Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Preston Young was tried by jury and convicted of murder and aggravated assault in connection with the death of his estranged wife, Sharon Sylvester. Young argued on appeal the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court erred in several ways, including in its evidentiary rulings and its jury charge. Upon review of the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no merit in these claims of error, and affirmed Young's convictions. View "Young v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2004, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Stanley Hollmon's conviction for malice murder, and held his convictions for criminal attempt to commit armed robbery and felony murder had been vacated. More than a decade later, the trial court entered a sentence on the vacated criminal attempt count. Following that resentencing, in March 2018, Hollmon filed a motion for new trial seeking to raise claims that the indictment was defective and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue. Without specifying whether it was denying or dismissing that motion, the trial court applied the Supreme Court's holding in Walker-Madden v. Georgia, 804 SE2d 8 (2017), and ruled that Hollmon could not assert the claims because he should have raised them in his first appeal. Hollmon challenged that ruling. Because the trial court’s resentencing was a nullity, Hollmon was not permitted a motion for new trial from the resentencing. The Supreme Court construed the trial court’s ruling as a dismissal of Hollmon’s motion and affirmed. The Court vacated the trial court's sentencing order for want of jurisdiction. View "Hollmon v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jarmond Curry was convicted by jury of felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with the shooting death of Byleem Moore and the armed robbery of Terry Dorsey. On appeal, Curry argued the trial court erred in denying his objection to the identification testimony of two witnesses and his motion for a mistrial based on the State’s failure to disclose that it showed at least one photograph of Curry to the witnesses and they identified Curry as the man they saw fleeing the scene of the crime. Though the Georgia Supreme Court concluded Curry was erroneously sentenced, it otherwise affirmed. View "Curry v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Zion Wainwright and co-defendant Qutravius Palmer were convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the December 2013 shooting death of Xavier Arnold. On appeal, Wainwright contended the trial court erred in denying a requested continuance for his lead counsel to be present for the beginning of the State’s direct examination of a key witness, and that his lead trial counsel was ineffective in cross-examining that witness. Wainwright also argued the trial court erred by refusing to allow voir dire of the jurors in panels of twelve and by refusing requests to instruct the jury on accident, justification, and voluntary manslaughter. Upon its review of the record, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the aggravated assault that Wainwright was sentenced for should have been merged, and so it vacated that conviction and sentence. Finding no other reversible error, the Court otherwise affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Wainwright v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Gabriel Flannigan appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes stemming from the 2007 shooting death of Quantavious Ragsdale. He argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, contending counsel erred in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. Finding no merit to these claims, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Flannigan's convictions. View "Flannigan v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Mark Birdow appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2010 death of Angela Woods. He argued to the Georgia Supreme Court: (1) the State failed to produce sufficient evidence at trial to overcome his claim of self-defense; (2) the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of an expert psychologist Birdow planned to call to testify about his behavior following Woods’ death; (3) the trial court failed to provide him with appropriate technology that would have allowed him to hear the trial proceedings; and (4) his trial counsel was ineffective in several regards. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Birdow's convictions. View "Birdow v. Georgia" on Justia Law

McDaniel appealed the denial of numerous post-judgment motions he filed since 2009. He originally pled guilty to felony murder in 2002 and was sentenced to life in prison. The issues common to all these motions involve ineffective assistance of counsel, defective indictment, void sentence and conviction, involuntary plea, and general infringement by the trial court of his constitutional rights. In 2017, the trial court entered a two-paragraph order denying all outstanding motions filed between October 2009 and April 2017. Finding that the trial court properly denied McDaniel's motions, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "McDaniel v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Joshua McKelvin was convicted of murdering Marilyn Patterson and assaulting Myra Youngblood, Belinda Hines, and Zeddie Holley. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by: (1) concluding that the defense of involuntary intoxication necessitated pretrial notice to the State; (2) by requiring him to provide the State with a copy of his pretrial mental evaluation; (3) by refusing to excuse a juror and declare a mistrial; (4) by admitting certain rap lyrics into evidence; and (5) by denying a mistrial after, he says, evidence placed his character at issue. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "McKelvin v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2014, Charles White was found guilty of three counts of rape, one count of statutory rape, ten counts of child molestation, three counts of aggravated sodomy, three counts of incest, and one count of enticing a child for indecent purposes in connection with incidents involving three victims, including S.M., who was a member of White’s extended family. During the course of being questioned about her own sexual misconduct, S.M. disclosed that she had been sexually abused by White since she was five years old and that White had done things to her that were similar to the things that she had done to her stepsisters. Prior to White’s trial, S.M. was adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court for having committed sexual batteries against her two stepsisters. White filed a pretrial motion in limine to have evidence of S.M.’s prior sexual acts excluded from his trial, arguing that the admission of the evidence would have been more prejudicial to White than probative of any issue at trial. The trial court denied White’s motion, and, without further objection from White’s counsel, the State briefly elicited testimony from S.M. regarding her prior sexual misconduct and her delinquency adjudication. Subsequent to his convictions, White moved for a new trial, arguing for the first time that the trial court erred by admitting S.M.'s trial testimony in violation of Georgia's Rape Shield Statute. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals did too, reasoning that the Rape Shield Statute could not be invoked by a defendant to prevent a victim from offering evidence that was otherwise relevant to the case. The Georgia Supreme Court determined: (1) a defendant can invoke the Rape Shield Statute to prohibit the admission of evidence of a witness’s past sexual behavior offered by the State where such offered evidence is inadmissible pursuant to the terms of the Rape Shield Statute; (2) evidence of a complaining witness’s past sexual behavior is only admissible under the Rape Shield Statute if that evidence is relevant to the issue of consent; and (3) the trial court did improperly admit evidence of the complaining witness’s past sexual behavior in this case, but the admission of this evidence did not amount to plain error requiring reversal of White’s convictions. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, though on different grounds. View "White v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following the habeas court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief, Richard Bishop filed an application for certificate of probable cause with the Georgia Supreme Court. The Court granted Bishop’s application to determine whether he was provided a full and fair hearing on his petition for writ of habeas corpus below. Shortly after shooting and killing his girlfriend and injuring her other boyfriend in 2009, then-76-year-old Bishop was arrested. Twelve days later, representing himself, Bishop pled guilty to malice murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus twenty years to run concurrently. In 2014, then 81 years old, Bishop filed for habeas relief, asking for "assistance" from the court because he was unable to read (even with glasses), and had questions for the attorney to helped him at his plea hearing. The Warden filed an objection to the motion for assistance, arguing that there was no authority for the habeas court to provide Bishop with counsel. Bishop responded and clarified that he was not requesting that counsel be appointed, he simply needed someone to read for him. Though the habeas court acknowledged Bishop’s eye problems, it initially treated Bishop’s request as one for the appointment of counsel and found that Bishop was not entitled to any such appointment. The habeas court went on to express concern that Bishop’s written questions were conceived by an inmate other than Bishop, as the habeas court apparently recognized the handwriting. The Warden then objected to Bishop’s motion and his use of the pre-prepared questions, and the habeas court declined Bishop’s request to have someone read the proposed questions on Bishop’s behalf. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, conceded by the Warden, the appointment of a reader for Bishop in light of his undisputed visual impairment, was necessary to satisfy his due process right to a full and fair hearing. The Court vacated the ruling of the habeas court and remanded this case for a new hearing. View "Bishop v. Hall" on Justia Law