Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Helen and Andreas Eversbusch married in June 1985. After marital problems arose in 2001, the couple engaged in counseling and other efforts in an apparent attempt to save their marriage. In January 2002, Helen prepared a six-page document in letter form entitled "Letter of Agreement between Andreas W. Eversbusch and Helene H. Eversbusch" ("Agreement") outlining, behavioral expectations for continuing the marriage, alleged promises between the parties, and "[i]n the unfortunate event of divorce" summary provisions for division of the parties' substantial assets, custody of their children, and alimony and child support. Several years later, marital problems again arose, and in January 2012, Helen filed a complaint for divorce. In May, she filed a motion to enforce the Agreement, requesting that the superior court enter an order finding that the Agreement was legally valid, and therefore, that it resolved "all issues regarding equitable division of property and permanent alimony." The Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal from a Superior Court order that denied Helen's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court did not err in denying the motion, and affirmed. View "Eversbusch v. Eversbuch" on Justia Law

Appellant Troy Lee and appellee Vanessa Vickers Arthur were married in April 1995 and are the parents of two minor boys. Husband filed for divorce in October 2010, with Wife filing a counterclaim for divorce shortly thereafter. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered the final judgment and decree on January 31, 2012 that awarded the parties joint legal custody of the children, with Wife given primary physical custody and ultimate decision-making authority. The final judgment also made an equitable division of marital property that, among other things, awarded the marital home to Wife after finding that Husband stated he did not want it. Without making a finding regarding the value of the marital estate, the final judgment made the award of the marital home subject to Wife's obligation to assume and hold Husband harmless from the existing indebtedness on the property. It also required Wife to use her best effort to refinance the indebtedness in order to remove Husband from the indebtedness and generate funds to pay Husband for his interest in the home and, if not successful in refinancing the home, to pay Husband with interest from the date of the decree. The final judgment granted Wife an indefinite amount of time to pay Husband should the refinancing be unsuccessful. Husband objected. Husband filed a motion for new trial which was denied. Finding fault with the trial court's equitable division of marital property and with the grant of physical custody of the children to Wife, Husband filed an application for discretionary review of the trial court's final judgment and the order denying the motion for new trial. In granting the application, the Supreme Court expressed concern with: whether the trial court erred by failing to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in response to Husband's request made pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-52; and whether the trial court erred in its division of marital property by allowing Wife to delay the ultimate division of the marital home's value for an indefinite period of time. An obligation of a party relating to the equitable division of property may not be extended for an indefinite period of time. Accordingly, that portion of the final judgment that provides an indefinite period of time for the Wife to pay Husband was reversed. Husband's request for a new trial was moot in light of the Court's decision as the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Arthur v. Arthur" on Justia Law

Appellant-mother appealed a superior court order that refused to modify a foreign jurisdiction's award of custody to Appellee-father. The mother contended that the superior court erred in refusing to take jurisdiction of the case under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the superior court's dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jackson v. Sanomi " on Justia Law

Carl and Nekissta Williams were divorced in June 2009. The terms of the original divorce decree held that Nekissta was to have primary physical custody of their children, and Carl was to pay a certain amount each month to Nekissta as child support, an amount based in part on a finding that Carl at that time had a gross monthly income of $4,166.67. Sixteen months later, Carl filed a petition to modify his child support obligation, claiming that he had lost his job since the divorce. Following a hearing, the trial court found that Carl by then had a gross monthly income of only $3,400, and based on this finding, the trial court granted his petition to modify the divorce decree. Nekissta appealed, contending that the finding of gross monthly income was in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellant Randall Craig Driver (Husband) contended that the trial court erred in its equitable division of the marital property, in its lump-sum alimony award to appellee Andria Elizabeth Driver (Wife), in making certain findings that affected the equitable division and the alimony award, and in denying his motion to reopen the proof. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Driver v. Driver" on Justia Law

