Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Terrence Burney was tried by jury and found guilty of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the death of Joseph Kitchens. Burney appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence presented against him was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the malice murder charge; (2) the trial court erred by not conducting a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); (3) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony from the medical examiner as to the cause of the victim’s death; (4) he was denied his right to a speedy trial; and (5) he should be granted a new trial because a juror conducted internet research relevant to the case during deliberations. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burney v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2013 when he was 17 years old, Dantazias Raines was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) for malice murder. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Raines' convictions and sentences in part, reversed Raines' convictions for misdemeanor obstruction of a police officer, and vacated his sentence in part. On remand, Raines filed a motion for a jury to make the requisite determination under Veal v. Georgia, 784 SE2d 403 (2016). The trial court denied his motion and certified its order for immediate review. The Supreme Court granted Raines' request for interlocutory review to consider whether a defendant facing a sentence of life without parole for an offense committed when he was a juvenile had a constitutional right to have a jury (as opposed to a judge) make the requisite determination of whether he was “irreparably corrupt” or “permanently incorrigible.” Raines argued in favor of having a jury make the determination prior to imposition of a LWOP sentence; the State argued a defendant did not have a right under the Sixth Amendment for the jury to make the "specific determination" outlined in Veal. The Supreme Court held a defendant convicted of committing murder as a juvenile did not have a federal constitutional right to have a jury determine, in accordance with Veal and the Sixth Amendment, whether he was irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible such that he may be sentenced to LWOP, thereby affirming the trial court. View "Raines v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Shanika Dunbar was convicted by jury for the murder of Theron Robbins, and for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, she contended the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the verdict, the trial court erred by admitting an irrelevant AK-47 rifle into evidence, and the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding the withdrawal of consent to search Dunbar’s home. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. View "Dunbar v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Olivia Smith appealed her 2017 convictions for felony murder and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of her husband, Cory Smith. Appellant argued the trial court erred in refusing to allow her expert witness to testify to out-of-court statements made by some of Appellant’s family members and in excluding documents reflecting Cory’s prior domestic violence against her. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed conviction. View "Smith v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Damon Frazier was convicted of malice murder and related offenses arising out of the 2015 shooting death of Corey Echols. On appeal, Frazier contended the evidence against him was insufficient, the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b), and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a charge on a justification defense. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Frazier v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Rickey Williams was convicted by jury in 2017 for felony murder for the shooting death of Lynett Karim. Williams contended the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on mutual combat and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the conviction. View "Williams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Warden Dennis Nelson challenged the habeas court’s order setting aside Morocco Jacobi Wilkey’s conviction for one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, to which he pled guilty. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the habeas court’s findings of fact regarding Wilkey’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, namely, that Wilkey desired to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing but was not informed by counsel of his absolute statutory right to do so under OCGA 17- 7-93 (b) and that trial counsel failed to give him the benefit of new advice stemming from information learned between the entry of the plea and the sentencing hearing, were supported by the record. The Court also determined that such findings supported the conclusion that Wilkey was deprived of his right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to the effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the habeas court’s determination that Wilkey was entitled to habeas relief on this basis. View "Nelson v. Wilkey" on Justia Law

In a discretionary appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court considered whether the superior court erred in dismissing Marcus Tumlinson's petition for pre-trial habeas relief without considering the merits of his claims or holding a hearing. Because the record showed Tumlinson exhausted his efforts to seek an interlocutory review of the trial court’s order denying him bond in this case, and because he had no other adequate remedy for meaningful review of the lawfulness of his continued detention, the habeas court erred in concluding that it lacked the authority to consider the merits of Tumlinson’s petition for pre-trial habeas relief on this basis. The Supreme Court therefore remanded this case and directed the habeas court to consider Tumlinson’s petition and any exhibits, and if necessary, to conduct a hearing. View "Tumlinson v. Dix" on Justia Law

Terrance Medina was indicted for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4) in connection with the July 20, 2015, shooting death of James Thornton. The jury reached a verdict as to malice murder but was deadlocked on the remaining counts. The parties and the trial court agreed to a mistrial on all counts. Before the trial court actually declared the mistrial, however, it instructed the jury to disclose its verdict. When the jury reported its not guilty verdict on the malice murder count and the judge read it in open court, all of the requirements for formally returning a verdict on that count were fulfilled and the verdict became effective. The trial court then purported to declare a mistrial on all counts, including malice murder. But the mistrial was not effective as to the malice murder count. Double jeopardy thus precluded retrial on that count, although retrial was permissible on the felony murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession counts. The Georgia Supreme Court found: (1) the record did not show the jury's verdict on Count 1 must have been based on a finding that Medina acted in self-defense; (2) the jury also could rationally have found Medina not guilty of malice murder based on a conclusion that the evidence did not prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt, while being undecided on the different issue of whether the evidence proved the general intent to inflict injury needed for aggravated assault (Count 2), which was the predicate for the felony murder count (Count 3) and one of the predicates for the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). The Court concluded Medina failed to carry his burden of establishing that the jury necessarily determined that he acted in self-defense. Consequently, he could be retried on Counts 2, 3, and 4. View "Medina v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In this case's first appearance, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of David Newman's motion for a new trial. In doing so, the Court found the trial court erred in concluding that harmful error occurred at Newman’s trial based on the court’s failure to give a sua sponte jury charge on the use of force in defense of habitation under OCGA 16-3-23. However, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of the remaining claims raised in Newman’s motion for new trial that had not been ruled upon in the trial court’s original order on the motion. This appeal stemmed from the trial court’s denial of Newman’s numerous remaining claims relating to the alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Finding that Newman failed to show his trial counsel performed deficiently, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court with respect to those claims. View "Newman v. Georgia" on Justia Law