Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved Husband Stephen Turner Scott's challenge to the trial court's final child support order entered in the divorce action initiated by Wife Amanda Kay Scott. At the time of the final bench trial in the parties' divorce case, Husband had ceased being a self-employed farmer, as he had been at the time the trial court entered the temporary child support order, and he had started working as an employee of his parents' farming business. He had also moved into a house owned by his parents. Husband's gross monthly income was $5,299.39. This figure consisted of a finding that Husband earned $2,166.67 in monthly wages, along with monthly fringe benefits as follows: $1,177.40 for the use of a 2011 Ford F-250 truck provided by his employer/parents; $100.00 for automobile insurance premiums; $400.00 for gasoline; $30.32 for the monthly average ad valorem tax and registration payments for the truck; $1,000.00 for the use of a house belonging to his parents; $350.00 for the power bill paid by his parents; and $75.00 for a cellular telephone they provided to him. The Supreme Court granted Husband's discretionary appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in its determination of fringe benefits available to Husband for purposes of calculating his gross monthly income. After review, the Court reversed the child support award to the extent it improperly added $1,000.00 per month for use of the house and $350.00 per month for payment of Husband's power bill to his gross monthly income as fringe benefits of his employment. Upon remand, however, the trial court could consider the value of these benefits as grounds for a nonspecific deviation from the presumptive amount of child support due from Husband as permitted by OCGA 19-6-15 (i)(3), after making findings required by OCGA 19-6-15 (i)(1)(B) that take into consideration the respective circumstances of the parents and the best interests of the children. View "Scott v. Scott" on Justia Law

Sanna Mermann (f/k/a Tillitski, Wife), and Christopher Tillitski (Husband) were divorced in Bibb County pursuant to a decree signed on February 24 and filed on February 26, 2009. More than four years later, Wife submitted a QDRO to the trial court, which signed it on November 29, 2012. Wife claimed the long delay was caused by Husband's failure to give her necessary information and documents. On July 19, 2013, after realizing that Husband had not seen the QDRO, Wife filed a motion asking the court to vacate the QDRO and enter one approved by Husband. Husband agreed that the QDRO should be vacated, asserting that some of the information in it was incorrect. At the hearing on Wife's motion held on July 9, 2014, Husband argued that Wife should not receive any earnings on her portion of the IRAs that accrued after March 26, 2009 (the date 30 days after the settlement agreement) was signed by which she was supposed to have prepared the QDRO. Husband claimed that the 30-day deadline imposed on Wife was meant to limit her ability to benefit from the accounts' investments and that she should not be allowed to profit from her failure to comply with the divorce decree. The trial court agreed with Husband, and on August 25, 2014, entered an order vacating the QDRO, setting March 31, 2009 as the "date of calculating gains and losses to the total value of the SEP IRAs as of February 24, 2009," and requesting that the parties submit an amended QDRO within 30 days that "calculat[ed] [new] figures in accordance with [the trial court's] Order." Wife appeals that ruling. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's determination that March 31, 2009 was the proper "date [for] calculating gains and losses to the total value of the SEP IRAs as of February 24, 2009," and remanded the case for a more proper consideration of the parameters of any new QDRO to be submitted by the parties. View "Merman v. Tillitski" on Justia Law

Following the trial court's denial of her motion for a new trial regarding her divorce from Jason McLendon (Husband), Amanda McLendon (Wife) filed an application for discretionary appeal. The issues presented for the Supreme Court's review were: (1) whether the trial court committed reversible error in its determinations on custody, child support, or any other issue addressed in the parties' Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce; and (2) whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees under OCGA 9-15-14 (b), where it actually granted part of the relief sought in Wife's motion for new trial/motion for reconsideration. Finding no reason to disturb the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "McLendon v. McLendon" on Justia Law

In 2013, appellant Victoria Hart ("wife"), filed a complaint seeking a divorce from her husband, Lee Hart ("husband"). The parties' pre-trial efforts to settle, including mediation, were unsuccessful and they proceeded to trial. They continued to negotiate, both with and without the aid of counsel, until the morning of trial but began selecting a jury after they were unable to resolve their differences. Following a mid-day recess, the parties informed the trial court that they had reached an agreement. The trial court stated its understanding that the parties had reached an agreement, directed counsel to put the parties' agreement on the record, and instructed counsel and the parties to listen carefully and ask questions if they had any. Wife's counsel then announced the parties' settlement agreement on the record. Although the announced settlement made no mention of husband's unvested civil service retirement, counsel for both parties affirmed at the conclusion of the hearing that the terms announced on the record covered "everything." The final draft was presented to the parties for their signatures, but wife refused to sign and subsequently retained new counsel. After a hearing, the trial court granted husband's motion to enforce the parties' settlement agreement and entered a final decree incorporating the last revision of the draft agreement. In doing so, the trial court rejected wife's argument that the unsigned draft did not accurately reflect the agreement between the parties because she never consented to waive her right to assert a claim against husband's civil service retirement. Wife subsequently appealed, alleging that the trial court improperly added a substantive term to the parties' settlement when it included the challenged waiver language in the final decree. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Hart v. Hart" on Justia Law

