Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Joe Lee Waye appealed the denial of his amended motion for out of-time appeal of his conviction and sentence on his plea of guilty to malice murder. In 1996, Waye entered a negotiated plea under which he pled guilty to one count of malice murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment for the 1991 murder of victim Tim Worley. In exchange for Waye’s plea, the State agreed to the dismissal of additional charges related to the murder (as well as separate pending drug charges) and agreed not to seek the death penalty. Twenty years later, Waye filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence. That motion was denied, and Waye did not initiate a timely appeal. Instead, Waye filed a pro se motion seeking leave to file an out-of-time direct appeal of his conviction, contending that his guilty plea was invalid. Subsequently, Waye amended his motion for out-of-time appeal, so that he could also seek leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct sentence. The trial court denied both motions. Finding no error with the trial court’s decision, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Waye v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellants Margarita Gomez and Alejandro Huitron challenged their convictions for felony murder and other crimes related to injuries to and the resulting death of their three-year-old daughter, Esmerelda. The Georgia Supreme Court vacated three of each Appellant’s convictions (Counts 4, 11, and 16) to correct sentencing errors, but rejected Appellants’ many other contentions and affirmed their remaining convictions. View "Gomez v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2006, Kenneth Berzett pled guilty to child molestation, and in 2009, the Sexual Offender Registration Review Board classified him as a sexually dangerous predator. Berzett petitioned the superior court for judicial review of his classification, and he simultaneously filed a petition for declaratory judgment, alleging that OCGA 42-1-14 was unconstitutional. Furthermore, he sought injunctive relief against enforcement or application of the electronic monitoring requirement required by the statute. As to the petition for judicial review, the superior court affirmed the Board’s classification of Berzett and denied his request for relief, and Berzett did not appeal the superior court’s decision. Meanwhile, the Board filed a motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action. After the final decision on the petition for judicial review, the Board asserted in a supplement to its motion to dismiss that Berzett’s request for declaratory judgment had become moot because there was no longer an active controversy between Berzett and the Board, any ruling on the constitutionality of OCGA 42-1-14 would have no practical effect on Berzett, and he no longer faced uncertainty as to any future undirected action. Although the superior court dismissed one of Berzett’s constitutional claims, it denied the Board’s motion to dismiss as to all other claims, deciding that, inter alia, those claims were not moot and a petition for declaratory judgment was a proper vehicle for raising them. On subsequent cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court granted summary judgment to the Board on one constitutional claim but granted summary judgment to Berzett on all of his other constitutional claims. The superior court held that Berzett was not subject to the electronic monitoring obligations imposed on sexually dangerous predators and issued a writ of prohibition against the Board and its officers and agents that prohibited them from requiring Berzett to wear or pay for GPS monitoring pursuant to the statute. The Board appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for dismissal, finding the trial court erred in deciding the constitutional arguments because there was no justiciable controversy, and the relief requested by Berzett would have no effect on the Board’s already-final and completed act of the risk of classification of Berzett or on any other right or responsibility of the Board towards him. View "Sexual Offender Registration Review Board v. Berzett" on Justia Law

The constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity forbids Georgia courts to entertain a lawsuit against the State without its consent. This case began in 2012, not long after the adoption of House Bill 954, which concerned medical procedures for the termination of pregnancies. Eva Lathrop, Carrie Cwiak, and Lisa Haddad are physicians licensed to practice in Georgia. In their petition, the plaintiff-physicians alleged that House Bill 954 violated the Georgia constitution in several respects. Based on their allegations, the plaintiff-physicians sought a declaratory judgment that certain provisions of House Bill 954 were unconstitutional, and they sought injunctive relief to restrain the defendant-state officers from enforcing House Bill 954. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss these claims, and the plaintiff-physicians appealed dismissal of their petition. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity extends generally to suits against the State, its departments and agencies, and its officers in their official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief from official acts that are alleged to be unconstitutional. In so holding, however, the Court recognized the availability of other means by which aggrieved citizens may obtain relief from unconstitutional acts, including prospective relief from the threatened enforcement of unconstitutional laws. View "Lathrop v. Deal" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in this matter to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming Robert Heatherly’s misdemeanor conviction. Heatherly and Donald Lewis Malone worked at a Dalton Paper Products, Inc. industrial plant. Officials discovered that certain materials were missing from a secured area of the plant, and the plant manager received an anonymous telephone call informing him that Malone was stealing from the plant. Law enforcement interviewed Malone who confessed to selling the stolen materials, and that Heatherly provided the materials. Both men were charged with theft by taking, and as part of a plea agreement, Malone testified at Heatherly’s trial. Heatherly appealed, and argued in his sole enumeration of error to the Court of Appeals was that because he had originally been charged with theft by taking property with a value of more than $500.00, regardless of the eventual proof of the value of the stolen property, and regardless of his eventual sentence, his case should have been considered a “felony case” for purposes of OCGA 24-14-8, which provides that the “testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact [but in]felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient.” He contended that under the State’s evidence and the trial court’s judgment, Malone had to be considered an accomplice of Heatherly’s, and that there was no evidence corroborating Malone’s testimony that Heatherly was involved in the theft of the materials from the plant. Finding that the Court of Appeals was correct in rejecting Heatherly’s assertion that, in this case, the testimony of a single witness accomplice had to be corroborated, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Heatherly v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In February 2010, Marion Hayes was charged with burglary, aggravated assault, possession of tools for commission of a crime, and obstruction of a police officer. The State filed notice of its intention to seek recidivist punishment under OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) and (c), based upon three previous burglary convictions. Hayes filed a pro se motion for an out-of-time appeal, which was granted, and he appealed pro se to the Court of Appeals. That court found that the trial court, by telling Hayes, “if you were sentenced to 20 years you will serve every day of that in prison,” and “you are facing 20 years and you would serve every day of it if you are found guilty. And that was the sentence imposed by the court,” failed to inform Hayes that part of his sentence could be probated or suspended. It thus concluded that the trial court “effectively advised Hayes that it had no intention of probating or suspending any portion of his sentence if he proceeded to trial, stating that he would spend ‘every day of [the 20-year sentence] in prison.’ And this impermissible participation by the trial court in the plea-negotiation process ‘rendered the resulting guilty plea involuntary.’” Hayes’ conviction was thus reversed and the case remanded for a new plea or trial. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the trial court’s colloquy and the applicable law, and reversed its judgment. View "Georgia v. Hayes" on Justia Law

