Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside a ruling finding him to be in contempt of a divorce decree, Alvah Crutchfield appealed, arguing the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Crutchfield challenged venue, not subject matter jurisdiction, and that he affirmatively waived any objections on the face of the record. View "Crutchfield v. Lawson" on Justia Law

When Jay Kaminsky and Diana Entrekin divorced in 2009, they agreed to a parenting plan by which they would share joint legal custody of their son, but Kaminsky alone would have physical custody of the child. The parenting plan also addressed the possibility that Kaminsky might not survive the minority of the child, expressing that Toby Kaminsky Friedman (paternal aunt of the child) have physical custody in the event Kaminsky died. That parenting plan was approved by the court and made a part of the final decree of divorce. Kaminsky died in 2013. In the days following his death, various members of his family (including Friedman) took custody of the child, and they refused to give the child over to Entrekin. Entrekin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that she was entitled to custody of the child. Around the same time, Friedman filed her own petition for custody of the child. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, awarded temporary custody of the child to Friedman, and allowed supervised visitation with the child to Entrekin. Entrekin appealed the denial of her petition for habeas corpus. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of that petition. View "Entrekin v. Friedman" on Justia Law

Husband and wife were divorced in 2012. Several months later, the wife filed a petition for contempt, alleging the husband failed to turn over certain jewelry she claimed should have been divided pursuant to the parties' divorce decree. The husband counterclaimed for contempt, arguing that the wife failed to comply with the decree's parenting and visitation provisions, and failed to reimburse him for repairs to the marital home. The trial court refused to hold either party in contempt. Acknowledging husband's admission that he already had sold some of the items he was supposed to return, the court further ordered that "[i]n the event [husband] is unable to return all pieces of jewelry, but returns selective items, said items shall be appraised by a mutually agreed upon certified appraiser and the amount of the appraisal shall be subtracted from the amount [husband] owes ($40,000) to [wife] for reimbursement of the jewelry." The court also directed the parties to submit a list of disputed expenses for repairs to the marital home. On appeal, the husband argued the trial court's order directing him to return the jewelry and for an accounting of the repairs constituted an improper modification of the parties' divorce decree. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision with regard to the withholding of the husband's share of the net proceeds of the sold jewelry until he returned the jewelry to the wife or provided her adequate compensation: "[a]lthough the trial court had broad authority to enforce and seek compliance with it original decree ... it could not do so by imposing upon husband a pre-condition to hie receipt of the net proceeds that did not exist in the original decree." The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Doritis v. Doritis" on Justia Law

After this divorce proceeding returned to the trial court on remand from "Horn I," the Husband filed a motion to recuse the assigned trial judge, and another judge from the circuit was assigned to hear the recusal motion. After a hearing on the recusal motion, but prior to the entry of a written order, the new judge held a hearing on a contempt motion that had been filed in the case before the recusal motion. The new judge issued an order holding the Husband in contempt. The judge later entered an order recusing the judge originally assigned to the case. The Supreme Court granted the Husband's application to appeal the contempt order, and it vacated that order because the judge assigned to decide the recusal motion lacked authority to act on unrelated matters in the case. View "Horn v. Shepherd" on Justia Law

This case involved the trial court's attempts to compel appellant Ronald Massey to comply with the terms of the parties' 2005 divorce decree and a series of later contempt orders obtained by appellee Angela Massey. In this appeal, Husband challenged the last two 2012 contempt orders; Husband's claims regarding a June 27 contempt order were barred by the dismissal of his previous appeal from that order. However, Husband was correct that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an October 16 contempt order because his previous appeal was still pending with the Supreme Court on that date. Therefore the Supreme Court dismissed Husband's attempted second appeal of the June 27 contempt order and vacated the October 16 contempt order. View "Massey v. Massey" on Justia Law

Judy Chatfield Terrell and Dale Terrell were divorced in 2010. Husband was awarded primary physical custody of the parties' minor daughter and Wife was awarded visitation rights. The Supreme Court granted Wife's application for appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 34 (4), arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Husband primary custody. Finding no reversible error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Terrell v. Terrell" on Justia Law

