Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband and Wife entered into a Prenuptial Agreement before their marriage in 1990. The parties divorced twenty years later, and following a hearing, the trial court agreed to enforce the Prenuptial Agreement and incorporated it into the parties' Final Decree. Wife appealed, primarily contending that the trial court erred in enforcing the Prenuptial Agreement. The court held that the evidence supported the trial court's conclusions that full financial disclosures were made to Wife before she agreed to sign the Prenuptial Agreement and that the agreement was not unconscionable. Furthermore, Wife had not shown that the increase in Husband's net worth over time presented a change of circumstances that would make enforcement of the agreement unfair and unreasonable. The court also held that Wife was also incorrect in her assertion that the trial court erred by entering its Final Decree despite pending counterclaims by Wife where the record revealed that all Wife's counterclaims dealt with matters that were specifically covered by the Prenuptial Agreement. The court dismissed Wife's remaining claim and affirmed the judgment.

Wife and Husband were divorced and in the Final Decree, Wife was awarded primary physical custody of the parties' two minor children, and was also awarded child support. Husband appealed, contending that these rulings were in error. The court held that there was evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Wife should be awarded primary physical custody of the parties' children and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court also held that the trial court did not err in determining the child support obligation where the trial court properly ascertained the reasons for Wife's occupational choices and the reasonableness of these choices. The court further held that Husband's argument that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to abate his child support obligation or award him child support during summer visitation was without merit.

Wife appealed the trial court's final divorce decree, contending that the district court erred in enforcing a postnuptial agreement and in determining that child custody was governed by the postnuptial agreement. The court held that the trial court's authority to find full and fair disclosure from wife's extensive familiarity with husband's business dealings and personal financial condition was not altered, but was further supported, by the affirmation in the agreement that each party had "knowingly and voluntarily chosen to forego" formal discovery, investigation, and analysis of the other party's financial condition "and accept the provisions of this agreement on [the] basis of information acquired prior to this date without further such discovery." The court also held that the trial court did not base its custody decision solely on the postnuptial agreement, but expressly and properly based that decision on its alternative application of the "best interests" standard pursuant to OCGA 19-9-3. Therefore, pretermitting the postnuptial agreement's relevance and the applicability of OCGA 19-9-5, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's custody award.

Husband challenged a divorce decree and the trial court's post-decree order denying his motion for a copy of the trial transcript. The court held that the trial court erred in denying the transcript motion and the court should not resolve the challenges to the divorce decree without the transcript. Accordingly, the court reversed the transcript order and remanded the case.

The court granted wife's non-frivolous application for discretionary appeal of the parties' final judgment of divorce. Wife contended, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by entering its decree nunc pro tunc so as to eliminate a "transition period" from supervised to unsupervised visitation that the trial court had orally announced it was providing for the welfare of the couple's children. The court held that, under the unique circumstances of the case, the parties' minor children qualified here as innocent third parties whose interests were adversely affected by the entry of the visitation provision nunc pro tunc because that action eliminated a provision expressly meant for the children's best welfare. Accordingly, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion when it made the visitation period nunc pro tunc to April 13, 2010. The court held that it was unnecessary to address wife's remaining enumerations of error.

Husband and wife were divorced in 2008 and husband subsequently filed a petition for downward modification of his child support obligation. The trial court read a divorce settlement to forbid changes to child support payments below a floor amount, even though the settlement agreement lacked a "clear and express waiver" of the modification right to any degree. The court reversed in light of Varn v. Varn and held that the trial court erred in refusing to allow husband to seek a modification of child support as provided by OCGA 19-6-15(j).

Wife and husband were married in 1993 and, after a bench trial, were awarded a final decree of divorce on July 14, 2010. The court granted wife's application for discretionary review under this court's previously instituted Pilot Project for domestic relations cases. On appeal, wife contended that the trial court erred when it improperly designated her Scottrade account as marital property; improperly applied the source of funds rule, improperly made an erroneous finding of fact, improperly valued husband's separate property, and improperly valued property adjacent to the marital home. The court held that the trial court erred in designating the Scottrade account as marital property and the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the order denying the motion for new trial was reversed as to this issue and the matter remanded for the marital property to be equitably divided. The court also held that the trial court did not commit reversible error in its varied treatment of husband's office and of the $210,000 funds from wife's Scottrade account. The court further held that there was no merit in wife's claim that husband's testimony, regarding his contribution, was insufficient proof where the trial court had the right to credit husband's testimony on that matter. The court finally held that the trial court did not err in applying the source funds rule where wife had acquiesced to the trial court's use of county tax records to determine the value of the various real estate properties at issue. The court sustained the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial where wife's remaining enumeration of error was without merit.

Appellant challenged the probate court's declaratory judgment interpreting her father's will to require equal distribution of his personal property and residual estate among his eight children. The court held that the probate court correctly ruled that appellant acted beyond her discretion in her distribution of the assets to date. Therefore, the court found no error, because under the correct interpretation of Items III and IV of the will, appellant did not have the discretion to distribute the bulk of the estate to herself to the exclusion of her seven siblings. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Husband and wife were married in 1983 and wife filed a petition for an uncontested divorce on April 26, 2000. The trial court signed a final decree granting a divorce on June 1, but the decree was not filed with the clerk until August 1, 2002. In the meantime, husband and wife, believing they had already been divorced, were married again on June 25, 2000. Wife filed a complaint for divorce on June 29, 2010 where the parties, soon thereafter, learned that the final decree of divorce was not filed in the previous action until August 1, 2002. At issue was whether a nunc pro tunc order could be used to backdate the entry of a divorce decree. The court held that the entry of the divorce decree nunc pro tunc to the date of the signing of the decree was advantageous to husband, as well as wife, because it accurately reflected his intention to re-enter the bond of marriage on June 25, 2000. Accordingly, the court held that the trial court did not err in asking wife's counsel to prepare the nunc pro tunc order and the judgment was affirmed.

Nu-Day Partnership, LLLP, ("Nu-Day"), a family limited partnership, filed an action against Norma Day for, among other things, quiet title in an attempt to clarify that Nu-Day was still the owner of certain property in Atlanta ("Bishop Street property"). At issue was whether Lon Day's 2001 transfer of his interest in LLD Management to his children was an ultra vires act and therefore void. The court held that an ultra vires act had nothing to do with the actions of an individual who simply chose to transfer his own interest in a company to other individuals, as such actions had nothing to do with the corporation itself acting beyond the scope of its legal authority. The court also held that the record indicated that Lon Day clearly intended to, and did, in fact, execute legal documents that transferred all of his interest in LLD Management to his children, who served as sole owners of Nu-Day.