and then asked Appellant to make an informed decision. Appellant elected not to retake the stand and thereby suffer the consequence of his testimony being excluded from the evidence he presented in his defense. Finding, therefore, no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction. View "McKoy v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In October 1999, pursuant to the Service Delivery Strategy Act (SDS), Greene County, Georgia and five municipalities within the County, including the City of Union Point, entered into various intergovernmental agreements governing local services. In 2015, the City of Union Point filed a “Complaint for TRO, Interlocutory and Permanent Injunction,” alleging that Greene County had unilaterally discontinued police and fire dispatch and communications services to the City’s police and fire departments and had ignored attempts to resolve the issue. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order directing the County to resume dispatch and communications services. A month later, in response to a motion to dismiss, the City amended its complaint to seek a declaratory judgment and mediation under the SDS Act. After the County filed a second motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity, standing, and untimely request for mediation, the City again amended its complaint to assert claims for breach of contract, mandamus, specific performance, injunction and attorney fees, and attached a certified copy of the service delivery agreements on file with the Georgia Department of Community Affairs. Before the Georgia Supreme Court, this case called into question the constitutionality of the evidentiary hearing process provided by OCGA 36-70-25.1 (d) (2). In its order entered at the end of the hearing process, the trial court found that portion of the statute unconstitutional, and further found that sovereign immunity barred all claims and remedies except those provided for in the SDS Act itself. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on sovereign immunity, but reversed its finding on the constitutionality of OCGA 36-70-25.1 (d) (2). Furthermore, the Court found the trial court exceeded the bounds of the statutory process by going beyond the remedies provided to order particular actions by the parties and by considering matters not submitted to mediation. View "City of Union Point v. Greene County" on Justia Law

Clarence Jenkins Jr. appealed his convictions and sentences for felony murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated battery, all in connection with the shooting death of his 22-year-old son, Chavarious Jenkins (“Chavarious”). The Georgia Supreme Court’s review of the record revealed Jenkins received a sentence of five years in prison for the crime of possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated assault, as well as a sentence of five years in prison for the crime of possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated battery. But, the underlying crimes for each possession charge were committed on the same victim, as part of the same fatal encounter, and the possession charges thus merged with each other. Consequently, the case must had to be remanded so that Jenkins could be resentenced on only one of the possession counts, in the discretion of the trial court. View "Jenkins v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The State of Georgia appealed the grant of habeas relief in regard to appellee Jude Ebele Aduka, a citizen of Nigeria. Appellee was arrested in 2007 after being found with numerous counterfeit goods. An indictment was handed down in 2009 and thereafter the State offered a plea deal which appellee rejected because of concerns he had about how such a deal would impact his immigration status. In 2012, however, appellee pleaded guilty to a single count of offer for sale of counterfeit goods. During the plea colloquy with the trial court, appellee stated he understood that entering a guilty plea “may have an impact” on his immigration status and that he understood that his guilty plea “could mean [he] could be deported.” The trial court sentenced appellee to five years of “confinement” to be served entirely on probation and ordered him to pay a fine. In 2015, appellee was arrested by federal immigration agents. Appellee petitioned for habeas relief concerning his 2012 plea and conviction. While the habeas petition was still pending, an immigration judge issued an order for appellee’s removal from the United States due to his counterfeit goods conviction. In his habeas petition, appellee alleged that plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to advise appellee that pleading guilty to a violation of OCGA 10-1-454 would subject him to mandatory deportation for committing an “aggravated felony” under federal law. The habeas court determined plea counsel was deficient by failing to inform appellee that he would be deported if he pleaded guilty to violating OCGA 10-1-454 (c). The habeas court found plea counsel’s informing appellee that he “may” be deported was not reasonable upon a direct reading of the federal statute at issue. The Georgia Supreme Court found appellee's plea counsel did not act outside the wide range of reasonable conduct afforded attorneys who represent criminal defendants, including those defendants who are noncitizens, when he advised appellee that he “could be” deported, rather than informing appellee that he “would be” deported if he entered the plea in question. Accordingly, the Court reversed the habeas court's judgment. View "Georgia v. Aduka" on Justia Law

Travis Graves was acquitted of armed robbery but found guilty of two counts each of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the deaths of Antonio Smith and Delaine King. His amended motion for new trial was denied, and he appealed, arguing as his sole enumeration of error the trial court’s striking of alibi testimony for failure to give notice under OCGA 17-16-5 (a). Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Graves’ conviction. View "Graves v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2013, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Dijon Cortez Abbott with murder and the related crimes of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, unlawful gang activity, criminal damage to property in the second degree, and reckless conduct, all in connection with the fatal shooting of Marques Eubanks and the wounding of two others. The superior court entered an order suppressing the entirety of Abbott’s video-recorded statements with two sheriff deputies, finding Abbott was in custody no later than the time when he was placed in an interrogation room and shackled to the floor, because no reasonable person could believe that he was free to leave under Abbott’s circumstances. Considering all of the circumstances, the superior court not only excluded Abbott’s pre-Miranda statements, it also excluded all of his post-Miranda statements as having resulted from an “interrogate first, warn later” procedure. The State of Georgia appealed the suppression of the recorded statements. In this case, the superior court did not address the existence, credibility, or weight of any such evidence, nor did the court make any findings or draw any conclusion as to whether Langford’s two-step interrogation was a deliberate strategy, used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning. Accordingly, the superior court’s judgment suppressing Abbott’s post-Miranda statements was vacated, and the case remanded so that the superior court could make further findings of fact and apply the correct legal standard. View "Georgia v. Abbott" on Justia Law