Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The court granted Wife's application for interlocutory appeal to determine whether the superior court erred in denying her motion to dismiss her ex-Husband's petition to modify child support. The court held that it was error to refuse to dismiss the petition because, even assuming arguendo, that the superior court had the authority to modify the dismissal order to provide that it was not an adjudication on the merits, the ruling terminated the Husband's petition for modification. Thus, it was a "final order" and triggered application of the prohibition in OCGA 19-6-15(k)(2). Further, there is no merit to the policy argument that the interest of judicial economy was served by allowing the modification action to proceed.

Larry DeFoor petitioned to establish title against all the world on a piece of property in Ellijay, Georgia. Appellants, certain descendants of Millie DeFoor, the record title holder, answered the petition and denied its material allegations. The court held that the earlier denial of appellants' motion for summary judgment was harmless or moot because the court found evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of Larry; Larry did not need to reside on the property in order to establish adverse possession, he only needed to exercise dominion over it; appellants' assertion that Larry could not "tack" his adverse possession to the adverse possession of his father was without merit; the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to conclude that Larry met his burden to show ouster; it was not error to grant Larry's first motion in limine which sought to exclude certain evidence; and the trial court did not err in refusing to permit appellants to show that Flint Timber agreed to pay Larry for an easement on the property. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Father and Mother's judgment of divorce incorporated by reference a parenting plan and custody order that gave Mother primary physical custody of the parties' daughter, with Father awarded visitation that required supervision when the child spent the night in Father's custody. At issue was whether the judgment contained an improper self-executing modification that was contingent upon a determination to be made by a person other than a judge. The court held that since the provision regarding the termination of supervision of Father's overnight visitation with his child was a material change in visitation that would occur automatically without judicial scrutiny into the child's best interests, it was an invalid self-executing change of visitation that should not have been included in the judgment and decree of divorce. Accordingly, the court reversed that portion of the judgment and decree of divorce and remanded the case.

Appellants are the biological paternal grandparents of a child born to appellee and appellants' son. After Douglas Bailey married the child's mother, he adopted the child in 2006 when appellants' son terminated his parental rights to the child. The court had granted appellant's petition for certiorari and posed the following question: Did the Court of Appeals correctly "conclude that the limiting language of OCGA 19-7-3 (b) - forbidding original actions for grandparent visitation if the parents are together and living with the child - includes adoptive parents"? The court answered the question in the affirmative and upheld the judgment by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err when it concluded that the term "parents" in OCGA 19-7-3(b) did not exclude an adoptive parent such as Mr. Bailey. The Court of Appeals also did not err when it concluded that the trial court erred when it denied appellees' motion to dismiss.

Husband appealed a trial court's issuance of a final divorce judgment and decree that divided some unimproved real property in Florida and two Morgan Stanley funds equally between the parties and made no disposition of the interests in an apartment complex, thereby leaving each party with his or her own interest. The court held that the two Morgan Stanley accounts were transformed into marital property when Husband gave Wife an ownership interest in the property; the Florida property was transformed into a marital asset where it was deeded to him and his Wife as tenants in common; and in regards to the apartment complex, Wife acquired an ownership interest separate and distinct from Husband's. Finally, the court held that Husband's claims that the trial court abused its discretion by announcing a prejudgment of the case prior to his presentation of evidence was without merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case arose after a divorce decree between Husband and Wife. After a hearing, the trial court entered a final order granting primary physical custody of the children to Husband and visitation to Wife. Thereafter, Wife filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. Wife then appealed this ruling, contending, among other things, that the trial court erred by relying on evidence adduced at the temporary hearing. The court held that the record and the trial court's final order explicitly showed that the trial court relied on evidence from the temporary hearing to reach its final decision regarding custody of the children and there was no indication that the parties were notified in advance that this was going to happen. As a result, pursuant to Pace v. Pace, the court reversed the trial court's final order and remanded for further proceedings.

Wife appealed the trial court's orders subsequent to a divorce decree, contending that the trial court erred by retroactively reducing husband's alimony obligation and by failing to grant wife attorney fees. The court held that the trial court erred by modifying husband's alimony obligation pursuant to Hendrix v. Stone. The court held, however, that the trial court's decision to have each party pay his or her own attorney fees stands because wife waived her right to pursue this argument. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Wife appealed a final judgment of divorce, contending that, in awarding primary physical custody of the parties' two children to husband, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider evidence of alleged family violence perpetrated by husband against her and that the trial court erred by failing to enter written findings of fact explaining its reasons for granting primary physical custody to husband. The court held that the trial court did not fail to consider the evidence of family violence and that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in awarding physical custody of the children to husband, with wife having joint legal custody and extensive visitation. The court also held that wife could not complain about the trial court's child support calculations where she specifically asked that court to use her child support worksheet. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Wife was granted an appeal from the superior court's denial of her motion for new trial, as amended, following its entry of a final judgment and decree of divorce and order of custody (decree). Wife appealed the decree's awards of custody, child support, and equitable division on the basis that the evidence at trial did not support them. The court held that, contrary to wife's contention, the court did not terminate her cross-examination of the guardian ad litem. The court also held that there was ample evidence to support an award of custody to the grandparents based on the best interest of their grandson. Although the court found wife's exact amount of income difficult to discern, it determined from all relevant circumstances, including her expenses and the fact that husband did not work when he lived in the home, that she must have had a minimum income of $5,000 a month and was capable of earning substantially more than that. Finally, there was no merit to wife's remaining complaint that the superior court erred by ordering her to pay $20,000 to husband as an equitable division of property. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Caveators Celia Beth Simmons (Beth) and Lisa Kay Norton (Lisa) appealed from the grant of summary judgment to the propounder of the will of their father, Charles Powell Norton (Charles). Beth and Lisa contended that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment on their claim that the will was the product of undue influence on the part of their brother, Samuel. The court held that there was simply no evidence that Samuel exerted any influence over Charles in the making of the will and it was therefore not error to grant summary judgment.