Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Kajul Harvey was convicted of malice murder, burglary and other crimes in connection with the death of her mother, Alena Marble. She appealed, arguing, amongst other things, the evidence of guilt was insufficient and her trial counsel was ineffective. After review, the Supreme Court found no harmful error and affirmed appellant’s convictions and sentences, except for the conviction and sentence for hindering the apprehension of a criminal, which the Court determined should have been vacated. View "Harvey v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant Kiera Graham pled guilty to felony murder, armed robbery, and arson in the first degree. Less than a month after she was sentenced for her crimes, appellant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, asserting that it was coerced by her attorney. The trial court denied the motion, and she appealed. After review, the Supreme Court found that appellant’s plea was voluntary, and affirmed. View "Graham v. Georgia" on Justia Law

During the course of investigating the murder of Earl Clemons, investigators learned through a witness and cellular telephone records that appellant Andrew Troutman may have met with Clemons on the day of the murder. In this pre-trial appeal, the State challenged the trial court’s order suppressing Troutman’s inculpatory statement. The trial court determined that Troutman was in custody prior to the beginning of a third interview and that, because investigators never advised Troutman of his Miranda rights, Troutman’s subsequent inculpatory statement was inadmissible. On appeal, the State contended that Miranda warnings were unnecessary because Troutman was not in custody. The Supreme Court found that under the circumstances of this case, in which Troutman was sequestered for hours, repeatedly interviewed, and never given any indication that he was free to leave or terminate the interview (and advised the he could not go), the Supreme Court could not say that the trial court erred in its determination that a reasonable person in Troutman’s position would have believed that he was in custody before the start of the third interview and, thus, that Troutman’s unwarned statement given during that third interview was due to be suppressed. With respect to the issue of whether the in-custody statement admitted in violation of Miranda was, nevertheless, voluntary under traditional due process standards, the trial court concluded that Troutman’s statement to investigators was involuntary and, thus, could not be used at trial for any purpose. On appeal, the States contended that these facts were insufficient to conclude that Troutman’s statement was involuntary. With that contention, the Supreme Court agreed. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Georgia v. Troutman" on Justia Law

In 2010, Daryl Jones was tried by jury on charges of malice murder, felony murder, and cruelty to children in the first degree in the death of his girlfriend’s 17-month-old daughter. The jury acquitted Jones of malice murder and was unable to reach a verdict on the charges of felony murder and cruelty to children, resulting in a mistrial on those counts. When the State retried Jones in 2012, the jury found him guilty of both felony murder and cruelty to children in the first degree. Jones appealed the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and asserting that the trial court erred in denying his plea in bar on double jeopardy grounds. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Jones’ convictions. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, Timothy Cain appealed his convictions and sentences for felony murder while in the commission of an aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, an evidentiary ruling, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cain v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Nick Roberson was convicted of family-violence simple battery after a trial in which she was represented by a public defender. Wishing to appeal her conviction, Roberson filed a motion seeking a transcript without charge as an indigent defendant under OCGA 9-15-2. The trial court held a hearing, but denied her motion. Roberson appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the authority to determine indigence for the purpose of requiring the county to pay for a transcript lay exclusively with the trial court, and thus could not be considered on appeal. Because the Court of Appeals was correct in its determination that the statute reserves this particular determination of indigence to the trial court alone, and because the record before the Supreme Court did not support Roberson’s assertion of a procedural violation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Roberson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Carol Hornbuckle was convicted of murder in connection with a domestic dispute that ended in the stabbing death of Charles Raburn. The trial court denied Hornbuckle’s amended motion for new trial, and she appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her motion for immunity under OCGA 16-3-24.2, erred in its charge to the jury, and that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hornbuckle v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Steven Barnett was convicted of malice murder in the stabbing death of George “Bubba” Bennett. The trial court denied Barnett’s amended motion for new trial, and he appealed. Barnett argued to the Supreme Court he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial judge should have recused herself. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Barnett v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jami and Louis Jones, were tried together by jury and convicted of the murder of their six-year-old son, Colin (among other crimes). They appealed, both contending that they were denied the effective assistance of counsel. Jami alone also contended the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury sua sponte about certain evidence. Upon review of the record and briefs, the Supreme Court found no error, and affirmed. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Sylvester Henderson was indicted, along with a co-defendant, for malice murder, felony murder, and other charges relating to the death of Derrick Brown. In 2011, appellant entered a guilty plea for felony murder. The trial court accepted appellant’s guilty plea, entered final judgment of conviction, and sentenced appellant to life in prison. The remaining counts of the indictment either merged with the conviction for felony murder or, as with the malice murder count, were nol prossed. Over two years later, in May 2014, appellant filed a “Motion of Withdrawal of Guilty Plea,” and the trial court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. Although not in the record, the State indicated that in 2015, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was still pending with the Coffee County superior court. In early 2016, appellant filed a pro se motion for out-of-time appeal of the guilty plea conviction in which he asserted, among other things, that plea counsel failed to file a motion for new trial to preserve his right of appellate review of his conviction, that plea counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in that counsel failed to investigate appellant’s mental history, and that the trial court failed to inquire into his competency to enter a plea freely, knowingly, and voluntarily despite the fact that evidence of his alleged incompetency was brought to the court’s attention. The trial court denied the motion, finding the guilty plea was entered freely and voluntarily based on the totality of the record, and that even if counsel failed to file a direct appeal, counsel could not be deemed to have provided ineffective assistance as such an appeal would have been frivolous given the record facts. The trial court noted that the guilty plea transcript reflected appellant was taking the prescription drug Risperdal, but appellant stated under oath that the drug did not affect his decision-making or reasoning. The record also reflected that on his written and signed guilty plea form appellant disclosed he was taking Risperdal, and indicated in handwriting that the drug was “not affecting [his] decision-making or reasoning ability.” The trial court further found appellant appeared to understand each question asked of him and provided intelligent, appropriate answers to questions, and also that appellant’s assertions that counsel exerted undue influence over him to enter his plea could not be resolved by reference to the record. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. But finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Henderson v. Georgia" on Justia Law