Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Shay Merritt was convicted by jury of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the shooting death of his wife, Rita Ann Merritt. On appeal, Merritt raised six claims of trial court error and further argued the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that he was denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Merritt's convictions. View "Merritt v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2010, Bilal Jackson was convicted by jury for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, attempted armed robbery, attempted murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting of Darryl Claro in 2007, when Jackson was 15 years old. The trial court sentenced Jackson to serve a total of 55 years in prison. Jackson's petition for habeas corpus was denied after a hearing. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Jackson's application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal to consider two issues: (1) whether alleged merger errors in sentencing may be raised for the first time in a habeas corpus proceeding or instead must be raised as part of a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (2) whether Jackson’s convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and attempted armed robbery merge into his conviction for attempted murder. The Supreme Court concluded that merger claims could be raised for the first time in habeas and were not procedurally barred by a habeas petitioner’s failure to raise them earlier in his criminal case. The Court also concluded the habeas court erred in rejecting Jackson’s claim that his convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery merge into his conviction for attempted murder, but did not err in rejecting his claim that his conviction for attempted armed robbery merged into his conviction for attempted murder. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The case was remanded to the habeas court with direction to vacate Jackson’s convictions and sentences for aggravated assault and aggravated battery. View "Jackson v. Crickmar" on Justia Law

Appellant Jamie Hood appealed his 2015 convictions on a total of 36 counts charging him with murder, aggravated assault, kidnapping, carjacking, and other offenses. The charges arose from the December 2010 shooting death of Kenneth Wray and a series of crimes in March 2011 that resulted in the death of Athens-Clarke County Police Officer Elmer Christian. With regard to his convictions for the Wray murder, Appellant contended: (1) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose material impeachment evidence with regard to a key State’s witness; (2) the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on the necessity of corroborating a confession; and (3) the cumulative harm of these two errors requires reversal. With regard to his convictions for the murder of Officer Christian, Appellant contended the trial court erred by: (1) failing to instruct the jury on the defense of delusional compulsion; and (2) admitting testimony from a responding officer about images of Officer Christian’s family he saw on the on-board laptop computer in Officer Christian’s patrol car. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed. View "Hood v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Martin Montanez was convicted by jury for the murders of Byron Caceres and Eulalio Mederos-Vega and several theft, firearm-possession, and drug-related offenses arising from the incident in which they were killed. On appeal, Montanez argued: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a matter of due process to sustain his conviction as to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under OCGA 16-11-133 (b); (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain any of his convictions because the testimony of his alleged accomplice was not corroborated, as required by Georgia law; and (3) that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Montanez v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Jaren Sullivan was convicted of malice murder and other charges related to the shooting death of Marques Dockery and the aggravated assault of Najee Murray. On appeal, Appellant contended that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to present evidence of Dockery’s alleged gang affiliation; (2) failing to elicit testimony suggesting that Dockery was armed; and (3) failing to object when an investigator offered his opinions regarding the shooting. Also contending that these errors combined to prejudice him, Appellant sought reversal of his convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. View "Sullivan v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Paula Kelly was convicted of murder and other crimes in 2015. Through new counsel, Kelly filed a motion for new trial, which was denied in an order entered on September 11, 2018. On October 15, 2018, Kelly filed a notice of appeal. Because the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the denial of the motion for new trial, the Georgia Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. In the dismissal order, the Supreme Court advised Kelly of her right to seek an out-of-time appeal and stated that, if an out-of-time appeal were granted, “appellant will have 30 days from the grant within which to file a notice of appeal.” Kelly thereafter sought an out-of-time appeal, and a trial court granted the motion on March 22, 2019. The court’s order incorrectly stated that “[Kelly’s] counsel did not file a timely motion for new trial” and advised Kelly that she could “file a motion for new trial or notice of appeal within 30 days from the date of this Order.” Kelly then filed a second motion for new trial on Monday, April 22, 2019. In this second motion for new trial, in which Kelly was represented by the same counsel as in her initial motion, Kelly asserted substantially similar claims as those previously raised and rejected. The second motion was denied on September 13, 2019. The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether, when a trial court has denied a criminal defendant’s motion for new trial and the defendant subsequently seeks and was granted an out-of-time appeal, the defendant was authorized to file a second motion for new trial to raise claims other than those alleging the ineffective assistance of trial counsel that could not have been raised in the initial motion. The Court concluded that a defendant was not authorized to do so. For this reason, this appeal was untimely and had to be dismissed. View "Kelly v. Georgia" on Justia Law

