Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert Smith was found guilty of malice murder, felony murder, and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of his friend, Raymond Brewer, Jr. On appeal, Smith contends that the trial court committed plain error in its jury instruction on witness credibility and that the trial court erred in its jury instruction on self-defense. Finding only that the trial court erred in merging possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony with malice murder, the Supreme Court affirmed Smith’s conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "Smith v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellee Quantavious Harris was convicted of felony murder and related offenses in connection with the 2009 shooting death of taxicab driver Stephen Anim. Harris timely filed a motion for new trial claiming, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress text messages obtained from Harris’ cell phone by law enforcement without a warrant. After a hearing, the trial court agreed with Harris and granted the motion. The State appealed, contending that the trial court’s conclusion regarding “Strickland” prejudice was erroneous. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, after review of the trial court record, and therefore reversed the trial court’s grant of a new trial. View "Georgia v. Harris" on Justia Law

Willie Jones was convicted by jury of felony murder for the death of his four-year-old daughter, Ty’Asia Phillips. He appealed on the sole ground that he was convicted by general verdict on a count of felony murder that contained two predicates, one of which, he claimed, there was insufficient evidence to support. Because the Supreme Court found there was sufficient evidence to convict Jones of felony murder based on one of the two charged predicates for felony murder, and that this was enough to sustain his conviction, the court affirmed. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Freedell Benton was convicted by jury of malice murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and various other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Drexel Berry. On appeal, Benton contended: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the jurors to submit questions to be posed to witnesses; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed into evidence certain autopsy photographs; and (4) that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. The Court found that the portion of the sentence purporting to merge the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon count into malice murder was made in error. View "Benton v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Wayne Welbon appealed his conviction for the murder of Taurean Reeves. Welbon argued on appeal: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike for cause a certain prospective juror; and (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to present testimony regarding statements he allegedly made to the police, contending any such statements were given involuntarily. Because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard by erroneously placing the burden on Welbon to show that his statements were involuntary, and because the Supreme Court could not say, after review, that there was no evidence before the trial court that would authorize the grant of a motion to suppress. The Court vacated the trial court’s order denying Welbon’s motion for new trial and remanded this case to the trial court for consideration of Welbon’s claim of involuntariness under the proper standard. View "Welbon v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Damien Reddick was convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of Cory Johnson. The trial court denied his amended motion for new trial, and he appealed. His sole enumeration of error was that the trial court erred in refusing his written request to charge on a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Reddick v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Under OCGA 17-10-6.2 (b), a defendant convicted of a sexual offense must receive a split sentence: one that includes a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment followed by an additional probated sentence of at least one year. This case presented the more complicated question of how the statute applies when a defendant was convicted of multiple sexual offenses: does the split-sentence requirement apply to each of the multiple sexual offenses of which a defendant is convicted or, as the State argued, only to the aggregate sentence? Considering the plain language of OCGA 17-10-6.2 (b) in the context of the “well-established” principle that each count receives a discrete sentence, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the statute required a split sentence on each sexual offense. Because the Court of Appeals correctly vacated those sentences that failed to meet this requirement, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Georgia v. Riggs" on Justia Law

“If the trial court has made express findings of fact, but not with sufficient detail to permit meaningful appellate review, an appellate court may remand for further findings.” Michael Williams was indicted for burglary and obstruction of justice by fleeing. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence. The trial court made almost no express findings of fact before denying the motion. Given the uncertainty in the trial court’s order regarding the basis for its ruling, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals which upheld the trial court’s judgment, and remanded for the Court of Appeals to remand this case to the trial court for further clarification on the specific findings that formed the basis for its legal conclusions with regard to Williams’ motion to suppress. View "Williams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Verlaine Laguerre and his co-defendant Prentice Baker for murder and related crimes. Trial was scheduled to take place around the holidays at the end of 2012. During both the week of December 22 and the following week, three to five jurors had conflicts, and that the first time that a complete jury could be back together would be January 8. During a recess, the trial court and the attorneys went into chambers where they determined that they had only two options: either the court should declare a mistrial or order a continuance for nearly three weeks from December 19 to January 8. Baker acquiesced in a mistrial because of the jurors’ apparent unpreparedness to be in a trial over nine days, and because it would not be in the best interest of the defense if it were blamed or placed in a negative light by continuation of the trial. The prosecutor also acquiesced in a mistrial as the “lesser of two evils,” expressing his concern over the jurors’ ability to recollect all the evidence after an extended break, especially when they were never told that there would be such a break. Over Laguerre’s objection, the trial court declared a mistrial, stating that the State in its discretion could try the case at a later date. In the subsequent order denying Laguerre’s plea of former jeopardy, the trial court expressly found no evidence that the State was benefitted by a delay, engaged in any prosecutorial misconduct, or did anything to induce a mistrial. Laguerre argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his plea of former jeopardy because the circumstances did not demonstrate the “manifest necessity” that was constitutionally required to authorize a mistrial over his objection. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding under the circumstances, the trial judge “acted in order to assure a fair trial, not only for[Laguerre] but for his codefendant and the prosecution as well.” View "Laguerre v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Eric Austin was found guilty of malice murder, felony murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and various other offenses in connection with the shooting death of his girlfriend, Sade Danmola. On appeal, Austin argued the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on “sudden emergency” in connection with the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge. The Supreme Court found the trial court erred with respect to sentencing, vacated the sentence and remanded for re-sentencing. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Austin v. Georgia" on Justia Law