Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Harold George was convicted by jury of two counts of child molestation and related offenses. He appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals, which affirmed his convictions in an unpublished opinion. In addressing one of George’s four enumerations of error, the Court of Appeals rejected his argument that the search of his home exceeded the scope of the relevant search warrant, agreeing with the trial court that “[t]he police officers were not compelled to overlook relevant evidence simply because it was not specifically listed in the search warrant.” Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals cited Walsh v. Georgia, 512 SE2d 408 (1999), for this proposition. The Georgia Supreme Court determined both the appellate and trial courts did not use the correct legal standard for a constitutional Fourth Amendment challenge to the seizure of evidence beyond the scope of a search warrant. The Court therefore vacated the relevant part of the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand this case for further proceedings. View "George v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Keontay Miller appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes arising out of the shooting death of Tellis Fort. Miller contended the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support the verdict, and that there were direct and irreconcilable conflicts in the evidence and contradictions between the testimonies of witnesses at trial, which required a new trial. The Georgia Supreme Court found no merit to these contentions, though it did find the trial court committed two merger errors at sentencing. Judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "Miller v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Steven Jones appealed his convictions for malice murder, aggravated assault, and other offenses arising in connection with the death of Quincey Denton and the assault of Kenneth Studivant. On appeal, Jones argued the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after the admission of allegedly improper character evidence during the State’s case. Finding no merit to these contentions, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Alexander DeVanna was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the 2017 shooting death of his wife, Casey DeVanna. DeVanna appealed, contending his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a proper jury instruction on the legal principle that a convicted felon can possess a firearm while acting in self-defense under certain circumstances. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with this contention and affirmed DeVanna’s convictions. View "DeVanna v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Grady Harper, Jr., was tried by jury and convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2018 shooting death of John Allen. On appeal, Harper contended the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the court reporter to transcribe the entirety of the jury selection proceedings, including voir dire, and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt his justification defense. Seeing no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Harper v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Shawncy Barrett was convicted by jury of the 2016 felony murder of Terrence Baker. On appeal, Barrett argued: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a matter of due process to support his conviction; (2) the trial court should have granted him a new trial on the general grounds; and (3) that the trial court erred by admitting a recording of his first custodial interview with law enforcement officials. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Barrett's conviction. View "Barrett v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The State challenged the suspension of part of Antwon Stanford’s recidivist burglary sentence. The trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the suspension was authorized by OCGA 17-10-7 (a), part of the general recidivist statute, as interpreted by the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Georgia, 651 SE2d 667 (2007). "But Goldberg decided only the right length of recidivist burglary sentences, not whether they can be suspended for offenders like Stanford. OCGA § 16-7-1 (d), part of the burglary statute, plainly says they cannot, and that statute controls this case." Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Georgia v. Stanford" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether a trial court’s order dismissing a criminal case for want of prosecution, which did not say that it was with prejudice to refiling, nevertheless constituted an impermissible dismissal with prejudice if the applicable statute of limitation has run. The Court concluded that such a dismissal order was without prejudice to refiling, and that, to the extent the statute of limitation barred the State from reaccusing the defendant, that consequence flowed from the operation of the statute of limitation and not from the dismissal order. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed. View "Walker v. Georgia" on Justia Law

When this case was before the Court of Appeals, the State argued that Kemar Henry failed to make a request for additional, independent chemical testing pursuant to OCGA 40-6-392(a)(3). The Court of Appeals stated that a request for additional testing is lawfully asserted when a suspect has made some statement that “reasonably could be construed, in light of the circumstances, to be an expression of a desire for such test.” The Court of Appeals applied the “reasonably could” standard in the context of evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel predicated on counsel’s failure to object to the admission of a blood test conducted by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) where the State allegedly failed to honor Henry’s request for independent chemical testing. In its analysis, the Court of Appeals held that Henry’s statements met the “reasonably could” standard. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals set forth the proper standard for determining when a person accused of driving under the influence has invoked his or her right to additional, independent chemical testing under OCGA 40-6-392(a)(3). The Supreme Court was unpersuaded that the standard established by the Court of Appeals for making this determination was consistent with the text and context of the statute, and rejected it in favor of a “reasonably would” standard, and overruled Ladow v. Georgia, 569 SE2d 572 (2002) and all other decisions of the Court of Appeals that applied the “reasonably could” standard. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment here was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Georgia v. Henry" on Justia Law

Tyra Lane was convicted by jury of felony murder and related offenses in connection with crimes he committed against Danielle Simpson and Austin Young. Lane appealed, alleging that the trial court erred by allowing Champion to testify regarding a polygraph test, that he was denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel, and that the cumulative effect of these errors prejudiced him. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Lane v. Georgia" on Justia Law