Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

William Hardman III (Father) appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and award of attorney fees to Mary Hardman (Mother), in an action he filed for declaratory judgment and contempt based on the parties' divorce decree. The parties were married in 1992 and divorced in 2013. They have three children, including twin boys who were minors. Under the settlement agreement, Father and Mother shared joint legal custody of the minor children, while Mother had primary physical custody. As joint legal custodians, the parties were to participate jointly in decisions regarding, among other issues, the children’s education, including the choice of schools. The settlement agreement required Father to pay Mother $7,000 per month plus a percentage of his gross annual income over a certain threshold. Before the divorce proceedings, the parties paid the private school tuition for the twins using joint marital funds, with Father generally writing the check. After the divorce, Mother refused to pay the tuition from her support payments, and threatened to move the children to a public school in North Carolina, where she lived, unless Father paid it. Father made an advance tuition payment of $9,453.56 so the boys could enroll for the 2013-2014 school year; he then filed a complaint seeking reimbursement and a declaratory judgment as to whether Mother was required to pay the tuition out of her $7,000 monthly alimony payments and whether she could remove the children to school in another state. The complaint also sought an order enjoining Mother from removing the boys from the private school, asked that Mother be held in contempt, and requested attorney fees. The trial court entered an order granting Mother’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Father’s action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court concluded that, if Father “intended for [Mother] to pay the private school costs out of the alimony he pays her each month, he should have written that intent in the Settlement Agreement” rather than trying to “relitigate the Settlement Agreement in order to supplement its terms.” The court also rejected Father’s argument that he needed clarification of the settlement agreement, noting that “[s]imply writing that [Father] has final authority on educational issues does not create an ambiguity as to payment of private school tuition.” Finally, after finding that Father’s complaint for declaratory judgment and his action for contempt “lacked substantial justification,” the court granted Mother’s motion for attorney fees and ordered Father to pay $5,500 to Mother’s counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part, following Father's appeal. Given the plain language of the settlement agreement, the trial court erred in granting Mother summary judgment on Father’s request for a declaration that the divorce decree precluded Mother from unilaterally changing the children’s school. The trial court also erred in granting summary judgment to Mother on the issue of whether the divorce decree required her to pay the children’s private school tuition. The court’s conclusion that Father “should have specifically addressed [Mother]’s obligation to pay for private school if that is what he intended” had it backwards: it was Mother who needed to have the settlement agreement (as well as the child support worksheet) specify that Father would pay for private school, if she wanted to alter the legal presumption that the custodial parent would pay that child-rearing expense. The trial court properly held that Father’s contempt claim was made in “anticipation” of Mother’s contempt, since she had not actually changed the children’s school and thus had not even arguably violated the divorce decree in that respect. View "Hardman v. Hardman" on Justia Law

In 2011, Husband, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint for divorce from Wife. Wife responded and filed a counterclaim for divorce. A few months later, Husband filed a voluntary dismissal of his complaint pursuant to OCGA 9-11-41 (b), which he later amended, explaining that the dismissal was pursuant to OCGA 9-11-41 (a) (1). After Wife filed a notice of hearing on her counterclaim, Husband filed a motion seeking a dismissal or continuance, explaining that he had already voluntarily dismissed the case and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the counterclaim. The court denied Husband's motion for dismissal or continuance. After a hearing, the court entered a temporary order awarding Wife one half of Husband's military retirement pay and attorney fees. Despite Husband's continued motions and protests to the court that he had voluntarily dismissed his complaint, the court refused to dismiss Husband's complaint and entered a final order granting a divorce between the parties. The Supreme Court granted Husband's discretionary application to appeal the judgment and decree of divorce, directing the parties to address whether a timely objection was posed to the voluntary dismissal of the complaint, and if not, whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action, including the counterclaim. Finding that the trial court could have continued on Wife's counterclaim, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's moving forward with Wife's counterclaim. View "Reed v. Reed" on Justia Law

