Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Georgia Supreme Court granted discretionary appeal to Lori Provenzano (Wife) to consider whether the trial court erred in its ruling on the petition to modify alimony filed by Forrest Jones (Husband) pursuant to Georgia’s “live-in lover” law, OCGA 19-6-19 (b). The parties were divorced in 2014. Pursuant to the final decree, Husband was to pay Wife alimony of $3,000 per month for sixty months and one-third of any net bonuses or commissions earned by Husband through his employment during that period. In 2016, Husband filed a petition for modification of alimony pursuant to OCGA § 19-619 (b) on the ground that Wife had voluntarily cohabited with her boyfriend “since at least the second half of 2014.” The issue before the Georgia Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that Wife voluntarily cohabitated with a third party in a meretricious relationship after she obtained a separate apartment from her boyfriend but allegedly maintained an intimate relationship with the boyfriend. Wife argued on appeal that the trial court misapplied the cohabitation requirement by allowing a prior cohabitation to form the basis for modifying future alimony obligations. The Supreme Court determined the record supported the trial court’s finding that Wife had voluntarily cohabited in “a meretricious relationship with a third party.” Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling on Husband’s petition to modify alimony. View "Provenzano v. Jones" on Justia Law

Husband Ricky Lockamy and Wife Margie Lockamy were divorced in 2009 pursuant to a final decree that incorporated the parties’ settlement agreement. The settlement agreement provided that Wife would receive 40% of Husband’s “military retirement” payments. The trial court awarded these payments as an equitable division of marital property, and it did not award any alimony to Wife. In March 2010, the Navy informed Husband that the payments he thought were for military retirement were actually disability benefit payments and that those payments could not be divided with Wife. As a result, Husband promptly stopped making payments to Wife provided under the “military retirement” provision of the settlement agreement. Six years later, Wife filed a motion to reform the divorce decree to provide for the original 60% to 40% division of the payments from the Navy that the parties originally thought were for Husband’s retirement. The trial court determined, among other things, in an order entered in 2016, that, because Husband’s disability benefits could not be divided as marital property, it would enforce the parties’ original intent to divide those payments by reforming the decree to award alimony to Wife. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of the motion to reform, finding the trial court was not authorized to modify the divorce decree pursuant to Wife’s motion, as the motion to reform the decree was untimely. Wife was not authorized to file an actual petition for a revision of “alimony” here, as it was undisputed that she was not awarded alimony in the original divorce decree. View "Lockamy v. Lockamy" on Justia Law

The parties were divorced in Connecticut in 2010. At that time, appellant Husband’s child support obligation was $279 per week for the parties’ two minor children. A Connecticut court modified the support order to facilitate appellee Wife’s move to Georgia with the children, reducing the obligation to $100 per week. In 2016, Wife filed an action in Georgia to domesticate and modify the parties’ Connecticut divorce decree and the modified order. The complaint was served on Husband personally while he was in Coweta County visiting the children. Husband moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the Georgia trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Connecticut child support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), because the requirements of OCGA § 19-11-172 (a)2 had not been met. Wife argued that jurisdiction was proper under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law (UEFJL), to both enforce and modify the Connecticut child support order. The trial court ultimately denied Husband’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that it had jurisdiction to modify the Connecticut child support order; however, it granted Husband’s request for a certificate of immediate review. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Husband’s application for interlocutory review, and, having considered the record, the parties’ arguments, and the relevant legal authorities, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment. The Georgia trial court did not have jurisdiction; Wife had to modify the child support order in Connecticut, and her invocation of the UEFJL did not change that result. View "Ross v. Ross" on Justia Law

Rhonda Bennett (f/k/a Donley) filed an amended motion for new trial following a habeas court order discharging the payment of restitution and any arrearage for back child support by the purported biological father of Bennett’s minor child. Concluding that she was a non-party to the underlying action and therefore lacked standing to challenge its order, the court dismissed Bennett’s motion. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, finding the habeas court erred in concluding that Bennett lacked standing. View "Bennett v. Etheridge" on Justia Law

