Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee filed an application for contempt after appellant failed to make the first installment payment on the lake house the parties owned and missed the July and August child support and home maintenance payments pursuant to a Divorce Agreement Settlement. At issue was whether the trial court impermissibly modified the divorce decree by requiring appellant to put the lake house on the market and pay appellee the money he owed her from the proceeds of the sale. The court held that the record supported the trial court's finding that appellant willfully failed to meet the extended deadline of the final consent order and therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in holding him in contempt of the final consent order. The court held, however, that the court erred in ordering appellant to sell the lake house in order to pay appellee. The court further held that the trial court did not err by requiring appellant to pay appellee for interest in the lake house and rejected appellant's claim that the attorney fee award was erroneous.

Mother and Father were divorced pursuant to a Final Decree in March 2009 which gave the parties joint legal custody of their minor child and named Mother as the primary legal custodian. Father then filed a complaint to modify child custody in June 2009 and the trial court transferred primary legal and physical custody of the child to him. Mother appealed from the ruling and contended that the trial court erred by transferring primary custody to Father based on Mother's planned move to New York. Mother also claimed that the trial court erred by failing to make written findings of fact regarding the material change in circumstances that justified the change in custody to Father. The court held that, in light of the trial court's consideration of the evidence and the best interest of the child, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by changing primary custody to the Father. The court also held that the record was devoid of any request by either party for written findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court awarding primary custody to Father was affirmed.

Husband appealed the final judgment of divorce and of an order, which he claimed held him in contempt of a temporary order. At issue was whether the trial court erred in awarding wife alimony because husband alleged that wife failed to show a need for alimony; husband had no ability to pay alimony because he was disabled and unemployed; and wife's misconduct and the short duration of the marriage made alimony inappropriate. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife alimony because there was some evidence in the record to support the award and it was not made pursuant to an erroneous legal analysis where wife was disabled due to her medical problems and needed alimony; where both husband's living expenses and costs to keep wife on his health insurance were lower than he claimed; and where husband's long-term disability income, future earnings, and personal property would enable him to keep wife on his health insurance for two years and make her car payments for one year. The court also reviewed the record and concluded that the trial court did not err in dividing the parties' property. The court further held that the trial court, in fact, did not hold husband in contempt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of divorce.

Lucien Cabrel died in December 1963 and Cabrel's wife and four minor children were the recipients of a joint award of year's support in 1964. In 2000, Cabrel's two daughters filed a petition to partition real property in Henry and Spalding counties in which property the daughters claimed an interest by virtue of the 1964 joint award of year's support. The daughters also sought an accounting and to recover from their mother income generated by the property between 1964-1997. In Case No. S11A0212, the mother appealed the denial of summary judgment on the partitioning issue and in Case No. S11A0214, the daughters took issue with the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment, its failure to conduct a hearing on their motion for attorney fees, and its determinations that they were barred from having an accounting and were not entitled to prejudgment interest. The court held that since the motion to set aside was filed more than three years after the entry of judgment of partition and that judgment was made by a court with jurisdiction, the trial court did not err when it denied the mother's motion to set aside the judgment of partition. The court held also that the partitioning judgment was not appealed and the daughters cannot now complain that they had a greater interest in the property than that which was awarded in 2004; that the trial court did not err in concluding that the daughters were not entitled to income from the property where they did not meet certain contingencies; and that the trial court did not err when it did not award attorney fees since the daughters were not awarded any damages.

Mother and father were divorced in March 2007 and father was awarded primary physical custody of the parties' two young children and mother was awarded substantial visitation and was required to pay child support. Mother subsequently filed an action seeking to hold father in contempt of the final divorce decree, to obtain sole custody of the children, and to obtain child support in the event child custody was given to her. Mother appealed the trial court's ruling in favor of husband and contended that the trial court erred by adding the visitation provision and in awarding attorney fees. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in adopting a provision that restricted against "any overnight male guests" which would prohibit mother from having visitors with whom she had no romantic relationship and for whom the record did not support a finding of harmful effect on her children. The court also held that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees when it failed to specify the statutory basis for its award either at the final hearing or in its written order. Accordingly, the court vacated the award of attorney fees and remanded the issue to the trial court to explain the statutory basis of the award and make any findings necessary to support it.

