Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Bernard Brock challenged his convictions for malice murder and other crimes arising out of the 2015 beating death of Marlene Murray. On appeal, Appellant argued the trial court abused its discretion in admitting, pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”), evidence that in June 2014 he had beaten Ansley Minkema, his girlfriend and co-defendant. Appellant also claimed that when Minkema’s testimony did not match the State’s pretrial proffer, the trial court erred in not reversing its earlier ruling and striking her testimony and, relatedly, that his trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to move to strike her testimony. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that even if the trial court erred in admitting or failing to strike Minkema's testimony, the error was harmless. Appellant’s claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to move to strike Minkema’s testimony about the assault was waived. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions. View "Brock v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Joseph Priester was convicted of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the May 2017 shooting death of Genaro Rojas-Martinez. On appeal, Appellant contended: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an armed robbery and shooting Appellant allegedly committed the day before the murder, pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”); and (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider the prior armed-robbery and shooting evidence for the purposes of opportunity, intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake or accident. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Priester v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Brandon Fuller was convicted by jury of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Daniel Landy. On appeal, Fuller contended he was denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel and that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors prejudiced him. Finding no such errors, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Fuller's conviction. View "Fuller v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2017, Malik Taylor was the driver in a drive-by shooting in which one of his passengers, Jyleel Solomon, was killed by return fire. Taylor was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting. At trial, he claimed that he was shot at first and fired his gun in self-defense. The jury rejected that claim, and on appeal, Taylor contended that the trial court’s jury instruction on the affirmative defense of justification could have led the jury to wrongly believe that Taylor bore the burden of proof on that defense. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected Taylor’s argument because it reject his reading of the jury instruction: in context, it was clear to the Court that the instruction correctly informed the jury about the defense of justification, including the principle that the defendant may not assert the defense if he used force during the commission of a felony. So Taylor’s convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "Taylor v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Roden Meadows appealed his convictions for murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony arising from the 2018 fatal shooting of Jason Williams. On appeal, Meadows contended the evidence constitutionally insufficient and that the Georgia Supreme Court should exercise its authority under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 as the “thirteenth juror” and grant him a new trial. He also argued the trial court erred in three instances by failing to rebuke the prosecutor for making improper and prejudicial statements during closing arguments. The Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to sustain Meadows’s convictions, and that it did not have authority under the cited statutory law to sit as the “thirteenth juror.” The Court also concluded Meadows failed to preserve his challenges to two of the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments, and with respect to the third instance, even if the trial court erred by failing to rebuke the prosecutor, any error was harmless. Although not raised by Meadows on appeal, the Court identified in the record a merger error related to the sentence the trial court entered on Count 3 of the indictment. Because the Supreme Court could not resolve this sentencing issue based on the record, it vacated the merger of and sentence on Count 3 and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Meadows v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Thaddas Nundra was convicted of murder and many other serious charges related to the 2017 shooting death of Herbert Moore. On appeal, he argued the trial court made four key errors, and the cumulative effect of those errors required reversal. Assuming the trial court made at least two errors as alleged, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded these errors were harmless, both individually and cumulatively. With regard to the remaining errors, the Court determined Nundra did not show it was plain error to allow the State to introduce “TrueAllele” DNA evidence without a baseline of how likely a sample was to match a random person. And certain arguments made by the prosecution "were certainly inflammatory," but based on permissible inferences from evidence in the record. The Court therefore affirmed Nundra's convictions. View "Nundra v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Garry Johnson was convicted of malice murder and robbery in connection with the 1997 killing of Irene Shields. Johnson was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole plus a consecutive 20-year term. For years, the Georgia Supreme Court has applied an absolute rule that anything filed by a criminal defendant on his or her own while still represented by counsel was a “legal nullity.” In this case, the Georgia Court asked the parties and amici whether that rule was correct: is a pro se filing made by a defendant who is actually or presumptively represented by counsel always a nullity? The Court now answers that question in the negative: although a defendant does not have a constitutional or statutory right to represent himself while he is also represented by counsel, nothing in the State Constitution or Code prohibited such “hybrid representation. ...Stare decisis does not require us to perpetuate a legal rule that is so obviously and harmfully wrong, and so we overrule our past decisions to the extent they held that a pro se filing by a counseled defendant is always a legal nullity.” View "Johnson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In November of 2020, the people of Georgia, through the results of a ballot question posed in the general election, amended the State Constitution to allow for a specific waiver of sovereign immunity. This new waiver allowed citizens to sue the State for declaratory relief ("Paragraph V"). To the extent that citizens obtain a favorable ruling on their claim for declaratory relief, they could then also seek injunctive relief to “enforce [the court’s] judgment.” To take advantage of this new waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, the Constitution provided that such actions had to be brought “exclusively” against the State. When a plaintiff’s suit violated this exclusivity provision, the Constitution required the suit be dismissed. In the underlying appeal, the plaintiffs’ suit named a defendant for whom a waiver was not provided by Paragraph V. Accordingly, the Constitution required the suit to be dismissed. The Georgia Supreme Court therefore vacated the trial court’s grant of an interlocutory injunction, reversed the denial of the State’s motion to dismiss, and remanded this case with direction that it be dismissed. View "Georgia, et al. v. Sass Group, LLC et al." on Justia Law

Fifteen-year-old Tia McGee was sexually assaulted by an employee working at a behavioral health facility operated by the Devereux Foundation ("Devereux"). At trial, Devereux admitted that “Devereux breached the legal duty of ordinary care owed to Tia McGee for her safety from sexual assault and that the breach of Devereux’s legal duty contributed to Jimmy Singleterry’s sexual assault of Tia McGee.” The jury returned a verdict for $10,000,000 in compensatory damages, finding both Devereux and Singleterry, the employee who assaulted McGee, at fault, and $50,000,000 in punitive damages against Devereux. The trial court ultimately reduced the jury’s punitive-damage award from $50,000,000 to $250,000, consistent with the statutory cap on punitive damages found in OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (g). Jo-Ann Taylor, the executor of McGee's estate, contended that OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (g) violated the rights to trial by jury, separation of powers, and equal protection guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that Taylor did not satisfy her burden of proving there was a "clear and palpable" conflict between the statute and the Georgia Constitution. Thus, the trial court's orders were affirmed. View "Taylor v. Devereux Foundation, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Larry Hood challenged a superior court’s order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Angela Ritter Davis. Hood claimed his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because his plea counsel made an affirmative misrepresentation about the collateral consequences of his plea (i.e., his parole eligibility). After review of the superior court’s record, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Hood’s motion. However, because the superior court committed sentencing errors, the Supreme Court vacated two of Hood’s convictions and remanded for resentencing. View "Hood v. Georgia" on Justia Law