Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brian Malverty appealed the denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal. He was indicted in 1985 for murder, felony murder, and related offenses in connection with the deaths of Charles West and Rickey Sims. In December 1986, Malverty pled guilty to two counts of felony murder and was sentenced to concurrent life terms. In January 2016, Malverty filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal of his guilty plea, but the motion was denied; Malverty filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Malverty argued he was entitled to an out-of-time appeal because, he argued, the September 1985 indictment was defective. The Georgia Supreme Court found this argument was without merit. He also claimed the trial court failed to rule on a succession of motions he filed; the Supreme Court determined the only judicial remedy for the trial court's alleged violation of OCGA 15-6-21 was an application for mandamus relief. View "Malverty v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Brian Malverty appealed the denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal. He was indicted in 1985 for murder, felony murder, and related offenses in connection with the deaths of Charles West and Rickey Sims. In December 1986, Malverty pled guilty to two counts of felony murder and was sentenced to concurrent life terms. In January 2016, Malverty filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal of his guilty plea, but the motion was denied; Malverty filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Malverty argued he was entitled to an out-of-time appeal because, he argued, the September 1985 indictment was defective. The Georgia Supreme Court found this argument was without merit. He also claimed the trial court failed to rule on a succession of motions he filed; the Supreme Court determined the only judicial remedy for the trial court's alleged violation of OCGA 15-6-21 was an application for mandamus relief. View "Malverty v. Georgia" on Justia Law

This case raised a question of whether Alexander v. Georgia, 772 SE2d 655 (2015), could be applied retroactively. The Georgia Supreme Court held that an attorney’s failure to counsel his client about parole eligibility may give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Teresa Lynn Kohnle pleaded guilty to felony murder in December 2010, before Alexander was decided, but after the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356 (2010), on which the Georgia Court relied in deciding Alexander. Sentenced to life in prison, Kohnle filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that her plea counsel was ineffective in several ways, including that he failed to inform her of the parole eligibility implications of a life sentence. The habeas court granted Kohnle’s petition, relying on Alexander to conclude that Kohnle’s counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The Warden appealed, arguing that the habeas court erred in applying Alexander retroactively. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the Warden that the habeas court erred by applying Alexander to find that plea counsel performed deficiently by failing to advise Kohnle that she would not be eligible for parole for 30 years if she pleaded guilty, and thus the Court vacated the habeas court’s order. But the Court remanded for the habeas court to consider Kohnle’s claim that counsel was deficient for affirmatively misinforming her about parole eligibility matters, something the Court had held could support a claim of ineffective assistance long before Kohnle entered her plea. View "Kennedy v. Kohnle" on Justia Law

This case raised a question of whether Alexander v. Georgia, 772 SE2d 655 (2015), could be applied retroactively. The Georgia Supreme Court held that an attorney’s failure to counsel his client about parole eligibility may give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Teresa Lynn Kohnle pleaded guilty to felony murder in December 2010, before Alexander was decided, but after the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356 (2010), on which the Georgia Court relied in deciding Alexander. Sentenced to life in prison, Kohnle filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that her plea counsel was ineffective in several ways, including that he failed to inform her of the parole eligibility implications of a life sentence. The habeas court granted Kohnle’s petition, relying on Alexander to conclude that Kohnle’s counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The Warden appealed, arguing that the habeas court erred in applying Alexander retroactively. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the Warden that the habeas court erred by applying Alexander to find that plea counsel performed deficiently by failing to advise Kohnle that she would not be eligible for parole for 30 years if she pleaded guilty, and thus the Court vacated the habeas court’s order. But the Court remanded for the habeas court to consider Kohnle’s claim that counsel was deficient for affirmatively misinforming her about parole eligibility matters, something the Court had held could support a claim of ineffective assistance long before Kohnle entered her plea. View "Kennedy v. Kohnle" on Justia Law

