Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Richard Morrison was tried before a jury and found guilty of the malice murder of his girlfriend Tammie Smith. He appealed pro se, asserting multiple claims of error. Having reviewed these claims, the Georgia Supreme Court found no merit to any of his claims, and affirmed his conviction. View "Morrison v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Derek Kemp, Harvey Hogans, and Alphonso Watkins appealed their convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Derek Gray. Kemp and Watkins challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions, and all defendants raised various challenges to the testimony of Steve Lewis, a fellow gang member. Watkins also argued the trial court erred in permitting a “non-examining doctor” to testify about the post-mortem examination of the victim. The defendants also purport to “preserve” certain claims to the extent they may be applicable in future habeas proceedings. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendants’ convictions, there was no error in admitting or refusing to strike Lewis’s testimony, and the so-called “non-examining doctor” was the medical examiner who was allowed to testify about the autopsy he performed on the victim. The defendants’ claims that they wished to “preserve” certain arguments failed because the Court determined defendants did not raise any meaningful arguments on appeal in this respect. The Court therefore affirmed their convictions. View "Kemp v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Derek Kemp, Harvey Hogans, and Alphonso Watkins appealed their convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Derek Gray. Kemp and Watkins challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions, and all defendants raised various challenges to the testimony of Steve Lewis, a fellow gang member. Watkins also argued the trial court erred in permitting a “non-examining doctor” to testify about the post-mortem examination of the victim. The defendants also purport to “preserve” certain claims to the extent they may be applicable in future habeas proceedings. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendants’ convictions, there was no error in admitting or refusing to strike Lewis’s testimony, and the so-called “non-examining doctor” was the medical examiner who was allowed to testify about the autopsy he performed on the victim. The defendants’ claims that they wished to “preserve” certain arguments failed because the Court determined defendants did not raise any meaningful arguments on appeal in this respect. The Court therefore affirmed their convictions. View "Kemp v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Terrance Dent appealed his convictions and sentences for felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, as well as the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, all in connection with the shooting death of Jevon Freeman. Dent challenged the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, the failure to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter in accordance with Edge v. Georgia, 414 SE2d 463 (1992), and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Finding the challenges to be without merit, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dent v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Terrance Dent appealed his convictions and sentences for felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, as well as the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, all in connection with the shooting death of Jevon Freeman. Dent challenged the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, the failure to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter in accordance with Edge v. Georgia, 414 SE2d 463 (1992), and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Finding the challenges to be without merit, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dent v. Georgia" on Justia Law

David Leeks appealed his convictions for malice murder and other charges stemming from the robbery and fatal shooting of a Fulton County convenience store clerk, Zerit Haileslasie. Leeks argued his convictions should have been reversed because the trial court committed plain error in charging the jury: (1) on the concept of party to a crime; and (2) that the jury may consider an identification witness’s level of certainty in assessing the reliability of the identification. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error with respect to the jury instructions and affirmed Leeks' convictions. View "Leeks v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 1999, Robert Hall, Jr. purchased property in Roswell, Georgia. In April 2005, after having married Cathleen Mary Cahill, Hall recorded a quitclaim deed that transferred the Roswell property to “Robert A. E. Hall, Jr. and Cathleen M. Cahill as Joint Tenants with Right of Survivorship.” Approximately three years later, the couple divorced. Pursuant to a settlement agreement incorporated into a final judgment and decree of divorce, Cahill was to have “exclusive use and possession” of the Roswell property until she reached the age of 66, at which point the property would be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties; the decree dictated that both Hall and Cahill were to “remain on the title” until the property was sold. In the following years, Hall failed to pay federal taxes, and, in February 2013, a notice of federal tax lien was filed against “all property and rights belonging” to Hall. Cahill resided on the property until her death on April 19, 2015; the property was not listed for sale before her death. The Estate of Mary Cathleen Cahill filed a quiet title action against the United States of America in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, seeking a determination that the right of survivorship was severed before Cahill’s death, thus giving her estate a one-half interest in the property. The Estate argued that the settlement agreement demonstrated an intent to sever the joint tenancy, while the Government argued that the parties’ failure to address the issue amounted to an unambiguous retention of the right of survivorship. The federal district court certified a question of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court, questioning the effect of the parties' divorce decree on the joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Though the divorce decree plainly addresses the use, possession, and eventual sale of the property – as well as the names on the deed to the property – the decree is silent on the question of the survival of the joint tenancy, and the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the provision was, in fact, ambiguous. The Court found the divorce decree in this case severed the joint tenancy with right of survivorship created by the April 2005 deed. View "Cahill v. United States" on Justia Law

Brian Malverty appealed the denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal. He was indicted in 1985 for murder, felony murder, and related offenses in connection with the deaths of Charles West and Rickey Sims. In December 1986, Malverty pled guilty to two counts of felony murder and was sentenced to concurrent life terms. In January 2016, Malverty filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal of his guilty plea, but the motion was denied; Malverty filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Malverty argued he was entitled to an out-of-time appeal because, he argued, the September 1985 indictment was defective. The Georgia Supreme Court found this argument was without merit. He also claimed the trial court failed to rule on a succession of motions he filed; the Supreme Court determined the only judicial remedy for the trial court's alleged violation of OCGA 15-6-21 was an application for mandamus relief. View "Malverty v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Brian Malverty appealed the denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal. He was indicted in 1985 for murder, felony murder, and related offenses in connection with the deaths of Charles West and Rickey Sims. In December 1986, Malverty pled guilty to two counts of felony murder and was sentenced to concurrent life terms. In January 2016, Malverty filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal of his guilty plea, but the motion was denied; Malverty filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Malverty argued he was entitled to an out-of-time appeal because, he argued, the September 1985 indictment was defective. The Georgia Supreme Court found this argument was without merit. He also claimed the trial court failed to rule on a succession of motions he filed; the Supreme Court determined the only judicial remedy for the trial court's alleged violation of OCGA 15-6-21 was an application for mandamus relief. View "Malverty v. Georgia" on Justia Law

This case raised a question of whether Alexander v. Georgia, 772 SE2d 655 (2015), could be applied retroactively. The Georgia Supreme Court held that an attorney’s failure to counsel his client about parole eligibility may give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Teresa Lynn Kohnle pleaded guilty to felony murder in December 2010, before Alexander was decided, but after the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356 (2010), on which the Georgia Court relied in deciding Alexander. Sentenced to life in prison, Kohnle filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that her plea counsel was ineffective in several ways, including that he failed to inform her of the parole eligibility implications of a life sentence. The habeas court granted Kohnle’s petition, relying on Alexander to conclude that Kohnle’s counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The Warden appealed, arguing that the habeas court erred in applying Alexander retroactively. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the Warden that the habeas court erred by applying Alexander to find that plea counsel performed deficiently by failing to advise Kohnle that she would not be eligible for parole for 30 years if she pleaded guilty, and thus the Court vacated the habeas court’s order. But the Court remanded for the habeas court to consider Kohnle’s claim that counsel was deficient for affirmatively misinforming her about parole eligibility matters, something the Court had held could support a claim of ineffective assistance long before Kohnle entered her plea. View "Kennedy v. Kohnle" on Justia Law