Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Georgia Supreme Court granted Wife’s application for discretionary appeal in this matter to consider whether the child custody award should be vacated for the failure of the trial court to incorporate a permanent parenting plan. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the final judgment and decree had to be vacated in part and the case remanded on this ground. The Court also vacated the award of attorney fees for the court, upon remand, to make the necessary findings of fact for the award of attorney fees to Husband. View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted a discretionary appeal in this case to decide whether the trial court, after interviewing the parties’ two children in chambers without the parties or counsel present, erred in relying on information from those interviews in making a final custody determination and entering the divorce decree, erred in denying the parties and counsel access to the court reporter’s transcript of the interviews, and erred in sealing the transcript. After review, the Court concluded the trial court improperly relied on information that was not available to the parties or counsel and improperly sealed the transcript of the court’s in-chambers interviews without complying with the procedures for sealing court records set forth in the Uniform Superior Court Rules. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s sealing order, vacated the final custody order and divorce decree, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Altman v. Altman" on Justia Law

In response to Wife’s request for an award of attorney fees and costs, the trial court entered an order finding Husband’s conduct had unnecessarily expanded the litigation and awarded Wife fees and expenses. The decree awarded primary physical custody of the child to Wife, and permitted Wife to relocate to Arizona where she and the child resided prior to the marriage. To address problems that immediately arose concerning child custody and the exchange of the child between Arizona and Georgia, the trial court entered an amended final judgment and decree that changed the terms of the original child custody award with respect to Husband’s visitation and other details. On appeal, Husband challenged the award of attorney fees to Wife, and further asserted that even if attorney fees were properly awarded, the trial court erred in failing to offset from the final attorney fees award the amounts he had previously paid as temporary support and attorney fees. Due to the terms of the parties’ prenuptial agreement, the Supreme Court agreed with Husband that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees: “[t]he fact remains, however, that pursuant to Georgia law, when they are awarded, attorney fees under OCGA § 19-6-2 are awarded ‘as an intrinsic part of temporary alimony.’” View "Vakharwala v. Vakharwala" on Justia Law

Appellant James Voyles (Husband) and appellee Tara Voyles (Wife) were divorced in February 2015. In December 2015, Husband filed a petition in which he sought to hold Wife in contempt of the property distribution provisions of the divorce decree, in contempt of various portions of the parenting plan, and by later amendment sought to be named as the child’s primary physical custodian. Wife filed her own petition for modification and contempt, in which, among other things, she sought to modify the parenting plan incorporated into the divorce decree. Husband answered Wife’s petition and filed a counterclaim, again requesting in relevant part, a modification of custody to award him full or joint physical custody of the child. Wife moved to dismiss Husband’s petition for contempt and his counterclaim to her petition. Pursuant to a rule nisi, the trial court consolidated the two cases and conducted a joint hearing, at which Husband was not present. The trial court then entered a joint order granting Wife’s motion to dismiss Husband’s contempt petition (as amended) and his counterclaim to her petition; granting her motion to find Husband in contempt; granting her petition to modify the 2015 divorce decree with respect to various aspects of the parenting plan; and ordering Husband to pay past due unreimbursed health care expenses and attorney fees. Acting pro se, Husband filed a motion in which he sought to set aside the joint order and sought a new hearing on the ground that he was unaware of the hearing date because he had not received proper notice of it. After conducting a hearing, the trial court entered another order denying Husband’s motion to set aside and for a new hearing. Husband then filed a notice of appeal directed to the Court of Appeals seeking review of the latter order, and the Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court. An issue remained as to whether Husband followed the proper procedure for seeking appellate review. The Supreme Court concluded he did not, and that the appeal had to be dismissed. The Court dismissed this case by opinion, as opposed to the usual dismissal order, so that it could clarify the law and provide guidance regarding which appellate procedure should be followed in a case like this one where the issue raised on appeal concerns a matter other than custody (here, whether the trial court properly denied Husband’s motion to set aside). View "Voyles v. Voyles" on Justia Law

Wife Michelle Merrill appealed a trial court order denying her motion for attorney fees, which was based on the unsuccessful petition by husband Gary Lee to modify his child support obligation under the parties’ divorce decree. Because the settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree required a party who unsuccessfully seeks relief in connection with the agreement to pay the defending party’s reasonable attorney fees, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with direction to determine the amount of fees to which Wife is entitled. View "Merrill v. Lee" on Justia Law

Over a period of fifteen years, mother Helen Wynn undercalculated by more than $72,000 the amount of child support a court had ordered father Robert Craven to pay. When the father sought a change in custody, she then demanded payment. The trial court rejected her belated claim on the basis that it was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. The Supreme Court found that laches does not apply to claims for uncollected child support, and it reversed. View "Wynn v. Craven" on Justia Law