Mother and father were divorced in 2003 and these appeals were from their most recent post-divorce litigation. At issue, inter alia, was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the award on attorney fees in May 2010 while an application for discretionary appeal was pending in this court, and whether mother had a right to appeal directly the trial court's denial of her motion to set aside the attorney-fee award. The court affirmed and held that the trial court did not err when it denied mother's motion to set aside the award of attorney fees since its underlying judgment was final and the trial court's award of attorney fees did not supplement, amend, alter or modify the April 2010 order and judgment, which were the subjects of the pending discretionary application and notice of appeal. Therefore, the supercedeas of the May 20 application and notice of appeal did not deprive the trial court jurisdiction to enter the award of attorney fees. The court also held that mother was required to file an application for discretionary appeal since OCGA 5-6-35(a)(8) required that review of an order denying a motion to set aside be preceded by an application for discretionary review.

Husband and wife were married in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and two daughters were born in Georgia during the marriage. After husband and wife divorced, wife was awarded custody of the children and husband subsequently appealed an order that denied the motion to vacate the 2006 judgment of divorce and award of child custody and an order modifying the child custody order to this court contending that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction because husband had sought to vacate the judgment of divorce. The court held that husband's challenges to the divorce court's jurisdiction were rendered moot by the trial court's entry of the 2010 custody modification and parenting plan order, where it was uncontested that the children resided in DeKalb County, as did the wife, and husband submitted himself to personal jurisdiction of the court when he filed his modification pleading and appeared for the hearing. The court also held that the trial court did not err in making jurisdictional findings regarding the children's home state where the trial court did not find any authority that alleged such findings were required by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act and where the trial court did not decline jurisdiction on the basis of being an inconvenient forum or stay the matter because of another custody action in a foreign jurisdiction.

Husband and wife executed a will in 1980, which was expressly identified as being "joint and mutual," bequeathing all of their property to each other as the survivor in fee simple and at the death of the survivor, the residue of the estate was to be divided equally among husband's two children, David and Darrell, and wife's two children, Deana and Diane. After husband died in 2005, wife probated the 1980 will, became the executor, and conveyed husband's estate to herself. In November 2005, wife executed another will which could, at her death, leave 20% of the estate to appellant, Deana, and the residue to the children of Deana and Diane. Deana then obtained wife's power of attorney and conveyed all of her mother's real estate to her two children and to appellee, Diane's child. When wife died in 2008, Deana offered the 2005 will for probate and Diane filed a caveat and also sought to petition the 1980 will as the last will and testament. The court held that the trial court did not err when it applied the law in place before the 1998 probate code was adopted to determine whether husband and wife had a contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it concluded that the 1980 will was joint and mutual and that husband and wife had an enforceable contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it did not in fact find that the fee simple conveyance to wife was a marital trust; when it made no rulings as to whether wife's 2005 will was a contract, and as such, that issue could not be raised on appeal; and when the 1980 will specifically provided that the residue of the survivor's estate was to be divided equally among the four children. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order that the 1980 will would be specifically enforced by equity.

After 16 years of marriage, Michael Abt filed for divorce from his wife Kerry. The couple had two children. The trial court conducted a temporary hearing and awarded the parties joint custody of the children with the wife being the primary custodian. During the next few months, the children revised their election of custodial parent because the wife had moved her new boyfriend into her home. The wife moved to have a guardian ad litem appointed to address the childrenâs decisions for custodial parent. On the eve of trial, the parties announced they had settled the custody issues; remaining issues were tried to a jury. Following the trial and entry of the verdict, the parties entered a consent agreement adopted by the court which granted a new trial. In the agreement, the parties agreed to a non-jury trial and prohibited the children from being in the presence of the wifeâs new boyfriend. After the non-jury trial, the court entered a final judgment and decree of divorce, and ordered wife to pay husband attorney fees. The wife filed an application for discretionary appeal claiming the lower court abused its discretion in its award of fees. The Supreme Court held that the record demonstrated that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees, and affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

Donald Greenwood and Joan Greenwood were divorced November 6, 2008. Pursuant to the divorce decree, the Husband was awarded the marital residence; however the decree required him to refinance the residence before October 1, 2009 in order to remove the Wife completely from the mortgage on the home; failing to do so under the decree accrued penalties payable to the Wife. The Husband did not refinance the home as required, and he did not pay the Wife any penalty. The Wife filed a motion for contempt on June 29, 2010. After a hearing, the trial court entered a final order September 21, 2010, holding the Husband in contempt for failure to pay the penalty. The court ordered that rather than as an immediate payment, the penalty would be converted into a lien against the residence. The court would not force the sale of the residence to remove the Wife from the mortgage. The Wife filed an application for discretionary review of the lower courtâs ruling. The Supreme Court found the trial court erred by improperly modifying the divorce decree by imposing the lien on the marital residence and by giving the Husband âa reasonable period of timeâ beyond October 1, 2009 to remove the Wife from the mortgage. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.