Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Chandler Saxton was convicted of malice murder and a firearm offense in connection with the 2014 shooting death of John Jones. In his sole enumeration of error, he contended the trial court erred by allowing the State’s lead investigator to testify about the direction in which one of the bullets that struck Jones traveled. Assuming without deciding that this testimony was erroneously admitted, the Georgia Supreme Court determined it was harmless, so it affirmed the trial court. View "Saxton v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Larry Bates was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of his neighbor, Paul Wilson, and Wilson’s dog. Appellant began accusing his across-the-street neighbors, Paul and Beth Wilson, of allowing their dogs, Scooter and Maggie, to urinate and defecate on his lawn. In May 2017, Appellant made numerous calls to 911 and code enforcement authorities regarding the Wilsons’ dogs and also to report “harassment” from the Wilsons in the form of staring and gesturing at Appellant. Officers responding to the 911 and code enforcement calls found no evidence of defecation by the dogs, and the Wilsons denied harassing Appellant and allowing their dogs to urinate or defecate on the lawn. On May 29, in the presence of a responding officer and another neighbor, Appellant and Wilson shook hands and agreed to let “bygones be bygones.” A month later, Wilson arrived home from work and took the dogs out for their nightly walk. Appellant saw Wilson and his dogs outside Appellant’s home. Shortly thereafter, Appellant called 911 and requested an officer to respond to his address because he was “fixing to shoot this son of a b**ch” for “letting his dog piss in [unintelligible] yard.” While on the phone with the 911 operator, Appellant fired numerous shots at Wilson, killing both him and Scooter. On appeal, Appellant claimed four instances of error, all alleging ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) trial counsel pursued meritless defenses; (2) trial counsel failed to file the necessary pre-trial notice to pursue a mental illness defense; (3) trial counsel failed to properly subpoena an expert witness; and (4) trial counsel failed to object to and rebut the State’s expert witness. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bates v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Maureen Floyd sought permission to file an information in the nature of quo warranto against appellee Superior Court Judge Jesse Stone of the Augusta Judicial Circuit, with the goal of having him removed from office. Relying on Paragraph VIII (a) of Article V, Section II of the Georgia Constitution, Floyd contended Judge Stone’s appointment was illegal, because the Governor did not “promptly” appoint him to fill the vacancy on the superior court created by the accepted resignation of his predecessor, Judge Michael Annis. The trial court granted Judge Stone’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in quo warranto and denied Floyd leave to file an information against Judge Stone, in part because Floyd failed to show that removal from office through a proceeding in quo warranto was the proper remedy for an appointment that was not made promptly. Finding no error in that judgment, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on that basis. View "Floyd v. Stone" on Justia Law

Corey Myers was convicted by jury of felony murder and related charges in the shooting death of Emanuel “Seymour” Jones and of burglary and trespass in a separate incident. On appeal, Myers contended that “[t]he verdict is contrary to the principles of justice and equity and against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence” and that the prosecutor improperly argued that a shell casing found near the victim’s body was not relevant to the circumstances of the shooting. He also contended that his decision to plead not guilty was not knowing and voluntary because, contrary to the State’s representation before trial, he was not actually facing a potential mandatory life without parole sentence if he went to trial. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed Myers' conviction. View "Myers v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Daniel Taylor was convicted by jury of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of his father, Richard. The trial court denied Taylor’s motion for new trial, and he appealed, contending only that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of statutory law because it was entirely circumstantial and the State failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than his guilt. Because the Georgia Supreme Court found the evidence was sufficient as a matter of statutory law, it affirmed Taylor's conviction. View "Taylor v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Lee Hines was convicted by jury of malice murder and felony murder in connection with the 2003 stabbing death of Lacharity Gaines. Hines’s sole contention on appeal was that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to present a “surprise witness” who was not disclosed to the defense until the day of trial. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Hines' conviction. View "Hines v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Victor Grullon was convicted by jury of trafficking heroin, and a trial court sentenced him to serve 30 years in prison. Grullon appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the trial court gave an erroneous jury charge on deliberate ignorance. The Court of Appeals affirmed Grullon’s conviction, concluding that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), and that Grullon did not show “reversible error because he affirmatively stated to the trial court that he had no objection after the jury was charged.” The Georgia Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that Grullon affirmatively waived his claim that the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction on deliberate ignorance. Because the Supreme Court answered this question in the negative, it reversed that portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment. View "Grullon v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Georgia law generally required a person to apply for and receive a valid weapons carry license from a probate judge before carrying a handgun or other weapon in public. The General Assembly identified specific categories of people to whom “[n]o weapons carry license shall be issued,” including people with certain criminal convictions. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a probate judge could deny an application for a weapons carry license under OCGA 16-11-129 based on a determination that the applicant’s criminal history records report failed to show the outcome of an arrest that could have resulted in a disqualifying conviction. Applying the plain language of the statute, the Court concluded that a probate judge had no such authority. It therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision to the contrary. View "Bell v. Hargrove" on Justia Law

Jammie Rashad Davis appealed his convictions for murder and other crimes stemming from the 2018 shooting death of Latravius Burks. Davis argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because evidence showed that he acted in self-defense; and (2) the trial court plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded: (1) Davis’s sufficiency claim failed because the jury did not have to believe Davis’s self-serving testimony that he was defending himself. And (2) his claim of plain instructional error fails because the victim’s touching of Davis’s daughter’s lips was "not the kind of provocation that would have obviously required a voluntary manslaughter instruction." View "Davis v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Andrew Murray was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Paul Sampleton, Jr. Over the course of his motion-for-new-trial proceedings, Murray was appointed three different attorneys, each of whom he rejected. Representing himself at the last hearing on his motion for new trial, Murray purported to be a different person – “Billy Drew Bey” – who was acting as Murray’s attorney, prompting the trial court to enter an order either dismissing or denying Murray’s amended motion for new trial because “Bey” had not provided any support for the motion and “Murray” had failed to appear for the hearing. Murray appealed that order. The Georgia Supreme Court found that because the reasons given by the trial court were not proper grounds for dismissing or denying Murray’s amended motion for new trial, judgment was vacated and the case remanded for the court to consider the merits of Murray’s motion. View "Murray v. Georgia" on Justia Law