Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Stiles Apartment filed suit asserting ownership over a parking area and sought interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief to prohibit ACC from exercising any control over the parking area. ACC counterclaimed for declaratory judgment, ejectment, and breach of contract. The trial court issued an order granting the request for injunctive relief against ACC's efforts to assert ownership or control over the parking area but denied a request to enjoin ACC from arresting Mr. Stiles for towing vehicles from the parking area. ACC appealed from the order. The court held that there was evidence authorizing the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court rejected ACC's defenses of laches, waiver, and the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County v. Stiles Apartment, Inc." on Justia Law

BB&T brought suit against Borrowers and Guarantors for more than $19 million then due under certain promissory notes at issue. The promissory notes were executed as a result of BB&T's issuance of 16 loans for residential housing development. In Case No. S1161728, appellants argued that the Court of Appeals in holding that no valid foreclosure sale occurred, erroneously relied on its determination that BB&T did not satisfy the Statue of Frauds. The court held that there were no valid foreclosure sales to prevent BB&T from suing on the notes in the absence of confirmation under OCGA 44-14-161, regardless of whether there was a valid executory sales contract which satisfied the Statute of Frauds. In Case No. S11G1729, the court held that, although the Court of Appeals correctly held that none of BB&T's claims was barred by its failure to seek confirmation after the foreclosure auctions, that court did err in holding that the 2008 guaranties did not sufficiently identify any pre-2008 notes and that the 2008 Guarantors were estopped by BB&T's part performance from asserting a Statute of Frauds defense to BB&T's claims against them on pre-2008 notes.View "Tampa Investment Group, Inc., et al. v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., Inc.; Legacy Communities Group, Inc., et al. v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Sea Gardens petitioned under OCGA 23-3-60 to quiet title to waterfront property in McIntosh County. Appellants appealed from the trial court's entry of a consent judgment purporting to resolve their ongoing dispute with Sea Gardens over title to the property at issue. Because both parties did not in fact consent to all terms of the consent judgment, the trial court erred in issuing it, and therefore the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings in the trial court. View "Allen, et al. v. Sea Gardens Seafood, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal involved a title to a house and lot in a residential subdivision in Forsyth County. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendants appealed. The court held that the trial court properly rejected defendants' claim of bona fide purchaser status; defendants' argument that the trial court erred in holding that the children acquired a collective two-thirds interest in the property by virtue of the 1998 quitclaim deed from their father was without merit; the trial court properly dismissed defendants' claim for equitable subrogation; the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' counterclaim for unjust enrichment; and the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' laches defense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. et al. v. Shelton et al." on Justia Law

The court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether that court erred in determining that the doctrine of res judicata barred plaintiff's "complaint for breach of contract" in this litigation involving the ultimate distribution of plaintiff's father's estate. The court concluded that res judicata was a bar to the present suit where plaintiff's restyling of her complaint in terms of a breach of contract theory of recovery did not revive her cause of action for fraud that was defeated on appeal from a summary judgment ruling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Crowe v. Elder" on Justia Law

Sterling, a limited liability corporation engaged in the business of importing and selling Iraqi currency, hired Grossi, a company that specialized in web-based marketing strategies, in an effort to create an internet-based sales platform. After the parties' dispute over the modification of a compensation scheme by which Grossi was paid, Sterling filed suit against Grossi seeking a temporary restraining order, interlocutory and permanent injunctions, and damages. Grossi subsequently appealed the grant of interlocutory injunction in favor of Sterling, contending that the trial court erred by entering an interlocutory injunction that failed to preserve the status quo. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering the injunction in light of Grossi's threats to do harm to the website. The court also rejected Grossi's contention that the interlocutory order was, in reality, a mandatory, permanent injunction affecting the rights of the parties. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Dr. Carol Walker, a physician who sold nutritional supplements, filed a damage suit in the State Court of Gwinnet County against AmeriSciences and three of the company's corporate officers (appellants) under the Fair Business Act (FBPA), OCGA 10-1-399(b), for failure to disclose and comply with the repurchase requirements of the Sale of Business Opportunities Act (SBOA), OCGA 10-1-415(d)(1). On appeal, appellants contended that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to give res judicata effect to an earlier Texas declaratory judgment. The court held that Dr. Walker was barred by the Texas judgment from filing an FBPA claim against AmeriSciences in Georgia and a Georgia court could not make its own determination regarding whether the forum selection clause precluded the filing of an FBPA claim in Georgia. Also at issue was whether the State Court of Gwinnett County had personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants. The court held that because the "fiduciary shield" doctrine did not apply in Georgia, the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to withstand appellants' attack on the trial court's jurisdiction over the individual defendants on the ground that they acted in their corporate capacities. Appellants further contended that, even if the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants, they could not be personally liable for violations of the SBOA because none of them was a "seller" within the meaning of OCGA 10-1-410(10). The court held that pursuant to OCGA 10-1-399(a) and 10-1-417(b), each individual defendant was subject to personal liability for any violation of the SBOA which he had committed and which was proved by Dr. Walker.

Appellants sued GLC and SGI asserting trademark infringement, deceptive trade practices, and breach of contract stemming from GLC's "Money Bags" lottery games of 2005 and 2007. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that GLC was entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a bar to a suit raising claims that arose outside the Georgia Tort Claims Act and whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that OCGA 10-1-440 required the bona fide use of a trademark to make out a claim concerning the trademark's infringement? The court held that because sovereign immunity applied to state instrumentalities, GLC was entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a defense in this case. The court also held that there was no error in the interpretation of OCGA 10-1-440(b) by the Court of Appeals where appellants have not made "bona fide" use of their MONEYBAG$ mark in commerce sufficient to establish protectable rights in the mark. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The court granted certiorari to examine whether the "anti-indemnity" statute found at OCGA 13-8-2(b) applied to invalidate an indemnification clause within an assignment and assumption agreement transferring responsibility for the management and operation of a newly developed subdivision to its homeowner's association. The court held that OCGA 13-8-2(b) did apply to the assignment and assumption agreement. Therefore, the court held that the indemnification provision was invalid and given that the third party's claims were premised solely on this invalid provision, the Court of Appeals correctly held that summary judgment should have been granted to appellee.

Purchasers sued Developers and Brokers, alleging that at the time of their purchases in a 26-story condominium, Developers had already undertaken plans to develop a 46-story building directly across the street. Developers advertised "spectacular city views" from the 26-story condominium and Brokers advised that any future developments to the south of the building would be low to mid-rise office buildings. Purchasers alleged that they paid substantial premiums for their views of the city which was now blocked by the 46-story building. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings on Purchasers' claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligent supervision and violation of the Georgia's fair business practices statute. The court held that the trial court was correct in finding that Purchasers did not properly elect rescission as a remedy, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision; the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Purchasers were not bound by the agreements they signed; because there can be no justifiable reliance where Purchasers were bound by their agreements, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Purchasers' fraud-based claims could proceed; and the trial court correctly found that Purchasers did not sufficiently plead a cause of action against Developers for negligent supervision and the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's decision on that count.