Donald Markle appealed the grant of a writ of habeas corpus in this child custody case. While residing in Georgia in 2010, Katrina Dass gave birth to the minor child at the center of this controversy; Dass and Markle, the child’s father, were never married, and prior to 2016, Markle did not attempt to legitimate the child. Sometime after the child’s birth, Markle relocated to New Mexico. The child lived in Georgia with Dass from birth until January 2011; he then lived with both Markle and Dass in New Mexico until August 2012. Dass returned to Georgia, and the child lived in Georgia with her from August 2012 until July 2015, spending the summers of 2013 and 2014 in New Mexico with Markle. In July 2015, the child returned to New Mexico, and it is undisputed that between late July 2015 and Dass’s February 16, 2016 filing of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the child lived continuously in New Mexico with Markle, and that Dass did not live with them in New Mexico. In 2016, Markle filed a petition seeking to determine paternity, custody, and child support for the minor child in New Mexico, naming Dass as respondent. The New Mexico court entered a temporary order providing, inter alia, that the child not be removed from New Mexico without the written consent of the other party. Dass requested that Markle return the child to Georgia but Markle declined. Dass filed ia “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and EmergencyMotion for Return of Child” in Georgia. After a hearing, the superior court entered a writ of habeas corpus, finding that Georgia was the “home state” of the child within the meaning of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), and ordering that the child be returned to Dass. The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed that Georgia was the child's home state, and vacated the grant of habeas relief to Dass. "Nothing precludes Dass from seeking such a ruling from the New Mexico court, and nothing indicates that, were a custody determination to be made by the New Mexico court, it would be unfair to her." View "Markle v. Dass" on Justia Law

In January 2015, Janice Eversole filed a divorce action against Jay Eversole seeking, among other things, an award of alimony, child custody, and child support. Wife alleged Husband had left the marital home in Georgia less than six months prior to the filing of the complaint and was living at a stated address in South Carolina. With respect to personal jurisdiction over Husband for the award of alimony and child support, Wife alleged Husband was subject to the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to the Georgia Long Arm Statute (OCGA 9-10-91 (5)). When Wife was unable to perfect personal service on Husband, the trial court granted her motion for service by publication. Husband failed to file a timely answer, and a hearing in the matter was conducted at which Husband failed to appear. After the hearing but before the trial court entered an order granting the divorce and other relief sought by Wife, Husband filed a late answer in which he admitted jurisdiction as pleaded in the complaint and admitted the marriage was irretrievably broken. He raised no objection to sufficiency of service. Husband denied other allegations of the complaint and sought custody of the parties’ minor child, along with an award of child support, and sought alimony from Wife. Nevertheless, the trial court entered the final judgment and decree of divorce which it dated nunc pro tunc to July 13, 2015, the date the hearing was conducted. In the order, the trial court awarded child custody to Wife, and also awarded, among other things, child support, alimony, and attorney fees and costs. Husband then filed a motion to set aside the judgment on two grounds: (1) that although he was served by publication he never received personal service or service by mail, and (2) that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because he was a resident of South Carolina. The trial court granted Husband’s motion in part and set aside its award of alimony, child support, and attorney fees and costs because it found it lacked personal jurisdiction over Husband to make these awards. The trial court did not set aside the grant of divorce, the division of personal property located in Georgia, the award of real property located in Georgia, or the child custody award, since it concluded personal jurisdiction was not required for those decisions. Wife filed an application for discretionary appeal which the Georgia Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court found final judgment in this case had not been executed or entered at the time Husband filed his responsive pleading, even though the judgment was later executed and back-dated. The trial court erred in granting, part, Husband’s motion to set aside because he was bound by his admission of jurisdiction and waiver of the defense of insufficiency of service. Because the Supreme Court reversed in part the order granting Husband’s motion to set aside the divorce judgment, Wife’s remaining enumerations of error were moot and need not be addressed. View "Eversole v. Eversole" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a trial court order determining that Father-appellant George Denney was the legal and biological father of minor child M. S. G., and ordering the state registrar to issue a new birth certificate for the child listing Father’s name. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Father’s discretionary application to address whether the court erred in ruling that it was without authority to correct the child’s surname. The Court agreed with Father that the trial court erred in its conclusion, albeit for a reason other than that urged by Father, and therefore vacated the judgment in part and remanded this case with direction and further proceedings. View "Denney v. Denney" on Justia Law

Husband Imran Rasheed appealed the trial court’s grant of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement filed by wife Maryam Sarwat and its incorporation into a final decree of divorce. Husband contended that no settlement had ever been reached and that, in any event, the trial court’s order setting forth what it found as a complete settlement and the subsequent decree of divorce incorporating that settlement were too incomplete to be enforced. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the terms of the settlement agreement as found by the trial court were incomplete, and those terms did not address all required aspects of the divorce: “Though visitation is cursorily addressed, the word custody never even appears in the order. Furthermore, the order setting forth the settlement does not contain a permanent parenting plan that complies with OCGA 19-9-1. The order regarding settlement terms also appears to be incomplete with regard to property holdings, or, at the very least, requires a great deal of inferences from unspecified sources to determine who actually owns what, what must be sold, and how any proceeds should be split between the parties. A trial court errs when it seeks to enforce what amounts to a settlement containing incomplete terms of a divorce. By incorporating such an incomplete settlement into the parties’ divorce decree and using that settlement as the decree’s operative terms, the infirmities of the incomplete settlement agreement became the infirmities of the divorce decree, which omits fundamental considerations such as the custody of the minor children.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rasheed v. Sarwat" on Justia Law