Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Paul Manner was convicted of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the 2013 shooting death of Tracey Kingcannon. On appeal, Manner contended his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by withdrawing a request for a jury charge on the requirement for evidence corroborating accomplice testimony, and by failing to introduce evidence of the confessions of two of the State’s witnesses to an earlier aggravated assault on the victim. Manner also contended the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on impeachment by prior conviction related to a first offender guilty plea by on State witness was plain error; or, in the alternative, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve her objection to the court’s denial of her request for that instruction. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court determined counsel’s strategic decision to withdraw her request for an accomplice corroboration instruction was not objectively unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. Similarly, counsel’s decision to rely on testimony about the State’s witnesses’ involvement in and confessions to an earlier aggravated assault on the victim, rather than seeking to admit the witnesses’ written statements, fell within the broad range of reasonable trial strategy. And the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction on impeachment by prior conviction, and thus, no deficiency in counsel’s failure to make a specific objection on this issue after the jury instructions were given. The Court did, however, find the trial court erred in merging the two felony murder verdicts into the malice murder verdict, when the felony murder convictions should have been vacated by operation of law. View "Manner v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Orlando Smith was convicted of felony murder and related offenses in connection with the 2010 shooting death of Demetra Smith . On appeal, Smith argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by: failing to suppress illegally obtained evidence; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial; and (4) the trial court erred in allowing inadmissible hearsay pursuant to the necessity exception. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Smith v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Bernard Dixon and Arrick Camps were tried by jury and found guilty of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2015 shooting death of Robert Carr. They appealed, both contending the trial court erred when it refused to declare a mistrial for prosecutorial misconduct in the cross examination of a defense witness. They also argued (each for different reasons) the trial court erred when it refused to grant them new trials based on jury misconduct. Finding no reversible error after review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. View "Dixon v. Georgia" on Justia Law

James Carter was tried by jury and convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2011 shooting death of Chandler Johnson. Carter appealed, contending: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it struck two prospective jurors; (3) the trial court erred when it refused to strike a third juror; (4) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of his pretrial statements; and (5) the trial court erred when it allowed Johnson’s mother to testify about certain text messages, which she said that she had received from Carter. After review of the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed. View "Carter v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Lawrence Womac appealed his convictions and sentences for aggravated sexual battery, child molestation, cruelty to children in the first degree, and false imprisonment. On appeal, Womac argued, among other things, that his life sentence for aggravated sexual battery constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Georgia Constitution. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirm. View "Womac v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Malcolm Muckle was convicted of felony murder in connection with the 2012 shooting death of his accomplice in an attempted armed robbery, Travis Callaway. On appeal, he argued the evidence at his trial was insufficient to support his conviction and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Georgia Supreme Court determined neither of those claims had merit, so it affirmed the conviction. View "Muckle v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Carlo Simpson was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in relation to the 2013 shooting death of Shakhira Dunson. Simpson and Dunson had a child together; when she ended the relationship, testimony at trial revealed he responded by telling her: “[I]f I can’t have you I will make sure nobody else will.” Simpson appealed his conviction and argued the trial court plainly erred in instructing the jury on a method of committing aggravated assault that was not alleged in the indictment. Because the trial court specifically instructed the jury that the State was required to prove every material allegation of the indictment, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Simpson’s convictions. View "Simpson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Thyrell Donaldson was tried by jury and convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, all in connection with the 2015 shooting death of Robert White, Jr. Donaldson appealed, contending the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred when it refused to grant him a new trial on the “general grounds” under OCGA 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. Upon review of the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Donaldson’s convictions for felony murder and one of the firearm possession counts, but due to a merger error, the Court vacated his convictions for aggravated assault and the other firearm-possession count. View "Donaldson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

This Court granted applications for certificates of probable cause from Mark Jason Jones, Kenneth Eric Gardiner, and Dominic Brian Lucci to appeal the denials of their petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Jones, Gardiner, and Lucci were tried and found guilty of malice murder in the shooting death of Stanley Jackson, as well as of possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The three defendants were Army servicemen stationed at Fort Stewart, near Savannah. Defendants were Caucasian; Jackson was African-American. Evidence presented at the November, 1992 trial showed that, during the day of January 31, 1992, Jones sought to borrow some equipment from a fellow soldier, Sylvia Wallace, telling Wallace he was going to Savannah that night because “he had somebody that he was going to shoot.” When Wallace enquired who that would be, Jones replied, “I got a black guy up there I got to get.” A witness stated he saw two men fire military-type automatic or semiautomatic rifles through the window of a 1992 black Chevrolet Cavalier while a third man drove the car; Jackson was killed in the shooting. The Georgia Supreme Court determined, in light of the totality of the circumstances, confidence in the outcome of the trial was undermined by the State’s failure to provide exculpatory evidence to the defense. It therefore reversed denials of each defendant’s petition for habeas corpus and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Medlin" on Justia Law

Mye Brindle worked as a housekeeper and personal assistant to Joe Rogers, who was married. During her employment with Rogers, the two became involved sexually. In June 2012, Brindle hired attorneys David Cohen and John Butters to represent her on a potential claim of sexual harassment. Without Rogers’ knowledge or consent to be video recorded, Brindle allegedly used a “spy” camera to secretly record video of Rogers naked in his bathroom and bedroom, as well as video of a sexual encounter between Rogers and herself inside his bedroom. The video recording was delivered to attorney Cohen, and Brindle resigned from her position with Rogers. Rogers received a demand letter from attorney Cohen relating to the potential sexual harassment claim that he and Butters were prepared to file on Brindle’s behalf. After extensive civil litigation between Rogers and Brindle, Brindle and her attorneys (collectively, “defendants”) were charged in the Superior Court of Fulton County with conspiracy to commit extortion under OCGA 16-8-16 (Count 1), conspiracy to commit unlawful surveillance (Count 2), and conducting unlawful surveillance under OCGA 16-11-62 (Count 3). Brindle was also charged individually with one additional count of conducting unlawful surveillance under OCGA 16-11-62 (Count 4). The indictment was largely based on the defendants’ prior actions involving an alleged conspiracy to secretly video record and then actually record Rogers in the bathroom and bedroom of his home, and then sending Rogers the litigation demand letter. Defendants filed a general demurrer to dismiss the indictment against them and to have the statutes underlying the charged crimes declared unconstitutional. The trial court issued an order granting defendants’ general demurrer, finding the indictment failed to show that defendants committed any crimes under the relevant statutes. The trial court went on to conclude that OCGA 16-8-16 (a) (3) was unconstitutionally overbroad on its face, and further declared that OCGA sections 16- 11-62 (2) and 16-11-66 (a) were unconstitutionally vague because “persons of ordinary intelligence [could not] be expected to determine what is permitted and prohibited by these [two] statutes.” Accordingly, the trial court dismissed all counts of the indictment against all of defendants. The State appealed. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that: (1) while the trial court properly dismissed Count 1 of the indictment, the trial court erred by reaching the constitutional issue relating to OCGA 16-8-16 (a) (3) in support of this result; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing Counts 2, 3, and 4 of the indictment and in concluding that OCGA sections 16-11-62 (2) and 16-11-66 (a) were unconstitutionally vague. View "Georgia v. Cohen" on Justia Law