Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Cody Regan appealed his sentence of 20 years in prison, with one year to serve, for one count of felony child molestation, following his non-negotiated guilty plea. Regan argued he improperly received a felony sentence for child molestation, in violation of his rights to equal protection under the United States and Georgia Constitutions, because he was similarly situated to people receiving misdemeanor sentences for aggravated child molestation. Regan also argued his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the federal and state constitutions, because his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crime. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the sentencing scheme for child molestation set out at OCGA § 16-6-4 (b), as applied to Regan, violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. These sentencing provisions provided for a misdemeanor sentence where the victim is at least 14 years old (among other conditions), but the misdemeanor sentencing provisions for aggravated child molestation provided for a misdemeanor sentence where the victim is at least 13 years old. Because the victim in this case was 13 years old, Regan did not qualify for the misdemeanor sentence he would have received if he had instead committed aggravated child molestation. "There is no rational basis for such disparate treatment." The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s order denying Regan's motion in arrest of judgment, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for Appellant to be resentenced for misdemeanor child molestation under OCGA § 16-6-4 (b) (2). Because the Court resolved Regan's challenges to his sentence on federal equal-protection grounds, it did not reach his cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims. View "Regan v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether Larry Jenkins’ unequivocal statement that he would not talk to law enforcement without a lawyer was a valid invocation of his Miranda rights. The trial court concluded that the statement came at a time that Jenkins was not being interrogated and at which no interrogation was imminent, and thus it was “anticipatory” and invalid under a line of precedent from several federal courts of appeals. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by extending that precedent to the circumstances in this case. The Court found that at the time that Jenkins invoked his Miranda rights, he (1) was in custody for the crimes at issue in this case, (2) had been given Miranda warnings, (3) had already been subjected to custodial interrogation by law enforcement on the way to the jail, and (4) was going through the booking process. "Whether or not the booking process itself was custodial interrogation, the facts of this case show that a reasonable person in Jenkins’s position would have believed that interrogation was at least imminent." Accordingly, the Supreme Court held his unequivocal invocation was valid, the State’s failure to honor it rendered his custodial statements inadmissible, and the State failed to show that the use of that inadmissible evidence was harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed Jenkins’s convictions; because the evidence against him was constitutionally sufficient, he could be retried. View "Jenkins v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellants Joshua Rooks and Quatez Clark were convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2016 shooting death of Christopher Dean. Rooks contended the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Clark similarly contended the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on certain counts; he also claimed the court erred by failing to grant his motion for new trial on the “general grounds” set forth in OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 and by admitting under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) evidence showing that he participated in another murder 11 days after Dean’s murder and that he committed marijuana- and firearm-related crimes about two months after Dean’s murder. Finding no reversible error in either case, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed convictions in both cases. View "Rooks v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jessica Eubanks was convicted by jury of felony murder. Eubanks lived with her boyfriend, Shawn Hughes, and Shawn’s sister, Amy Hughes, who had severe developmental disabilities. Eubanks used heroin and methamphetamine and kept a large supply of heroin in the home. One evening when Shawn was out, Eubanks invited two people to the home to buy heroin. During the transaction, which she conducted in the main part of the home, some of the drug spilled “all over the place” and Eubanks tried to clean it up. Then she went out, leaving Amy home alone. The next morning Amy was found dead of heroin toxicity. Eubanks appealed. "Although Eubanks’s conviction tests the limits our felony-murder statute places on that offense," the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that based on precedent and the unusual facts of this case that the evidence was sufficient to authorize her conviction. "Eubanks’s possession of heroin with intent to distribute was dangerous to human life under the circumstances of this case because it was foreseeable that keeping a large amount of a deadly drug in a home where a highly vulnerable person lived, and engaging in drug transactions in areas that person could freely access, could lead to that person being fatally exposed to the drug." Finding no other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Eubanks v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Deveric Hardy was convicted of malice murder for the November 2016 shooting death of Kyree Smith. He appealed that conviction, arguing that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to introduce evidence that Smith had a violent character and by failing to request a jury instruction on accomplice corroboration. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Hardy's judgment of conviction. View "Hardy v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Cortney Bell was convicted by jury of second degree murder, second degree cruelty to children, and felony contributing to the dependency of a minor in connection with the death of her infant daughter, Caliyah. The Court of Appeals reversed Bell’s convictions for second degree murder and cruelty to children on appeal, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support those charges. It affirmed her conviction for felony contributing to the dependency of a minor, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to support Bell’s conviction on that charge. Because the Supreme Court concluded, based on the facts of this case, that the evidence was insufficient to authorize a jury to conclude that Caliyah’s death was proximately caused by Bell’s conduct as alleged in the indictment, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Bell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Reginald Maynor appealed his convictions for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and other crimes related to the 2015 shooting death of Marti Stegall, Sr. This case stemmed from f a romantic affair involving two couples residing in the Trestle Tree Village Apartments. The conflict caused by this affair ultimately resulted in Appellant shooting and killing Stegall during a neighborhood Fourth of July celebration. At trial, Appellant admitted that he shot Stegall but claimed that he did so in self-defense. On appeal, Appellant argued the evidence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional and statutory law to disprove his claim of self-defense. Appellant also contended he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine a witness and failed to move for a mistrial when the trial evidence did not substantiate a factual claim made by the prosecutor in his opening statement. Appellant also asked that the Georgia Supreme Court consider the prejudicial effect of trial counsel’s errors cumulatively. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Maynor v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Javion Caldwell was charged with: felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 1), felony murder predicated on possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (Count 4). These charges arose in connection with the shooting death of Jaleen Harrell during a drug deal. Caldwell was found guilty of Counts 2 and 4 and not guilty of Counts 1 and 3. On appeal, Caldwell argued the trial court failed to charge the jury that it had to find that he shot Harrell with a handgun in order to find him guilty on Count 2. Caldwell alternatively argued that the jury’s verdicts on Counts 1, 2, and 3 were repugnant, because the jury’s verdicts on Counts 1 and 3 reflected a finding that he did not shoot Harrell, even as a party to the crime, which Caldwell argued also meant that it had to acquit him on Count 2. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Caldwell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2020, Darnell Priester was convicted of malice murder, aggravated battery, and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Thomas Robinson and the non-fatal shooting of Timothy Nelson. He appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to support them; (2) the trial court erred by denying him a new trial on the general grounds; and (3) the trial court committed plain error by not giving jury instructions related to justification and perjury. Priester also argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the lack of jury instructions related to justification and perjury; failing to object to testimony that implicated Priester’s right to remain silent; failing to cross-examine Shane Godsey; requesting an instruction on the necessity of corroboration of accomplice testimony; failing to file a pretrial motion for immunity; and failing to object to narrative testimony, to “asked and answered” testimony, and to the prosecutor “testifying.” Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Priester v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Antonio May died from injuries he sustained inside the Fulton County (Georgia) Jail while in the custody of the Fulton County Sheriff. The defendants, Aaron Cook, Jason Roache, Guito Dela Cruz, Omar Jackson, Kenesia Strowder, and William Whitaker, were employed as jailers by the Fulton County Sheriff and were on duty at the Jail when May died. The State alleged through indictments of the defendants for felony murder and other crimes the defendants beat, pepper sprayed, and repeatedly shocked May with an electronic taser, thereby causing his death. Claiming the pre-indictment protections afforded to “peace officers” under OCGA § 17-7-52, the defendants sought to quash their indictments on the basis that they did not receive preindictment notice and an opportunity to be heard. The trial court found that, while none of the defendants were empowered to make arrests, they were nevertheless charged with maintaining the public peace. To that end, the trial court reasoned that “within the community of over 3,000 inmates in the Fulton County Jail (which is accessible to the public in various controlled ways), detention officers are the maintainers of public order” in the event that “there is a fight in the mess hall over bad beans or a brawl in the common space over which channel the TV should be on[.]” On that basis, the trial court quashed the indictments. The State appealed. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by finding that the defendants’ duty to control and supervise inmates within the jail constituted a duty to maintain the public peace. Accordingly, the judgments were reversed. View "Georgia v. Cook, et al." on Justia Law