Husband Tigh Froehlich appealed a trial court’s order holding him in contempt of the parties’ divorce decree and a later order approving a modified parenting plan. Husband challenged four of the court’s five findings of willful violations of the prior court orders. He also argued that the court impermissibly modified the divorce decree in the contempt proceeding by ordering him to transfer to wife Deirdre Froehlich half of his accumulated Marriott hotel loyalty program points, which the decree awarded to her; requiring him to make an accounting of the points prior to the transfer; and obligating him to provide an annual accounting of the points he accumulated in the future before transferring Wife’s share of the points to her. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Froehlich v. Froehlich" on Justia Law

Ronald Steis, M.D. (Husband) and Jane Steis (Wife) married in 2000 and filed for dovirce. Husband filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a ruling that certain property acquired during the marriage was his separate property under the terms of the parties’ prenuptial agreement, and thus was not subject to equitable division. Specifically, Husband claimed as his separate property his salary from employment as an oncologist earned during the marriage and the parties’ jointly titled bank accounts, investment accounts, and real property, all of which he asserted were acquired with his salary. The trial court denied Husband’s motion, and the Supreme Court granted his application for an interlocutory appeal. After careful review of the parties arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Steis v. Steis" on Justia Law

Husband David Stone and Wife Anna Stone were married to one another twice, and had one minor son from the marriage. Husband and Wife were divorced the second time by a decree dated 2014, and this decree incorporated a parenting plan. Among other things, the parenting plan awarded joint legal custody of the minor child to Husband, who the court specifically found was a fit parental custodian, and the maternal Grandmother. Husband was given primary physical custody, Grandmother was given visitation rights, and Wife, who the court found was unfit to have custody, was given only a potential for future visitation. In granting certiorari review in this case, the Supreme Court stated its specific interest in determining whether the trial court erred in awarding joint legal custody of the parties' son to the Husband and Grandmother. Because Georgia statutory law supported joint custody arrangements only between parents, the Court reversed the award of joint legal custody in this case. View "Stone v. Stone" on Justia Law

Lillian and Jimmie Lee Johnson were married for 37 years, and together, raised her grandniece, Jessica Rogers. In 2005, Ms. Johnson made a will that included a number of bequests to Rogers. Ms. Johnson died in 2011, and Mr. Johnson then sought to probate her will. Rogers filed a caveat, asserting that she had been adopted by Ms. Johnson after the will was made, which would entitle her to an intestate share of the estate Although Rogers was unable to point to any statutory adoption by Ms. Johnson, she claimed nonetheless that she had been adopted pursuant to the equitable doctrine of “virtual adoption.” The probate court agreed that Rogers was “virtually adopted” by Ms. Johnson after she made her will, and so, the probate court admitted the will to probate, but subject to Rogers taking an intestate share of the estate. Mr. Johnson appealed, arguing the doctrine of virtual adoption had no application in a case in which the decedent disposed of her entire estate by will. The Supreme Court agreed, and for that reason, affirmed the admission of the will to probate, but reversed that part of the judgment holding Rogers was entitled to an intestate share. View "Johnson v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Following the denial of her motion for new trial, as amended, Alba Mallard (Wife) was granted a discretionary appeal from the final judgment and decree of divorce dissolving her marriage to Kenneth Mallard (Husband). The issue on appeal was whether the superior court erred by awarding Husband a 100% interest in the parties’ marital home. In the divorce action, Wife did not object to Husband being awarded the possession of the Property as she had purchased another home, but she asked that the Property be partitioned or that she be awarded 50% of its value. The trial court declined Wife’s request to partition the Property, and awarded it entirely to Husband. In so doing, the superior court determined: at the time of the parties’ remarriage, there was no equity in the Property; the outstanding balance of a loan on the Property (which Husband paid off from his separate funds) was higher than the fair market value of the Property a year after the payoff; each party owned a 50% interest in the Property as the result of the Wife’s deed to Husband; there was no evidence that Husband intended to make the payment of the debt a gift to Wife or to the marital unit; and there was no marital investment in the Property. The Property was considered by the parties to be the separate property of Wife, but she made the joint property of Wife and Husband. And, as joint tenants with right of survivorship, each party held an interest in the Property in part and potentially in whole. The Supreme Court held that the superior court erred in its finding that Husband’s payment of the Debt was not a gift to the marital estate. "And, while unquestionably the 'source of funds' rule as set forth in "Maddox v. Maddox" was a method of equitable distribution of marital property, it contemplates and weighs the contribution of separate property brought to the marriage against the entire non-marital and marital investment in the property." The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mallard v. Mallard" on Justia Law

Under the parties' 2012 divorce decree and incorporated settlement agreement, Terry Gooch was required to select a certain option for his retirement benefits, and to designate Nancy Gooch as the survivor beneficiary; under that option, Terry would receive life-time benefits, with a guarantee of ten years of payments, such that should he die within that period, payments would continue to his designated survivor beneficiary for the remainder of the guarantee period, referred to as “Life with 10-year guarantee.” However, Terry did not comply with this directive of the decree, instead selecting an entirely different retirement option, and naming his new wife as the survivor beneficiary thereunder; this designation was irrevocable. In December 2013, Nancy filed a petition for Terry to be held in contempt for his failure to comply with this portion of the decree. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order finding Terry in willful contempt of his obligations under the divorce decree, but determined that no available remedy existed; the court’s order also awarded Nancy $5,600 in attorney fees, which it struck in response to a motion for reconsideration by Terry. The Supreme Court granted Nancy’s application for discretionary appeal to determine whether the trial court was correct in ruling that there was no available remedy for Terry’s contempt. The Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in failing to devise a remedy for Terry’s willful contempt. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Gooch v. Gooch" on Justia Law