Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On September 27, 2006, Mother Marci Mironov and Father Jeff Mironov were divorced; the decree directed Father to pay $3,750 per month for child support for their two children. In 2008, through a consent order, the parties agreed to reduce Father’s monthly child support payments to $1,700. In April 2010, Mother petitioned to modify the child support upward, contending that Father’s income had more than doubled since the time of the consent order. The parties, recognizing that Father’s income fluctuated, reached an agreement setting his child support obligation at between $1,834.27 and $2,755.00 per month, depending on his income, and memorialized this in a 2011 consent order. However, the parties were unable to resolve the issue of attorney’s fees and submitted the matter to the trial court. Each party claimed to have prevailed in the underlying action, Mother because she secured an upward modification of child support, and Father because the settlement was less than the $2,800 a month that Mother had sought before filing the modification action; Mother requested that she be awarded $7,312.50 in attorney’s fees, and Father requested that he be awarded $7,242.26. The court issued an order stating that “[s]ince the parties reached an agreement, both with the assistance of counsel, this Court finds that both parties prevailed in this action,” and concluded that “justice does not require the award of fees.” To the extent that the trial court’s order is an exercise of its discretion not to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, the Supreme Court concluded it was in error as it was based on the erroneous conclusion that there could be, and were, two prevailing parties under OCGA 19-6-15 (k) (5). Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether any attorney’s fees are due Mother as the prevailing party, and if so, in what amount. View "Mironov v. Mironov" on Justia Law

Appellant-Father Kelly Fladger and appellee-mother Monica Fladger were married in 1994. Their marriage produced two children, who were ages ten and six when Mother filed for divorce in 2011. After a bench trial, the trial court entered an order of divorce in 2012, and then approximately one year later. In a discretionary appeal, Father challenged the amount of child support he has been ordered to pay, which was calculated in part using a high-income deviation. The Supreme Court reversed that portion of the divorce order and remanded for the trial court to make all of the written findings that the child support statute required before such a deviation may be applied. View "Fladger v. Fladger" on Justia Law

In a pending divorce action, the Georgia Supreme Court granted an application for interlocutory appeal by Appellant-Husband James Coxwell, who challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to enforce a lost antenuptial agreement between himself and Appellee-Wife Sandra Coxwell. Upon review of the application, the Court held that the appropriate standard of proof for establishing the contents of a lost antenuptial agreement is the preponderance of the evidence standard. Utilizing this standard, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in holding that Husband failed to prove the terms of the lost antenuptial agreement. View "Coxwell v. Coxwell" on Justia Law

Mother Annie Carr-MacArthur and Christopher Carr ("Father") were married in 2004; they had one child, born in 2005. The couple divorced in 2009. The incorporated settlement agreement gave the parties joint legal custody of the child, with primary physical custody to Mother, who had just moved to Florida. Father, who was in the Air Force, was based in Georgia. At the time of the divorce, Mother had certain physical and mental health issues, of which Father was aware, and that he believed to be manageable. In 2010, Mother surrendered physical custody of the child to Father after the Florida Department of Family and Child Services determined her home was unsafe due to unsanitary conditions, empty prescription bottles found throughout the home, and cat food on the floor and kitchen table. At a Georgia juvenile court, Father filed a petition for deprivation after Mother requested the child be returned to her; in October 2010, Father filed a petition for modification of custody, child support, and alimony. In a final order entered September 2013, the trial court modified custody, named Father the primary physical custodian, and made associated changes in child support. Mother appealed the superior court's grant of a change in child custody and child support in regard to her minor child. The Supreme Court reversed only on the issue of calculating child support: "[w]hile the trial court can certainly deviate from the presumptive amount of child support in a modification action, if it does so, it must "enter a written order specifying the basis for the modification . . ." The case was remanded for the trial court to make its mandatory written findings. View "Carr-MacArthur v. Carr" on Justia Law