For a brief time period, OCGA 9-3-33.1 allowed time-barred civil claims for childhood sexual abuse to be revived. During that time period, Joy Caroline Harvey Merchan sued her parents, Walter Jackson Harvey, Jr., and Carole Allyn Hill Harvey, under the revival provision of the statute for damages resulting from alleged childhood sexual abuse that occurred decades prior to the filing of the action, principally in Quebec, Canada. The Harveys moved dismiss and for summary judgment, arguing that Merchan’s claims were time-barred and could not be revived. Alternatively, the Harveys argued the revival provision of the Act violated Georgia’s constitutional ban on retroactive laws and the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The trial court largely denied the Harveys’ motions, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted interlocutory review to decide: (1) whether Georgia or Quebec law applied to Merchan’s claims; (2) whether OCGA 9-3-33.1 could revive a cause of action for acts that did not occur in Georgia; and (3) whether Georgia’s constitutional ban on retroactive laws and the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions would bar Merchan’s pursuit of such a cause of action against her parents. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded: (1) Georgia substantive law applied to those torts committed in state, while Quebec substantive law applied to the torts committed there; (2) Georgia’s limitations period applied to torts committed in state, but for torts committed in Quebec, the trial court had to determine in the first instance which limitations period was shorter, and the shorter period would control. Merchan could pursue a cause of action for acts that occurred in Quebec as well as Georgia, because OCGA 9-3-33.1’s definition of childhood sexual abuse was broad enough to cover acts that occurred outside of Georgia. "And such a result does not violate Georgia’s constitutional ban on retroactive laws or the Harveys’ due process or equal protection rights. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, vacate it in part, and remand the case for the trial court to compare the respective limitations periods." View "Harvey et al. v. Merchan" on Justia Law

Appellant Annette Collins Flood was convicted of felony murder and a knife offense in connection with the stabbing death of Bobby Burns, her longtime boyfriend. Appellant contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for felony murder. She also raised three separate enumerations of error regarding the jury instructions provided at her trial, contending these instructional errors combined to prejudice her. Finally, Appellant contended the State improperly placed her character at issue during closing argument. Appellant sought a new trial, but the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed her convictions. View "Flood v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Timothy Wilson, Jr. was convicted by jury of child molestation, statutory rape, and two counts of incest involving his 13-year-old stepdaughter, B. O., and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. Wilson petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted to consider “[w]hether the trial court erred in concluding that evidence of alleged prior offenses of child molestation was admissible under OCGA 24-4-414.” The Court determined the Court of Appeals' analysis of the trial court's decision to admit Wilson's prior offenses of child molestation was flawed, but concluded the judgment was correct. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Wilson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jereno Kinslow's felony conviction for computer trespass was premised on evidence that Kinslow altered his employer’s computer network settings so that e-mail messages meant for Kinslow’s boss would also be copied and forwarded to Kinslow’s personal e-mail account. The Court of Appeals affirmed Kinslow’s conviction, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted Kinslow’s petition for certiorari, posing the question of whether Kinslow’s conduct constituted a violation of OCGA 16-9-93 (b)(2). The Court found that although the statute in general was extremely broad, the portion of (b)(2) on which the State exclusively relied did not reach Kinslow’s conduct. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented at Kinslow’s trial was insufficient to support his conviction under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and thus reversed. View "Kinslow v. Georgia" on Justia Law