Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
by
Joseph Brant appealed several trial court orders relating to his murder conviction. But because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded Brant’s plea agreement with the State precluded him from appealing the trial court’s orders, it dismissed the appeal. View "Brant v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Christian Vasquez appealed the denial of his motion for new trial after a jury found him guilty of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, aggravated assault, two counts of cruelty to children in the first degree, and concealing the death of another in connection with the death of his two-year old daughter, Prisi Vasquez. On appeal, Vasquez argued: (1) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for cruelty to children in the first degree predicated on his failure to seek timely medical care for the victim; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for concealing the death of another because the State did not prove that the applicable statute of limitation was tolled; (3) the trial court committed plain error by giving erroneous jury instructions regarding the statute of limitation applicable to the offense of concealing the death of another and the manner in which the statute of limitation could be tolled; (4) the trial court plainly erred when it failed to instruct the jury regarding corroboration of accomplice testimony; (5) he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel based on his counsel’s failure to object to the admission of evidence regarding prior acts of child abuse committed by Vasquez and because his counsel did not object to the trial court’s instruction regarding the statute of limitation for concealing the death of another; and (6) his convictions for cruelty to children in the first degree should have merged with his conviction for malice murder. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vasquez v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Kevin Boyd was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2013 shooting death of Ray Murphy. On appeal, Boyd challenged the evidence presented at trial used to support his conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boyd v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Ryan Duke was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, burglary, and concealing the death of another in connection with the 2005, death of Tara Grinstead. Duke was initially provided counsel through the Tifton Judicial Circuit Public Defender’s office, but, in September 2018, he obtained pro bono private counsel. The case was set for trial in Irwin County Superior Court, and, in the lead-up to trial, Duke filed a series of motions in the trial court seeking public funding for expert witnesses and investigators to aid his defense. Notwithstanding the trial court’s finding that Duke was indigent and that the assistance of experts was necessary to mount a proper defense, his motions were denied, and the trial court did not grant Duke’s request for a certificate of immediate review pursuant to OCGA 5-6-34 (b). In the absence of a certificate from the trial court, Duke filed both a motion asking the Georgia Suprem Court to stay the proceedings below and an application asking the Court to exercise discretion to allow an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the analysis set forth in Waldrip v. Head, 532 SE2d 380 (2000). The Georgia Supreme Court granted Duke’s request for supersedeas and stay, but held Duke’s application to appeal in abeyance pending consideration of whether Waldrip should be overruled. After briefing and oral argument, the SUpreme Court overruled Waldrip to the extent it permitted the Supreme Court to disregard the requirement set forth in OCGA 5-6-34 (b) that a party must obtain a certificate of immediate review from the trial court before pursuing an interlocutory appeal not otherwise authorized by OCGA 5-6-34 (a). Because the trial court did not issue a certificate of immediate review in this case, the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to consider Duke’s application for interlocutory appeal. His application was therefore dismissed. The stay previously issued in this case would dissolve when the Supreme Court's remittitur was received by and filed in the trial court. View "Duke v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
A jury found Johnathan Anthony and Jekari Strozier guilty of a variety of crimes, including felony murder. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that “the trial court properly convicted [the] appellants of felony murder predicated upon unlawful participation in criminal gang activity through the commission of a simple battery [Count 4].” The Supreme Court also held that the jury’s verdicts as to voluntary manslaughter (Count 1) and the other felony murder counts (Counts 2-3, 5-7) were vacated by operation of law. Further, the Court held the evidence was insufficient as to Count 11 (affray) and so it reversed that conviction. After explaining in detail how the convictions on Counts 1-3 and 5-13 had been either merged, vacated, or reversed, we affirmed the appellants’ convictions as to the Count 4 felony murder only. The Supreme Court did not remand these cases to the trial court for resentencing. When the cases returned to the trial court, all the court was required to do was to file the remittiturs. Instead, upon the return of the remittiturs, the trial court, at the urging of the prosecutor, entered an “Amended Sentence Pursuant to Supreme Court Decision” for each defendant. The court sentenced Strozier and Anthony to life imprisonment for felony murder predicated on aggravated battery (Count 3, one of the felony murder convictions that had been vacated by operation of law) and to 15 years imprisonment for criminal gang activity (Count 13, aggravated battery, one of the predicate offenses that we held had merged into Count 10, which, in turn, had been merged into Count 4.) The trial court directed a verdict of not guilty on Count 11 and noted that the remaining counts either merged or had been vacated. The appellants contended on appeal to the Supreme Court, and the State conceded, the trial court’s resentencing orders violated the law of the case rule. Because the trial court was precluded from revising the previous holding, the amended sentencing orders were nullities that did not supersede the sentencing orders already reviewed by the Supreme Court. Therefore appellants' sentences as to Count 4 remained in effect. View "Strozier v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Kavion Wyzeenski Tookes pled guilty to murder with malice aforethought, kidnapping, armed robbery, and other crimes, all in connection with a violent home invasion. The trial court accepted his plea and promptly imposed sentence, including a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole for the murder. The next day, Tookes filed a motion to withdraw his plea, claiming that his lawyer had misadvised him about his sentence and that he was denied his right to be present for a portion of his plea and sentencing. The trial court denied his motion, and Tookes appeled. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. View "Tookes v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Melvin Cooper appealed the denial of his second motion for leave to take an out-of-time appeal. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the earlier denial of his first motion for an out-of-time appeal settled the question of whether he was entitled to an out-of-time appeal, and the matter was deemed res judicata. For that reason, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal. View "Cooper v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Arthur Clark was convicted by jury of felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and aggravated assault in connection with the shooting death of his brother-in-law, Sonny Barlow. Before the Georgia Supreme Court, Clark argued: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the State failed to disprove his affirmative defense of justification based on self-defense; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested charges on sudden emergency and self-defense; (3) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence documentation of his prior conviction for aggravated cruelty to animals; and (4) the trial court erred in admitting testimony about a prior incident. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Clark v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
A jury found Sean Swanson guilty of felony murder, and of the predicate felony of sale of marijuana, in the shooting death of Noel Reed. On appeal, Swanson argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury charge on use of force in defense of habitation and for withdrawing a request to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded Swanson’s trial counsel indeed rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury charge on use of force in defense of habitation and therefore reversed Swanson’s felony murder conviction. View "Swanson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
William Davis and Trinika Beamon appealed the trial court’s denial of their motions for new trial after a jury found them guilty of felony murder and related crimes in connection with the death of T’arsha Williams and the aggravated assault of Julius Larry. Davis argued the trial court erred in not applying the rule of lenity in sentencing, and that his trial counsel was ineffective in numerous regards. Beamon argued Georgia’s felony murder statute was unconstitutional and that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Finding no merit to either defendant's contentions, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Davis v. Georgia" on Justia Law