A jury found appellant Dale El Smith guilty of felony murder and two counts of cruelty to a person age 65 or older in connection with the 2014 death of Arthur Pelham. On appeal, Smith argued there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions and that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded after review of this matter that neither contention had merit, and affirmed. View "Smith v. Georgia" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the meaning of the term “motor fuel taxes” as used in the Georgia Constitution, Article III, Sec. IX, Par. IV(b). A trucking industry association and three individual motor carriers challenged local sales and use taxes on motor fuels, the revenues of which were not used solely for public roads and bridges. They argued that these taxes fell within the meaning of “motor fuel taxes” under the Motor Fuel Provision and, therefore, the revenues from these taxes (or an amount equal to that revenue) had to be allocated to the maintenance and construction of public roads and bridges. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint because the history and context of the Motor Fuel Provision revealed that “motor fuel taxes” were limited to per-gallon taxes on distributors of motor fuel, and did not include sales and use taxes imposed on retail sales of motor fuels. View "Georgia Motor Trucking Assn. v. Georgia Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

This case involved challenges to the City of Atlanta’s attempted annexation of five areas. Shortly after the Governor approved HB 514 on April 26, 2016, Atlanta received petitions for annexation from five unincorporated areas of Fulton County contiguous to Atlanta. Emelyn Mays and five other individuals (collectively, “Mays”), who represented each of the proposed annexation areas as residents or property owners, filed a petition for declaratory judgment challenging the annexations. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, and shortly thereafter issued an order granting Mays’s request declaring the annexations null and void on the ground that they were untimely under the terms of HB 514 and thus the Communities were part of South Fulton. In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly rejected Atlanta’s contention that HB 514 unconstitutionally conflicted with the general laws governing annexation by municipalities by preventing Atlanta’s annexation of the Communities as of July 1, 2016. Atlanta appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found the trial court correctly held that the annexations were invalid because at the time they would have become effective, the areas in question were already part of the newly incorporated City of South Fulton and thus ineligible for annexation by Atlanta. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "City of Atlanta v. Mays" on Justia Law

In the course of representing criminal defendants in two cases, an attorney at the Merchant Law Firm participated in three hearings before Judge David Emerson in June and October 2015. Each of these proceedings was open to the public and audio-recorded by court reporter Melissa Cantrell, who subsequently transcribed the hearings. The Firm emailed Cantrell, requesting copies of the audio recordings of the three hearings. Cantrell responded, stating that she had consulted with Judge Emerson, who advised that the Firm should file a motion in order to make a formal request for the recordings. Later that day, the Firm emailed Cantrell (copied to Judge Emerson) that “no such motion is needed, and any instruction that these tapes be withheld until a motion is filed (and presumably ruled upon) is contrary to the Court’s rules and the long-established black letter law in Georgia regarding the public’s access to court records.” When such a motion was ultimately made, the Judge denied it, and the Firm petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for mandamus relief, arguing: (1) the right of access to court records, as provided by Uniform Superior Court Rules 21 through 21.6 (“Rule 21”), included the right to make copies of the recordings; (2) the Firm lacked an adequate legal remedy to vindicate that right; and (3) public officials violated their public duties by refusing to allow the Firm to make copies. The Supreme Court found Rule 21 indeed provided an adequate remedy at law, thus the Court affirmed dismissal of the Firm’s mandamus and injunctive claims. The Court also affirmed dismissal of the Firm’s claim for declaratory judgment, because such a claim cannot be used as a collateral attack on Judge Emerson’s order. View "Merchant Law Firm, P.C. v. Emerson" on Justia Law