Elisha Franklin and Elijah Franklin were divorced in 2011. Husband was awarded primary custody , and Wife was awarded visitation. Wife was ordered to pay $1,518 per month in child support, and found that the parties had agreed to a final division of marital assets prior to the final divorce hearing. Husband filed a Motion for Disposition of Real Property, representing that, although the parties had previously agreed to sell their marital residence, the parties had been unable to agree on a date upon which Wife would move out of the residence in order to allow for the house to be sold. Wife filed a motion for new trial, and Husband filed a contempt motion based on Wife's failure to pay child support. Later, Wife filed a motion for reconsideration and a contempt motion based on Husband's alleged violation of the visitation provisions of the trial court's Final Decree. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Wife's contempt motion and granted Husband's contempt motion, requiring Wife to pay $4,555 in child support. In a separate ruling, the trial court ordered that the proceeds of the sale of Husband and Wife's house be equally divided between them. The Supreme Court granted Wife's application to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 34 (4), and after careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's finding as to Wife's gross monthly income and remand the case to the trial court to make a proper finding based on the evidence. The Court affirmed the remainder of the trial court's challenged rulings on appeal. View "Franklin v. Franklin" on Justia Law

This case concerned one of the exceptions to the Georgia Tort Claims Act known as the "discretionary function" exception. The guardians of two infant boys sued the Department of Human Services (DHS), alleging that the Clayton County Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS) was negligent in several respects in its investigation of a report that the boys were neglected by their parents. On motion of DHS, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the “discretionary function” exception properly applied, but the Court of Appeals disagreed, and it reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether the "discretionary function" exception applied in this case, and concluding that it did, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Georgia Dep't. of Human Svcs. v. Spruill" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the trial court's termination of a family violence permanent protective order (PPO) issued against William Lovell in favor of Lynda Mandt. After a hearing, the trial court entered a written order terminating some aspects of the PPO, while leaving others including a requirement that Lovell stay away from Mandt, in place. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's termination of the PPO. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine under what circumstances, if any, a trial court could terminate a permanent protective order pursuant to OCGA 19- 13-4.1 A restrained party who seeks termination of a permanent protective order must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a material change in circumstances has occurred, such that the resumption of family violence is not likely and justice would be served by termination of the order. In reviewing cases like this one, a court should look to the totality of the circumstances, which may include the present nature of the parties' relationship, proximity of shared residences and any shared parental responsibilities; the restrained party's history of compliance with the protective order and history of violence generally both before and after its issuance; the restrained party's efforts to undergo family violence therapy or similar counseling and rehabilitation; the age and health of the restrained party; any undue hardships suffered as a result of the order; and the existence and nature of any objections the victim has to termination of the protective order. View "Mandt v. Lovell" on Justia Law

Gregory Crook (Father) and Janet Crook (Mother) were divorced in 2011. The final judgment and decree of divorce, which expressly incorporated the parties' settlement agreement, awarded the parties joint legal custody of their two minor children; it designated Father as the primary physical custodian, and provided that, with the exception of specified holiday and summer visitation, the children would live with each parent on alternating weeks. The Decree included a deviation from the statutorily prescribed amount of child support based on the parents' agreement that "neither party shall pay child support to the other," which deviation the superior court found to be in the children's best interests. A few months later, Mother filed a petition for modification of child custody, asking, inter alia, that she be given primary physical custody of the children and that there be an award of child support commensurate with the established statutory guidelines. Father moved to dismiss. The superior court entered a final order granting Wife's petition for modification; the parties retained joint legal custody, but Wife was given primary physical custody and Husband was awarded limited, but escalating visitation. With respect to child support, the court expressly determined the total basic child support obligation, but made no findings as to each parent's "adjusted child support obligation" or each parent's "presumptive amount of child support." The Supreme Court granted Mother's application for discretionary appeal to determine whether the superior court erred in applying a "parenting time deviation" to Father's "presumptive amount of child support" on the cited bases of "shared custody" and "history of the parties." Because the superior court awarded a discretionary downward deviation in the amount of child support, but failed to comply with the appropriate statutory requirements, the final order must be reversed and the case remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Crook v. Crook" on Justia Law