Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1987, Dennis Langley was convicted of murder and sentenced to serve life in prison. He was later released on parole. On July 26, 2019, a search of Langley’s home revealed a semi-automatic pistol with a loaded magazine hanging on a wall in his living room and two rifles in his bedroom closet. Langley was charged by accusation with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of OCGA 16-11-131 (b).1 The accusation specified that he had previously been convicted of a forcible felony, murder. Langley pled guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment with the first six months to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. The State filed a timely notice of appeal directed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked the authority to impose a probated sentence and that the sentence was therefore void. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that trial courts lacked the discretion to probate any portion of a sentence imposed for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals did err, and therefore reversed its judgment. View "Langley v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Carl Gardei filed a petition for declaratory judgment against R. L. “Butch” Conway, the Sheriff of Gwinnett County, Georgia, and D. Victor Reynolds, the Director of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”), in their individual capacities (collectively “Respondents”), alleging that Respondents’ continued enforcement against him of the statutory requirements governing Georgia’s Sex Offender Registry (the “Registry”) violated his constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed Gardei’s petition on the ground that his claims for relief were time barred under OCGA 9-3-33, the two-year statute of limitation for personal injury claims, because Gardei had initially registered under the Registry Act in 2009 and every year thereafter. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided opinion. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Gardei’s petition for certiorari to address whether Gardei’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were subject to the limitation period set forth in OCGA 9-3-33, and whether any applicable statute of limitation was tolled based on the requirement that Gardei annually renew his sex-offender registration. The Supreme Court concluded that although Gardei’s claims were subject to the two-year statute of limitation under OCGA 9-3-33, because he sought only prospective relief, the statute of limitation on those claims had not yet begun to run. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’s judgment holding that Gardei’s claims were time-barred, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gardei v. Conway, et al." on Justia Law

Emanuel Ellison appealed his convictions for felony murder and other offenses stemming from the 2014 fatal shooting of Kentrealvist Malcom during an argument at an apartment complex. Ellison argued only that the trial court erred in denying his motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2 based on a justification defense. The Georgia Supreme Court found the record supported at least one of the trial court’s two bases for its ruling — an adverse credibility determination — and so judgment was affirmed. View "Ellison v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Rodney Noel was granted habeas relief from his conviction for murdering nine-month-old Terrell Williams (“Terrell”). The habeas court held that Noel’s appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance for two reasons: (1) counsel failed to challenge the trial court’s denial of Noel’s right to impeach his intimate partner and Terrell’s mother, Crystal Williams (“Williams”), using three prior violent acts by her; and (2) counsel failed to assert Noel’s right to use these acts as proof that Williams, not Noel, killed Terrell. The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with the habeas court that appellate counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Court found Noel’s claim regarding alleged impeachment error failed because it was not preserved at trial and so could not have been successfully raised on appeal. "And Noel has not shown that any deficiency of appellate counsel regarding proof of third-party guilt was prejudicial." Judgment was therefore reversed. View "Bowen v. Noel" on Justia Law

Devon Jenkins was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with an August 6, 2014 home invasion in which the victim was shot and killed and two other victims, including a child, were injured. On appeal, Appellant contended: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; (2) the trial court erred in admitting other-act evidence prohibited by OCGA 24-4-404 (b); and (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a limiting instruction on the other-act evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions. View "Jenkins v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Lowe Payne appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes arising out of the 2017 shooting death of Carldrake Finister. On appeal, Payne argued the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of prior difficulties between the parties, and that trial counsel was deficient for failing to admit a key piece of exculpatory evidence and for failing to request the trial court to reopen the evidence at the jury’s request. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found not reversible error and affirmed Payne's convictions. View "Payne v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Timothy Ward, the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections, appealed the grant of habeas relief to petitioner Lewis Carlton on the ground that the trial court lacked authority to revoke Carlton’s probation arising from his 2012 convictions by guilty pleas before the probationary period of the criminal sentences began. The Commissioner argued the trial court was authorized by statute and precedent to revoke Carlton’s probation before it began. Carlton responded that the habeas court was correct in granting relief because the trial court lacked such authority. He also claimed the trial court’s actions rendered his guilty pleas unknowing and invalid because he would not have entered the pleas had he known that his probation could be revoked before the probationary period began – claims that the habeas court ruled that the trial court should have addressed in the first instance in the context of a motion for out-of-time appeal. After its review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the habeas court erred both in ruling that the trial court could not revoke Carlton’s probation, and in not ruling on Carlton’s invalid-plea claims as well as other claims he asserted. The Court therefore reversed the habeas court’s judgment in part and remanded the case for further consideration. View "Ward v. Carlton" on Justia Law

Odeirrek Boone pleaded guilty to malice murder and other offenses and appeals the denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal. Boone, proceeding pro se, briefly referenced his plea counsel’s failure to consult with him regarding his right to appeal, but the bulk of his argument was that plea counsel failed to advise him of his right to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing and, had he been so advised, he would have withdrawn his guilty plea. And in attacking on appeal the court’s denial of the motion for out-of-time appeal, before the Georgia Supreme Court, Boone sought only an opportunity to move to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court found "a belated motion to withdraw his guilty plea is not a remedy to which Boone would be entitled even if the court below had granted his motion for out-of-time appeal." It therefore affirmed the denial of relief. View "Boone v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to address whether defendant's convictions for theft by taking merged under the correct unit-of-prosecution analysis. Because the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal analysis in evaluating whether Johnson’s theft-by-taking convictions should have merged, the Supreme Court vacated the lower court's holding on that issue and remanded with direction to apply the correct analysis. View "Johnson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the scope of Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVI of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 (“Paragraph XVI”) extended to another test sometimes administered in driving-under-the-influence cases, namely, a chemical test of urine. Under the reasoning of Olevik v. Georgia, 806 SE2d 505 (2017) and Elliott v. Georgia, 824 SE2d 265 (2019), the Supreme Court held that the right against compelled self-incrimination protected by Paragraph XVI prohibited the State from admitting into evidence a defendant’s refusal to urinate into a collection container as directed by the State for purposes of providing a urine sample for chemical testing. View "Award v. Georgia" on Justia Law