Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented to the Georgia Supreme Court centered on a dispute over the legal ownership of mineral rights to land located in Bartow County. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that appellee James Dellinger, Jr. held a legally enforceable interest in the mineral rights and granted summary judgment in his favor on claims filed by appellant Cartersville Ranch, LLC. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision in the main appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Cartersville Ranch, LLC v. Dellinger" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute over equipment owned by Tri-State Concrete Contracting, an unincorporated sole proprietorship. Abel Ramirez worked at Tri-State, and when its proprietor, DuWayne Juhnke, died. Ramirez entered an agreement with Juhnke's wife to continue operating Tri-State and to make payments to purchase Tri-State and its equipment. After making some payments, Ramirez stopped, opened Abel & Sons Concrete, LLC, and started doing Tri-State's jobs with Tri-State's equipment without paying for the use of that equipment. In response, Mrs. Juhnke and the administrator of Mr. Juhnke's estate ("Appellees") sued Ramirez and Abel & Sons ("Appellants") along with Dollar Concrete Construction Company, the company that was storing the equipment and allegedly letting Appellants use it without Appellees' permission. Appellees and Dollar filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied both motions for summary judgment, explaining that it was undisputed that Dollar did not own the equipment and that Appellees did not have access to it, but there was a genuine factual dispute as to the ownership of the equipment and whether Dollar had refused Appellees' demand for its return. The trial court's order that although Appellees and Dollar had asked at a hearing for time to resolve how Dollar would relinquish the equipment, they had not presented a consent order, so the court sua sponte required Dollar to place the equipment outside its locked storage yard within 30 days and after giving seven days' notice to Appellants and Appellees to allow them to "arrange to retrieve and store same pending determination as to ownership." The order further directed Appellants and Appellees not to "transfer, damage, or use the property pending determination as to ownership" and to equally share the costs of moving and storage. The Supreme Court concluded that those portions of the order comprised, in substance, an interlocutory injunction, and Appellants filed this appeal to challenge the injunction against them on the ground that they were not given notice before the court imposed it. Because Appellants did not have proper notice of the interlocutory injunction, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing it against them, and the portion of the court's order issuing equitable relief binding Appellants was vacated. View "Abel & Sons Concrete, LLC v. Juhnke" on Justia Law

In 2007, Larry Thompson executed a continuing guaranty in favor of Lafarge Building Materials, Inc., as part of an application for credit submitted by his company, Elite Dwellings, LLC. During 2008, Elite Dwellings ordered building materials under the account established based on the application but then failed to pay Lafarge for the materials. In May 2009, Lafarge sued Elite Dwellings and Thompson, alleging that they were jointly and severally liable for the debt. Lafarge and Thompson eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and in October 2012, the trial court ruled that the guaranty satisfied the Statute of Frauds and entered summary judgment against Elite Dwellings and Thompson jointly and severally. Elite Dwellings did not appeal the judgment, but Thompson did. A divided Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the guaranty was unenforceable because it did not sufficiently identify the name of the principal debtor and thus failed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The question presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the guaranty agreement at issue here did not identify the principal debtor with sufficient specificity to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The Supreme Court concluded the appellate court did err, and reversed. View "Lafarge Building Materials, Inc. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) entered into a construction contract with Lewis Walker Roofing (Walker Roofing) to re-roof several buildings at Valdosta State Prison. The Contract contained two “no assignment” clauses, and as a prerequisite to contracting with GDOC, Walker Roofing was required to obtain payment and performance bonds. It obtained such payment and performance bonds from Developers Surety and Indemnity Company. Walker Roofing did not complete its work within the time frame required by the Contract, and GDOC declared Walker Roofing in default. Developers Surety did not notify GDOC within 25 days of receipt of GDOC's notice of default regarding whether it would remedy the default or perform the contract. However, approximately three months after the declaration of default, Developers Surety gave GDOC the option of entering into a contract with another company for the completion of the work. GDOC then contracted with that company to finish the project. Under the payment and performance bonds and prior to Walker Roofing's default, Developers Surety had provided financial assistance to Walker Roofing. Developers Surety filed suit against GDOC for breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation under the payment and performance bond it issued to Walker Roofing on behalf of GDOC. GDOC filed a counterclaim for breach of contract. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court determined that Developers Surety's claims were not barred by sovereign immunity and that GDOC had breached the construction contract as a matter of law. It concluded that GDOC waived its sovereign immunity by entering into the contract with Walker Roofing, and that the doctrine of equitable subrogation gave Developers Surety the ability to file suit against GDOC once it incurred liability and paid the obligations of its principal under the bond. Consequently, the trial court granted summary judgment to Developers Surety and denied it to GDOC; in the same order, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Developers Surety in the amount equal to the "financial assistance" Developers Surety provided to Walker Roofing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the State’s sovereign immunity was waived for the claim Developers Surety made on its contract with the State. The Supreme Court found that immunity was indeed waived in this instance, and accordingly, it affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Georgia Dept. of Corrections v. Developers Surety & Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