Nancy Murphy and John Murphy divorced in 2006. In 2012, Mr. Murphy filed an action to modify the child custody provisions contained in the parties’ divorce decree. After the case was assigned to Judge Baldwin, Ms. Murphy moved to disqualify Judge Baldwin. Judge Baldwin denied the motion and Ms. Murphy filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed Ms. Murphy’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It held that a legislative amendment to OCGA 5-6-34 (a) (11), which became effective on May 6, 2013, applied retroactively and barred the Court from hearing Ms. Murphy’s appeal. The version of OCGA 5-6-34 (a) (11) in effect when the change of custody action was filed, when the order at issue was entered, and when Ms. Murphy filed her appeal provided that a direct appeal was authorized from, "[a]ll judgments or orders in child custody cases including, but not limited to, awarding or refusing to change child custody or holding or declining to hold persons in contempt of such child custody judgment or orders." However, the 2013 legislative amendment to subsection (a) (11) provided for direct appeals only from, [a]ll judgments or orders in child custody cases awarding, refusing to change, or modifying child custody or holding or declining to hold persons in contempt of such child custody judgment or orders." Although the Supreme Court found the analysis of the Court of Appeals as "flawed," the Suprmee Court nevertheless affirmed its dismissal of the appeal. View "Murphy v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Appellant Colleen Gunderson and appellee Ronald Sandy were divorced in 2010. The decree of divorce provided both with approximately equal physical custody time with their children. Gunderson remarried and moved, and at the time Sandy filed his contempt motion, he alleged that she resided 45 miles from the marital home. The trial court granted Sandy's motion for contempt and ordered Gunderson to "move back into the school district in which [Sandy] lives and in which the parties' minor child attends school." The Supreme Court granted Gunderson's application for discretionary appeal in order to examine the question of whether the trial court's contempt order impermissibly modified the parties' divorce decree. It was undisputed that Gunderson moved more than once without giving the required notice set forth in the decree, and that at the time the contempt motion was filed she had moved more than 48 road miles from the marital residence referenced in the agreement. The trial court did not err in finding Gunderson in contempt, but the Supreme Court found that the portion of the contempt order that addressed the relocation agreement impermissibly modified the divorce decree. Therefore, the order was reversed in part. View "Gunderson v. Sandy" on Justia Law

Appellant George White (Husband) and appellee Vanessa Howard (Wife) divorced in 2007. Among other things, the final divorce decree: (1) required Husband to obtain a $100,000 term life insurance policy, naming Wife as the beneficiary, and to keep the policy in effect for 12 years; (2) awarded Wife half of Husband’s pension; and (3) required Husband to make partial mortgage payments on property titled in Wife’s name until the land was sold. The decree also recited that neither party was entitled to alimony and that "the transfers contained herein are intended to constitute such an equitable division of property and such transfers are not alimony." In 2011, shortly after Wife remarried, Husband filed a pro se motion seeking to terminate those three components of the divorce decree, contending they were forms of alimony that expired upon Wife’s remarriage. Wife filed a motion to dismiss, and requested attorney fees but cited no statutory basis for such an award. In 2013, Husband, now represented by counsel, filed a complaint for modification of alimony. The trial court entered a final order granting Wife’s motion to dismiss all of Husband’s requests for relief and awarding her $5,000 in attorney fees. The court concluded that the three obligations at issue were equitable divisions of property rather than alimony and, in particular, that the life insurance requirement was “a fixed obligation because it is set for a definite period of time and is not terminable by operation of law and is therefore not subject to modification” as periodic alimony. The order did not indicate the basis for the attorney fees award. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) the court could modify an obligation to pay permanent periodic alimony if the financial circumstances of the parties change substantially, but the court does not have the power to modify if the marital property is fixed, even if the circumstances of the parties change; (2) the life insurance policy was periodic alimony (despite being labeled in the divorce decree as "not alimony"), that could be modified by the court, and terminated upon the Wife's remarriage. View "White v. Howard" on Justia Law