Appellant-husband James Flesch and appellee-wife Debbie Flesch were divorced by decree of divorce following a bench trial. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Husband’s discretionary application to address whether the trial court erred in: (1) determining that Wife’s Vanguard retirement account was her separate, non-marital property;(2) concluding that certain real estate qualified as marital property and was subject to equitable division; and, (3) awarding attorney fees to Wife. Though the Court agreed the trial court erred in classifying Wife’s retirement account as entirely nonmarital property, there was no merit to Husband’s remaining arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Flesch v. Flesch" on Justia Law

In a post-divorce contempt action, the Georgia Supreme Court granted Appellant’s application for discretionary appeal to review the trial court’s order finding Appellant in contempt of three separate provisions of the parties’ divorce decree. “To be sure, this Agreement could have been more clearly drafted [. . .] the complete text of the Agreement demonstrates that the parties intended for Husband to assume all tax liabilities of the businesses. We therefore conclude that the trial court’s construction of ‘corporate income tax liability’ constituted a reasonable clarification of that term rather than an improper modification of the Agreement.” The Court affirmed the trial court’s findings as to two of provisions and reverse as to the third. View "Sutherlin v. Sutherlin" on Justia Law

Wife Tracy Hardin was granted a discretionary appeal of the grant of partial summary judgment to Husband John Hardin in this divorce case. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that certain disability benefits issued pursuant to an insurance policy are non-marital property and are not subject to equitable division. Finding that it did not, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Hardin v. Hardin" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court remanded this matter for redistribution of the marital assets. Alina Gibson (Wife) appealed the trial court’s order granting her requested divorce from Stewart Gibson (Husband). She argued that the trial court erred by excluding approximately $3.2 million in assets from the marital estate that Husband previously had placed into two trusts. She argued: (1) property placed in trust by one spouse without the other’s knowledge and consent remains marital property; (2) Husband’s transfer of assets into the trusts was fraudulent; and (3) Husband failed to transfer properly the assets in question into the trusts. The Supreme Court found that contrary to Wife’s argument, trusts like those here were exempt from equitable division absent a finding of fraud. Because the trial court’s finding that Husband’s transfers of assets into the trusts were not fraudulent was supported by evidence in the record, the Court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of Wife’s fraudulent transfer claim. Wife’s other claims were without merit too, with one exception: the Court agreed with her that transfers of the contents of two brokerage accounts into the trusts were ineffective under OCGA 53-12-25 (a) because the accounts erroneously listed Husband as trustee. View "Gibson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

This case made a second appearance before the Georgia Supreme Court. Jeffrey Sponsler (Husband) appealed the trial court’s order finding him in contempt of the final decree effectuating his divorce from April Sponsler (Wife). When the Supreme Court granted Husband’s application, it issued two questions for argument and consideration: (1) Did the trial court err by ordering both parties to share responsibility for home equity line of credit (HELOC) payments on the rental home until it is sold? (2) Did the trial court err by ordering Husband to repair the rental property? The Court found that although the trial court ultimately did not err in finding Husband to be in contempt of the divorce decree, the trial court did err by ordering Husband to share ongoing responsibility for HELOC payments and to make repairs to the rental property. View "Sponsler v. Sponsler" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court issued the following three questions to the parties with respect to their appeal of a child support order: (1) Did the trial court err in applying a deviation from the presumptive amount of child support for extraordinary educational expenses without complying with OCGA 19-6-15 (c) (2) (E)?; (2) Did the trial court err in ordering that child support would continue until the child reached the age of 20?; and (3) Did the trial court err in adjusting Mother’s gross income for a preexisting child support order under OCGA 19-6-15 (f) (5) (B)? The Supreme Court concluded, after review of the specific facts in the trial court record, the trial court erred in all three aspects: (1) the trial court erred in applying a deviation from the presumptive amount of child support for extraordinary educational expenses without complying with the statute; (2) the trial court omitted any requirement that the parties’ son be enrolled in and attending secondary school to extend support beyond the age of majority, therefore not complying with the plain language of the statute; and (3) no such preexisting child support order satisfying the time qualifications of the statute existed, therefore the trial court’s modification of a non-existent order was simply a nullity and had to be vacated. View "Heintz v. Heintz" on Justia Law