Appellee Yvonne Butler was a principal at a DeKalb County elementary school. Appellant DeKalb County School District notified appellee it would be terminating her employment for: (1) incompetency; (2) insubordination; (3) wilful neglect of duties; and (4)for other good and sufficient cause. Appellee was placed on suspension while the charges were pending. A hearing was scheduled pursuant to the Fair Dismissal Act (FDA), but the parties agreed to a continuance. The record revealed the hearing never took place. Appellant offered appellee, in lieu of termination, a contract for a classroom teaching position for the 2011- 2012 school year and required that she sign and return the contract before May 19, 2011, if she chose to accept the offer. On May 31, 2011, appellee responded to the May 11 letter by asserting that she had a right to an FDA hearing. In her May 31 response, appellee never indicated she would be accepting the offered position of classroom teacher. On June 30, 2011, upon hiring new counsel, appellee returned the signed teaching contract "under protest." In July, appellant issued appellee a separation notice indicating appellee’s employment had ended as of June 30, 2011. The following March, appellee filed this mandamus action, requesting an FDA hearing, a name-clearing hearing, and damages for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in regard to the proffered 2011-2012 teaching contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted and denied in part both parties’ motions: the decision effectively granted appellee’s petition for a writ of mandamus and held that appellee was entitled to an FDA hearing because she was a tenured employee and had been demoted from an administrator to a teacher. In addition, the trial court held that the request for a separate name-clearing hearing was moot as appellee could clear her name at the FDA hearing. Finally, the trial court denied appellee’s claim of damages for breach because it found that appellee had not timely accepted the contract to be a classroom teacher for the 2011-2012 school year. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since appellee had earned tenure as a teacher, at the time of her suspension from the position as principal in 2010, the only right she had under the FDA was continued employment as a teacher. Therefore, the School District complied with the FDA when it offered appellee a teaching position for the 2011-2012 school year rather than insisting upon her termination. At that point, the FDA did not require any additional action by appellant. Thus, it was error for the trial court to conclude that appellant was required to hold a demotion hearing pursuant to the FDA in addition to offering appellee continued employment as a teacher. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court in all other respects. View "Dekalb County Sch. Dist. v. Butler" on Justia Law

Appellee AGCO Corporation (AGCO) manufactured and sold a self-propelled, agricultural spray applicator called the "RoGator." In 2005, AGCO began offering an Extended Protection Plan (EPP) to its RoGator customers. Appellant Lloyd’s Syndicate No. 5820 d/b/a Cassidy Davis provided the master policy of insurance for the EPP program, which covered AGCO for certain liability to customers who purchased the RoGator EPP. Glynn General Corporation administered the plans. Between 2005 and 2008, AGCO enrolled about 2,050 RoGator machines in the EPP program. In 2008, a number of customers presented claims under the EPP based on the failure of wheel motors on the RoGator. After it paid about 25 claims related to this failure, Cassidy Davis invoked the "Epidemic Failure Clause" of the master insurance policy and refused to pay for any more claims. AGCO then sued Cassidy Davis asserting various claims, namely claims for breach of contract and bad faith denial of insurance coverage. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to AGCO and denied partial summary judgment to Cassidy Davis on a breach of contract issue, holding that the EPP covered failures caused by design and engineering defects in the RoGators. The trial court also denied Cassidy Davis’s motion for summary judgment on the bad faith claim, rejecting the insurer’s argument that it was not obligated to indemnify AGCO until a court entered a judgment establishing AGCO’s legal liability to its customers. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on both issues. Cassidy Davis appealed, arguing: (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the coverage provision of the extended protection plan; and (2) the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the indemnity provision of the master policy of liability insurance. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the relevant language of both contracts. Therefore the Court reversed on both issues. View "Lloyd's Syndicate No. 5820 v. AGCO Corporation" on Justia Law

The Public School Employees Retirement System of Georgia (PSERS) filed suit against Appellant Leroy Ayers to recover three months of benefit payments to his mother that PSERS mistakenly made after Mrs. Ayers had died. A jury ultimately returned a $5,000 verdict in favor of Appellant. PSERS appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in denying PSERS' motion for a directed verdict. The Supreme Court found that the statutes that established Mrs. Ayers' contract for retirement benefits did not authorize the payment of monthly retirement benefits beyond her life and her designated joint annuitant who predeceased her. Accordingly, no benefits were payable to Appellant after his mother's death. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court erred in denying PSERS' motion for a directed verdict, but did so based on analysis of retirement forms Mrs. Ayers filled out and correspondence she exchanged with PSERS instead of analysis of the statutory scheme. View "Ayers v. Public School Employees Retirement System of Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellee Steven Wilson is a licensed optometrist, providing eye care services in Lowndes County as Wilson Eye Center (“WEC”). Appellees Cynthia McMurray, Jodie E. Summers, and David Price are also licensed optometrists employed by WEC. Prior to 2010, Spectera, Inc. had entered provider contracts ("Patriot contracts") with Wilson and McMurray and they became members of Spectera's panel of eye care providers. Summers was already on Spectera's panel of eye care providers. Under the Patriot contract, Spectera would reimburse appellees for the materials Spectera insureds used from WEC's inventory by paying appellees a fee for their materials' costs and by having Spectera insureds remit a materials copayment to appellees. Spectera decided to terminate its Patriot contracts and replace them with independent participating provider (IPP) agreements. After the trial court temporarily enjoined Spectera from enforcing its IPP agreement, Spectera sought to remove appellees Wilson, Summers, and McMurray from its approved panel of providers. The trial court enjoined Spectera from taking such action. Although Price was not on Spectera's provider panel, he alleged Spectera violated Georgia law by denying him membership on its panel because of his refusal to sign the IPP agreement. Upon considering the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted issued a permanent injunction precluding Spectera from enforcing the restrictions contained in the IPP agreement as to "any other licensed eye care provider on [Spectera's] provider panel" or those who had applied for admittance to the panel. Spectera appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in part and reversed in part. Upon review of Spectera's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded a portion of the IPP agreement violated Georgia law, and therefore sustained the Court of Appeals in one respect. However, because the IPP agreement did create the type of impermissible discrimination between classes of licensed eye care providers contemplated by the applicable law, the Court of Appeals was incorrect in concluding that the IPP agreement violated that particular subsection of the applicable law. Furthermore, the termination of any outstanding contracts with appellees Wilson, McMurray, and Summers should have been based on the lawful terms stated in the contracts and not based on a permanent court injunction. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Spectera, Inc. v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Stephen and Elizabeth Schultz contracted with Benchmark Builders, Inc. for the construction of a home. The Schultzes refused to close because they claimed the home was not built in conformance with the contract and Benchmark sued for specific performance or, in the alternative, for money damages for breach of contract. The Schultzes answered and filed a counterclaim for breach of contract seeking money damages for the return of earnest money they had paid and also for the value of certain fixtures they purchased and that had been installed in the home. They also sought attorney fees resulting from the alleged breach. The jury returned a verdict form that found for the Schultzes both as to Benchmark's claim and the Schultzes' counterclaim. The jury awarded the Schultzes zero dollars on the claim for light fixtures, zero dollars for return of the earnest money, and $16,555 on the claim for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals held the Schultzes were entitled, as the “prevailing party” to the award of attorney fees pursuant to the parties' contract and thus affirmed the award. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the parties' contract allowed for an award of attorney fees to a party that recovered no money damages or other relief that it sought. Under the terms of the contract, the fact that the jury did not award actual damages did not mean the Schultzes could not be deemed the prevailing party to the lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Benchmark Builders, Inc. v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Spectera is a vision care insurer that provides eye care benefits coverage to Georgia residents. Appellee Steven M. Wilson is a licensed optometrist who provides eye care services in Lowndes County as Wilson Eye Center ("WEC"). Appellees Cynthia McMurray, Jodie E. Summers, and David Price are also licensed optometrists that work for WEC. Prior to 2010, Spectera had entered provider contracts ("Patriot contracts") with Wilson and McMurray and they became members of Spectera's panel of eye care providers. In 2010, Spectera decided to terminate its Patriot contracts and replace them with independent participating provider (IPP) agreements. Under the new agreement "[appellees] would no longer receive the reimbursement for materials from Spectera and would no longer be entitled to retain the materials co[-]pays from Spectera insureds." Appellees sued Spectera contending that Spectera's proposed IPP agreement violated various subsections of Georgia's Patient Access to Eye Care Act. While the case was pending, the trial court issued a temporary injunction prohibiting Spectera from forcing its panel of independent participating providers in Georgia to abide by the IPP agreement. After the trial court temporarily enjoined Spectera from enforcing its IPP agreement, Spectera sought to remove appellees Wilson, Summers, and McMurray from its approved panel of providers altogether; but the trial court enjoined Spectera from taking such action. Although appellee Price was not on Spectera's provider panel, he alleged Spectera violated the Act by denying him membership on its panel because of his refusal to sign the IPP agreement. The trial court granted the appellees' motions for summary judgment, denied Spectera's motion for summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction precluding Spectera from enforcing the restrictions contained in the IPP agreement as to "any other licensed eye care provider on [Spectera's] provider panel" or those who had applied to be on the panel. Spectera appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Appeals found that the covered materials requirement in the IPP agreement violated subsections (c)(2) and (c)(5) of the Act in regard to independent optometrists. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed OCGA 33-24-59.12 (c) of the Act. Because the IPP agreement did not create the type of impermissible discrimination between classes of licensed eye care providers contemplated by subsection (c)(5), the Court of Appeals was incorrect in its conclusion that the IPP agreement violated that subsection of the Act. Accordingly, the Court reversed that portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Act does not preclude insurers from terminating contracts with its existing eye care providers. "While Spectera's terminating its contracts with appellees Wilson, McMurray, and Summers may be an unpopular or ill-advised course of action, it cannot be said such action violates the Act." Therefore, that portion of the permanent injunction against Spectera was vacated. View "Spectera, Inc. v. Wilson" on Justia Law