Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Barbra Polke was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes arising from the shooting death of her former girlfriend, Ashley Sharpe. Polke contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court should have exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror to grant a new trial. Polke also contended the State failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the record supported the trial court’s order denying Polke’s motion for a new trial, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Polke v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Antonio Randall was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive, in addition to other traffic offenses. The trial court granted Randall’s motion to suppress evidence of his refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test on the ground that Georgia’s Implied Consent statutes violated a DUI defendant’s due process rights by allowing blood test refusal evidence to be admitted against the defendant at trial. The State appealed. On appeal, the parties agreed that the evidence was admissible for the limited purpose of explaining the absence of evidence of blood test results. Consequently, it was not necessary for the trial court to consider in this case whether admitting blood test refusal evidence for other purposes against DUI defendants was constitutional. "Because a trial court should consider a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute only when necessary to resolve the merits of the case at bar," the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order granting Randall’s motion to suppress. View "Georgia v. Randall" on Justia Law

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Stephen Willis was convicted along with four co-defendants of crimes arising from the 2014 shooting death of Nicholas Hagood. On appeal, Willis contended: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury that the testimony of an accomplice requires corroboration; and (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing an exhibit to be introduced that included information about his prior encounters with law enforcement, not requesting a limiting instruction as to how the jury could consider that felony conviction, and failing to move to suppress the search warrant that yielded Willis’s phone records. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to support Willis’s convictions. Further, the failure to give an accomplice-corroboration jury instruction was not plain error, because even assuming the instruction should have been given, the failure to give it was not likely to have affected the outcome of the trial in light of the substantial evidence against Willis. Finally, Willis failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. "He has not shown that he was prejudiced by the introduction of the exhibit that showed his prior criminal history, and his counsel was not deficient for failing to move to suppress the search warrant because the warrant was supported by probable cause: the warrant application relied in part on a statement from a named informant that was against the informant’s penal interest." So judgment was affirmed. View "Willis v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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In early 2019, police officers responded to a shooting where they discovered 15-year-old appellee Paris Powell standing beside the decedent, Larry “Tre” Bryant. Appellee was interviewed by Detective John Gleason on March 1, March 4, and March 25, 2019, in connection with Bryant’s death. Powell’s mother, Tiffany, was present at all relevant times. After a hearing, the trial court found that Appellee was not in custody for any of the interviews and determined that Appellee’s March 1 and March 4 statements were freely and voluntarily given. However, the trial court partially suppressed Appellee’s March 25 statement, finding that, under a totality of the circumstances, she did not knowingly and voluntarily make a statement as a matter of constitutional due process. The State appealed the trial court’s partial suppression of Appellee’s March 25 statements, contending that the trial court clearly erred in determining that Appellee’s statements were involuntary under Riley v. Georgia, 226 SE2d 922 (1976). After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with the State and affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Georgia v. Powell" on Justia Law

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Anthony Clark was convicted by jury of felony murder and related crimes in connection with the 2019 death of Stasha Baggett. On appeal, Clark argued that, during his trial, a juror improperly communicated with a member of the victim’s family who was sitting in the audience. Clark contended that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate properly or otherwise address the incident, and that the trial court also failed to investigate the incident properly, depriving him of his right to a fair trial. The Georgia Supreme Court found the record showed that counsel made reasonable efforts to address the juror issue, and any error on the part of the trial court was not preserved for review. So judgment was affirmed. View "Clark v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Appellant Jacarey Reese challenged his conviction for felony murder in connection with the 2018 shooting death of Stacy Devero. Appellant’s first trial ended with a hung jury. At his second trial, the defense argued both that Appellant did not shoot Devero and that, even if he did, he was legally justified in doing so. Appellant contended the trial court erred when it denied his request to give a modified version of the former pattern jury instruction on affirmative defenses in light of the Georgia Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in McClure v. Georgia, 834 SE2d 96 (2019), and when it overruled his objections to the prosecutor’s repeated arguments in closing that Appellant was legally precluded from claiming justification because he never admitted that he shot Devero. Appellant also contended the trial court erred in responding to a jury note showing that the jury was swayed by the prosecutor’s improper arguments and therefore misunderstood the law of justification. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s request to give a modified version of the former pattern jury instruction on affirmative defenses in light of McClure. As a result of that initial error, the trial court overruled Appellant’s objections to the prosecutor’s repeated misstatements of the law of justification during closing arguments, which the note sent out by the jury during deliberations showed had misled the jury. Moreover, the court’s response to the jury’s note did nothing to correct the jury’s misunderstanding of the law and indeed may have worsened it. Accordingly, the Court could not say that the court’s instructional error was harmless, and it therefore reversed Appellant’s conviction and sentence for felony murder. However, the Court also concluded that the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction, so the State could retry him if it so chose. View "Reese v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Troy Simmons was convicted by jury of felony murder and other crimes arising out of the 2013 shooting death of Wendell Lee and the aggravated assault of April Tongol. On appeal, Simmons argued : (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury completely on corroboration for confessions as required by OCGA § 24-8-823; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to Simmons’s flight; and (4) trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. Because Simmons did not show reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Simmons v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Appellant Carlos Drennon appealed his convictions for malice murder and participation in criminal street gang activity stemming from the 2007 shooting death of Randy Griffin. Drennon contended, among other things: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants; and (3) that he was denied his right to be present at trial when he was not included in certain bench conference discussions. With respect to the right-to-be-present claim, the Georgia Supreme Court "cannot easily reject that claim on the existing record." The Court vacated the trial court's judgment in part and remanded for a hearing on Drennon’s constitutional claim in the first instance. View "Drennon v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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This appeal presented only a discrete and important threshold question to the underlying case: whether the Georgia Constitution required a plaintiff to establish some cognizable injury to bring a lawsuit in Georgia courts, i.e., to have standing to sue, separate and apart from the statutory authorization to bring suit. The Georgia Supreme Court found T. Davis Humphries, as a private citizen, had standing to assert a claim for injunctive relief against her local county government for its planned removal of a Confederate monument in alleged violation of OCGA § 50-3-1. But the other plaintiffs — the various Sons of Confederate Veterans entities — did not show that they were members of the communities the governments of which they sought to sue, and they alleged no other cognizable injury sufficient to establish their standing. The Court of Appeals was therefore wrong to affirm the dismissal of Humphries’s complaint for a lack of standing as to her claim for injunctive relief, but it was right to affirm the dismissal of the complaints filed by the various Sons of Confederate Veterans groups. The Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether Humphries had standing for her claim for damages under OCGA § 50-3-1, because the cause of action that statute purported to create had not yet arisen; by the statute’s terms, the cause of action arose only upon the occurrence of conduct prohibited by the statute, and that conduct had not yet occurred. View "Sons of Confederate Veterans, et al. v. Henry Cty. Bd of Commissioners" on Justia Law

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Vernon Beamon was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of Sylvia Watson and Samuel White. Beamon appealed, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and that his convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony should have merged. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with both contentions and affirmed. View "Beamon v. Georgia" on Justia Law