In 1997, Husband began working for Envirotech Environmental Services, Inc., a closely-held Subchapter S corporation. In 1998, Husband purchased 150 shares of stock in Envirotech ($1.00 per share), and made an additional capital contribution. Three years later, Husband and Wife were married. During the next year, Husband sold 50 shares of his stock for a total purchase price of $11,800. Husband retained 100 shares of the 1,000 issued shares of stock. As a minority shareholder, Husband was apportioned K-1 income to be recorded on his tax return, but the actual cash was retained in the company. In 2011, Husband filed for divorce. At the bench trial of the issues remaining in the divorce action, Wife maintained that she was entitled to an equitable division of the appreciation of the value of Husband's 100 shares of Envirotech stock from the date of the parties' marriage to the date of their divorce. Husband asserted that the 100 shares of stock should not be considered to be marital property and should be awarded solely to him because they were acquired prior to the marriage, and any increase in value of the 100 shares that occurred during the course of the marriage was not attributable to Wife or the marital unit but to outside market forces. The superior court awarded the entirety of the 100 shares of stock and any appreciation to Husband. Wife appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sullivan v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Appellant Husband is a native of Pakistan and has dual Pakistani and American citizenship. Appellee Wife is a natural born American of Pakistani descent. The parties' two minor male children are American born. The trial court designated Wife as the primary physical custodian of the children and gave Husband visitation rights. In the divorce decree, restrictions regarding the children’s international travel were made. In addition, the decree required Husband to reimburse Wife up to $250 a month for work-related childcare expenses. Husband disagreed with the terms of the decree and raised multiple errors in the superior court's order. But finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sahibzada v. Sahibzada" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the principle of "priority jurisdiction" when it held that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to terminate Emmanuel Alizota's parental rights and erred in granting Ryan and Melissa Stanfield's petition for the adoption of S.K. The Court of Appeals determined that because the juvenile court had previously exercised jurisdiction over a deprivation proceeding involving Alizota and S.K. and had entered a temporary long-term custody agreement, the doctrine of priority jurisdiction deprived the superior court of jurisdiction over the termination proceeding. Based on that, the Court of Appeals vacated the superior court’s order and declined to consider Alizota's appeal on the merits. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the termination proceeding. View "Standfield v. Alizota" on Justia Law

Husband Ronald Friday appealed the trial court's order on a petition for contempt and a petition for modification of child support in his divorce. The Decree provided for an equitable division of the parties’ retirement assets. And, those assets awarded to Husband included the retirement accounts that were the subject of the trial court's order regarding a QDRO. Thus, ordering that Husband pay child support arrearages from his retirement accounts via a QDRO was a reapportionment of the retirement accounts, constituting a modification of the final decree, and was error. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the trial court's order. View "Friday v. Friday" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted appellant Angela Buckner's (Wife) application for discretionary review of the trial court's order denying her motion to set aside the consent final judgment of divorce filed by appellee Mark Buckner (Husband) and denying her motion to rescind or reform the settlement agreement the parties signed. The parties appeared for a final hearing on their divorce proceeding but continued to negotiate in an attempt to reach a settlement. On that day, the parties memorialized an agreement by using a letter that had been prepared by Husband’s counsel as a prior settlement offer and modifying it with handwritten notations in the margins and handwritten terms on additional pages. The document was then signed by both parties and their counsel, and counsel announced to the court that the parties had reached an agreement and executed a settlement memorandum. The settlement document was filed with the clerk but not read into the record. Wife would later file a motion to set aside the terms of the settlement memorandum on the ground that the order was signed by mutual mistake, and did not represent a meeting of the minds. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed that part of the trial court’s order that denied Wife’s motion to set aside the settlement agreement, but reversed the trial court in denying her motion to set aside the "Consent Final Judgment and Decree." The Court also vacated the final judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Buckner v. Buckner" on Justia Law

Bruce and Latosha Rose were married in 2003. They had one child who was born in 2007. The couple lived in Gwinnett County and the child attended school there until 2012 when the couple separated. Wife moved to Henry County and took the child with her. Shortly thereafter, she filed for divorce. A temporary order was entered giving her primary physical custody and stipulating that the child would attend school in wife's school district. The parties were given joint legal custody and directed to confer with one another on all matters pertaining to the well-being of the child. A final hearing was held later that year at which husband sought primary physical custody. Husband expressed his concern for the child's education in Henry County; took issue with the quality of the meals wife gave to the child (wife fed the child fast and processed, pre-packaged food, "far too often"); that wife was unable to spend time with the child weekdays (her work schedule required the child to attend an after school program) whereas he works from home several days a week; and that the child behaved better in his presence than in the presence of wife since moving to Henry County. The trial court did not make findings of facts and conclusions of law and awarded primary physical custody to husband. Wife sought discretionary review by the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error or abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's decision. View "Rose v. Rose" on Justia Law

In 2005, David and Yvonne Barker divorced. Seven years later, David filed a petition in a Gwinnett County court to enforce certain provisions of the original decree by contempt and to modify certain other provisions of the original decree. The Gwinnett County court, however, dismissed his petition for want of personal jurisdiction, noting that Yvonne moved from Georgia several years ago, and therefore out of the court's jurisdiction. David appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that since 2010, Georgia law has provided that a Georgia court may obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident if she had "been subject to the exercise of jurisdiction of a court of this state which has resulted in an order of alimony, child custody, child support, equitable apportionment of debt, or equitable division of property if the action involves modification of such order and the moving party resides in this state or if the action involves enforcement of such order notwithstanding the domicile of the moving party." View "Barker v. Barker" on Justia Law

The parties in this case challenged an order awarding attorney fees under OCGA 9-15-14 for post-divorce litigation. Because the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion for fees and did not make the required findings specifying the improper conduct justifying the fee award, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Becker" on Justia Law