Husband Joseph McCarthy filed an application for discretionary appeal, following the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside a final decree regarding his divorce from Wife Annie Ashment-McCarthy. Following a pre-trial hearing, the financial agreement reached by the parties was read into the record along with the trial court's decisions on any remaining contested issues regarding custody. Husband and Wife stated under oath that they were in agreement with all financial decisions, and Husband did not object to the trial court's rulings on custody. At that time, Husband and Wife also agreed to file letter briefs and submit the issue of attorney fees to the trial court's discretion. Thereafter, Husband fired his counsel, and, before the divorce decree was entered, he began to argue that the parties had not reached an agreement. Wife filed a motion to enforce the agreement and for contempt, and the trial court dealt with all of these matters in the Decree, which granted both the motion to enforce and for contempt and ultimately awarding Wife $2,550 in attorney fees (that award related only to Wife's costs in bringing the motion to enforce). After considering Wife's letter brief on the issue of attorney fees relating to the general divorce action, the trial court entered an order granting Wife $12,580. Husband, still pro se, then filed a motion to set aside the Decree as well as a motion for new trial, and an amended motion to set aside. Husband's motion for new trial contained no grounds at all, and his motion to set aside, as amended, contended that the parties never reached a valid agreement and that Wife had defrauded the trial court by misrepresenting her finances. OCGA 19–6–15 mandated that certain findings must be made in writing by the trial court prior to any deviation in statutory child support. Husband did not raise the issue of the trial court's compliance with the statute in either of his motions. As such, his argument with respect to compliance with the statute was deemed by the Supreme Court as having been raised for the first time on appeal. As a result, Husband waived review of the issue. Husband's main argument, both at trial and in his appeal, challenged the two awards of attorney fees to Wife. Husband argued that, with respect to both awards, the trial court failed to include appropriate findings of fact. Based on this specific set of facts, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's award of fees for failing to make the required findings of fact. The Court concluded Husband's other challenges lacked merit. View "McCarthy v. Ashment-McCarthy" on Justia Law

Following his divorce from Leanne Williams (Wife), Christopher Williams (Husband) filed two motions: one to modify custody and reduce child support and another to hold Wife in contempt for violating Husband’s custody and visitation rights as set forth in the parties’ divorce decree. The motions were consolidated, and hearings were conducted on two separate dates. Following both hearings, the trial court, among other things, reduced Husband’s child support obligations, made certain alterations to visitation, and awarded $2,000 in attorney fees to Wife. In Case. No. S14A0510, Husband appealed the trial court’s ruling in his post-divorce action for modification of child custody and support, contending that the trial court erred by: (1) unduly limiting his new wife’s ability to drive his child from place to place; (2) failing to issue an amended parenting plan; and (3) failing to include in its order certain changes to the visitation schedule allegedly agreed upon by Husband and Wife. In Case No. S14A0512, with regard to the contempt action, Husband argued that the trial court erred by awarding $2,000 in attorney fees to Wife in the absence of sufficient evidence and findings to support the award. The Supreme Court found the trial court’s omission of a modification to custody and visitation required that its order be reversed with respect to this particular issue, and the trial court must reconsider the issue on remand. Further, there was no statutory basis given, no statutory language used, and no findings of fact presented on whether the trial court awarded Wife attorney's fees based on OCGA 19–9–3 (g) or some other statute. Under these circumstances, the Court vacated the award of attorney fees and remanded the case for both a statement of the statutory basis for the fees as well as any required supporting facts.View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a divorce action filed by appellant Kathryn Brookfield Hoover (Wife) against Richard Craig Hoover (Husband). Wife requested a jury trial, and the court bifurcated the proceedings, first hearing the issue of child custody in a bench trial, and reserving issues of equitable division of property, alimony, and child support for a jury trial. After the bench trial on the child custody issue, the trial court issued a court-ordered parenting plan which granted joint physical and legal custody of the minor children. An amended parenting plan order was entered, and another order, “2nd Order Amending June 15, 2012 Parenting Plan” was entered January 11, 2013. Before the jury trial on the remaining issues started, the parties executed a settlement agreement resolving the financial issues in the case, and the trial court entered a final judgment and decree of divorce on February 14, 2013. In addition to referencing the settlement agreement, the final judgment referenced the three orders relating to the parenting plan and stated these orders “are . . . incorporated herein and made a part of this Final Judgment and Decree.” Wife filed a motion for new trial of the custody issues within thirty days of the date the final order and decree was entered. The trial court granted Husband’s motion to dismiss the motion for new trial, finding that Wife’s motion for new trial was untimely since it sought a new trial on the court-ordered parenting plan and was thus filed more than thirty days after the “entry of judgment” on the court-ordered parenting plan. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing the motion for new trial as having been untimely filed.View "Hoover v. Hoover" on Justia Law