Appellant Manoucher Jahanbin (husband) appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside the final judgment and decree in a divorce action brought by Zahra Rafieishad (wife). Husband contended that the trial court erred in finding service upon him was perfected. The parties met in their native Iran, but were married in Atlanta, Georgia, shortly after moving here in 2007. After living together in Georgia for several years, husband began traveling internationally and spending time in Iran while wife remained in the marital residence in Atlanta. Wife filed for divorce; after attempts to have husband served personally in Iran were unsuccessful, the trial court entered an instructing wife to utilize the provisions of OCGA 9-11-4 (f)(3)(B)(iii)(II) and deliver the summons and complaint to the clerk of court, who was "directed to mail the correspondence" to husband's residence in Tehran, Iran. However, upon providing the correspondence to the clerk of court, the clerk instructed wife's attorney to complete the registered mail receipt in Farsi and to transact the mailing herself. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the requirements of OCGA 9-11-4 (f)(3)(B)(iii)(II) were not met and reversed: "[w]hile this Court recognizes the difficulties incumbent in the fact that mail sent to a foreign country may require the address to be written in a foreign script, OCGA 9-11-4 (f)(3)(B)(iii)(II) does not permit the clerk of court to direct someone else to address and dispatch the mail for service of process." View "Jahanbin v. Rafieishad" on Justia Law

Aaron and Michelle Black were married in 1996, and later divorced in Houston County. Michelle appealed the final divorce decree, contending that the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant a divorce, that it erred when it refused to stay its proceedings in favor of pending divorce proceedings in New York, and that it erred in its final decree with respect to an equitable division of marital property, child support, and a provision that was intended to enable Michelle to retain her health insurance. Upon review of the decree and the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred with respect to a deviation from the presumptive amount of child support to account for the payment of life insurance premiums, and the Court also agreed that the trial court erred in its framing of the provision to enable Michelle to retain her health insurance, so it vacated those portions of the decree and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found no other error and otherwise affirmed the final decree of divorce. View "Black v. Black" on Justia Law

Sandra M. Singh (Wife) and Zachary Hammond (Husband) were divorced in 2005. The parties had two children together, and pursuant to the final divorce decree, were awarded joint legal custody of the children, with Husband being awarded primary physical custody. In 2009, Wife filed an action seeking child support and a modification of custody. The parties eventually agreed to allow Wife to have primary physical custody of the children, and in late 2011, the Superior Court ruled that Wife should be awarded child support. However, as part of its order, the trial court also ruled that, "[a]s long as [Wife] receives child support payments from [Husband], she shall not apply for any financial assistance for the children from the government." Wife appealed to the Supreme Court, asking whether the trial court erred in ruling that as long as Wife received child support payments from Husband, she should not apply for any financial assistance for the children from the government. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling with respect to its calculation of Husband’s gross monthly income, but reversed the trial court’s ruling with respect to its calculation of Wife’s gross monthly income and its prohibition against Wife’s application for financial assistance as long as she received child support. View "Singh v. Hammond" on Justia Law

Leon East and Donia Stephens divorced in 2002. They entered a settlement which was incorporated into their divorce decree. By their settlement, East and Stephens agreed that Stephens would have custody of their two children, and East would pay weekly child support and would reimburse Stephens for certain miscellaneous expenses that she incurred for the benefit of the children, including "one-half of the minor children’s school expenses. East later petitioned for a modification of the decree, and the trial court granted that petition in part in March 2011. The order of modification said nothing expressly about miscellaneous expenses, but it specified that any and all other provisions of the incorporated settlement "not modified herein shall remain in full force and effect." Following the modification, Stephens moved to have East held in contempt for, among other things, his failure to pay half of miscellaneous expenses that she incurred on behalf of the children. The trial court held East in contempt for that failure, as well as other failures to meet his court-ordered obligations. The court specifically rejected East’s contention that the March 2011 modification discontinued and superseded his obligation in the 2002 decree and incorporated settlement to pay half of the miscellaneous expenses. East appealed the trial court's contempt order, contending that he could not be held in contempt for failing to pay miscellaneous expenses for the children when the modification order directed him to pay the presumptive child support amount and made no deviation for miscellaneous expenses. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with East and reversed the final contempt order to the extent that East was held in contempt for failure to pay a portion of the miscellaneous expenses that Stephens incurred for the benefit of the children. View "East v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Michael and Kelly Goodell divorced in 2006 by a Final Judgment and Decree which incorporated a settlement agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, Michael was required to pay Kelly alimony until she remarried. Michael also voluntarily agreed to make payments for the benefit of Kelly's two children from a previous marriage, after she remarried. Kelly remarried in 2008, and Michael began making payments to her children. Kelly died one year later, and Michael stopped making payments to her children. The administrator of Kelly's estate filed a contempt action against Michael for non-payment, contending that the payments were part of the property division in the divorce, and as such, survived Kelly's death. The trial court agreed with Kelly's estate; Michael thereafter appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the payments were a voluntary contractual obligation to be construed in the same manner and with the same rules of construction as other contractual agreements. The payments remained Michael's responsibility, and accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Goodell v. Oliver" on Justia Law