Appellant Cassandra Norwood appealed her convictions for crimes related to the death of her newborn child, Josiah Lucas Norwood. Appellant attempted to conceal the child's birth; a sister, who happened to be a trained nurse, discovered a garbage bag filled with bedding in a corner of appellant's room. Trying to dismiss the amount of blood as associated with her menstrual cycle, the sister insisted appellant go to the hospital due to the "abnormal" amount of blood. Once away, the sister discovered a newborn baby, placenta and umbilical cord inside the bag. In her sole enumeration, Appellant alleged the trial court erred by admitting her two statements made to law enforcement officers. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Norwood v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Cassandra Norwood appealed her convictions for crimes related to the death of her newborn child, Josiah Lucas Norwood. Appellant attempted to conceal the child's birth; a sister, who happened to be a trained nurse, discovered a garbage bag filled with bedding in a corner of appellant's room. Trying to dismiss the amount of blood as associated with her menstrual cycle, the sister insisted appellant go to the hospital due to the "abnormal" amount of blood. Once away, the sister discovered a newborn baby, placenta and umbilical cord inside the bag. In her sole enumeration, Appellant alleged the trial court erred by admitting her two statements made to law enforcement officers. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Norwood v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether a locked entry door to a homeowner’s residence provided sufficient notice to a would-be trespasser that he or she is forbidden from entering the premises. The Court of Appeals held that David Harper, a bail recovery agent, could not be found guilty of trespass under OCGA 16-7-21(b)(2) as a matter of law after he entered the residence of Tina McDaniel through a locked door from her backyard without McDaniel’s knowledge or permission to arrest Stephen Collier, a man whose criminal bond had been forfeited. Harper gained access to the residence by either reaching his hand through a doggy door attached to the larger locked door and unlocking it, or crawling through the doggy door to do so. Collier did not live at the house, and was there only to work on a vehicle. Harper was a stranger to McDaniel, as he had not been given any access to McDaniel’s home on any prior occasion and had no prior relationship with her. The Court of Appeals concluded that, because a finding of guilt under OCGA 16-7-21(b)(2) “requires proof that the accused entered [the premises in question] knowingly and without authority after having received express notice that the entry was forbidden,” and because “[t]he State failed to produce any evidence showing that Harper was given the required prior express notice not to enter McDaniel’s premises,” Harper could not be found guilty of criminal trespass under the statute. The Supreme Court concluded that the locked door to the residence provided reasonable and sufficiently explicit notice to Harper that entry into McDaniel’s residence was forbidden under the circumstances of this case, and as such, reversed. View "Georgia v. Harper" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether a locked entry door to a homeowner’s residence provided sufficient notice to a would-be trespasser that he or she is forbidden from entering the premises. The Court of Appeals held that David Harper, a bail recovery agent, could not be found guilty of trespass under OCGA 16-7-21(b)(2) as a matter of law after he entered the residence of Tina McDaniel through a locked door from her backyard without McDaniel’s knowledge or permission to arrest Stephen Collier, a man whose criminal bond had been forfeited. Harper gained access to the residence by either reaching his hand through a doggy door attached to the larger locked door and unlocking it, or crawling through the doggy door to do so. Collier did not live at the house, and was there only to work on a vehicle. Harper was a stranger to McDaniel, as he had not been given any access to McDaniel’s home on any prior occasion and had no prior relationship with her. The Court of Appeals concluded that, because a finding of guilt under OCGA 16-7-21(b)(2) “requires proof that the accused entered [the premises in question] knowingly and without authority after having received express notice that the entry was forbidden,” and because “[t]he State failed to produce any evidence showing that Harper was given the required prior express notice not to enter McDaniel’s premises,” Harper could not be found guilty of criminal trespass under the statute. The Supreme Court concluded that the locked door to the residence provided reasonable and sufficiently explicit notice to Harper that entry into McDaniel’s residence was forbidden under the circumstances of this case, and as such, reversed. View "Georgia v. Harper" on Justia Law

Suzzett Calloway was convicted in a federal court of several crimes related to manufacturing methamphetamine. She then was convicted in a state court of felony murder predicated on manufacturing meth; the state charges arose from the same conduct as the federal charges. Calloway argued on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court that the State’s prosecution was barred by OCGA 16-1-8 (c), which, in some instances, prohibits a successive prosecution when the accused was previously acquitted or convicted in federal court for the same conduct. Calloway also argued the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts and that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to “read the law” to the jury during closing arguments. The Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts, but Calloway’s federal conviction for attempt to manufacture meth barred a successive prosecution for the state crime of felony murder predicated on manufacturing meth. Therefore, the Court reversed her felony murder conviction, which unmerged her other convictions. Of those unmerged convictions, all counts were barred except possession of meth with intent to distribute, and this case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing on that count. The Court’s reversal of Calloway’s felony murder conviction rendered moot her argument about the prosecutor’s reading of the law on the issue of causation as an element of felony murder. View "Calloway v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Patrick Fletcher was found guilty of two counts each of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the April 2013 shooting deaths of Wayne and Octavia Brown. Fletcher appealed, contending erroneous admission of “other acts” evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b). Because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded any error in the admission of that evidence was harmless, it affirmed. View "Fletcher v. Georgia" on Justia Law