Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

James Partridge (Husband) and Bridget Partridge (Wife) were married in 1994, and had two children together. One child was born in 1994, and the other was born in 1997. The parties separated in 2013. Wife filed for divorce and the parties were divorced pursuant to a June 2014 Final Decree. Husband appealed the trial court's alimony order, and in addition, alleged several other errors. Finding nor eversible error or abuse of discretion in the calculation of alimony, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Partridge v. Partridge" on Justia Law

The parties to this case were divorced in 2007, and a child support order was entered as part of the final judgment pursuant to which appellee Joseph Marlowe (Husband) was ordered to pay appellant Ronni Green Marlowe (Wife) $992.00 per month for support of their three children. In 2013, Husband filed a petition to modify the original child support award downward on the ground that his income had diminished. Wife counterclaimed, seeking an upward modification on the ground that she now had work-related child care expenses that were not considered in the original child support award since at the time of the original award the children were not attending daycare. The trial court modified Husband's child support obligation downward to $771.00 per month. The Supreme Court granted Wife's application for discretionary appeal for the purpose of determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of child support due in light of the Georgia Schedule of Basic Child Support Obligations, OCGA 19-6-15. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part. Wife argued the trial court applied the wrong figure listed in the statute; the Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for further consideration. View "Marlowe v. Marlowe" on Justia Law

Gary Mims (husband) and Lynn Mims (wife) married in 1986 and were divorced in 2008. At the time of their divorce, two of the couple's four children were minors. The final divorce decree incorporated a settlement agreement entered into by the parties in which husband agreed to pay the costs of a college education for all of the children. In 2010, the couple's youngest daughter graduated from high school and enrolled in Valdosta State University (“VSU”) in 2010. In February 2012, wife filed a contempt action against husband alleging that he failed to pay college expenses for their daughter as required under the terms of the settlement agreement. The Superior Court of Lowndes County entered an order directing husband to pay daughter's college expenses for all nine semesters she had attended, minus amounts credited for daughter's receipt of the Hope Scholarship and Pell Grants. The trial court declined to find husband in contempt, however, determining that he had not received notification of the expenses incurred by daughter prior to wife's filing her complaint. The Supreme Court granted husband's application for discretionary appeal to determine whether the trial court erred when it ordered husband to pay daughter's expenses for each of the nine semesters she had attended college. Finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mims v. Mims" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a divorce action filed by appellant-wife Kayleen Pollard against husband Brian Pollard. The final judgment and decree was entered July 31, 2013. Wife retired in 2012 after the divorce complaint was filed, and she commenced receiving retirement benefits from the Teacher’s Retirement System of Georgia prior to the date the final judgment was entered. Wife elected not to provide for survivor benefits, thereby entitling her to receive the maximum monthly benefits during her life. Husband had already named Wife as the sole beneficiary with survivorship rights of his pension plan, which he was ordered not to change for so long as Wife was alive. Wife was ordered to "restore" Husband as her sole beneficiary with survivorship rights within thirty days of the date of the order. By the time the final judgment was entered, however, Wife was precluded from changing her survivor benefits election. Whether or not she was aware it was too late to provide for survivor benefits, she apparently did not disclose this fact to the trial court or to Husband. When Husband discovered Wife’s failure to comply with this provision on the ground of legal impossibility, he filed a pro se action for contempt. The trial court found that it was impossible for Wife to comply with the order since she had already commenced receiving benefits prior to the final decree and was now precluded from making the ordered change. The court found the final decree contemplated Husband’s receipt of a portion of Wife’s pension if he survived her. The order did not find Wife to be in contempt, but the trial court ordered Wife to take out a life insurance policy in an amount not less than $50,000 naming Husband as the sole beneficiary, or alternatively, to establish a bank account payable on her death to Husband in an amount not less than $50,000. The Supreme Court granted Wife’s application for discretionary appeal of the trial court’s contempt order to address whether the contempt order improperly modified the divorce decree, and specifically directed the parties to consider this Court’s previous holdings in "Cason v. Cason" and "Smith v. Smith." The Court found that it did, and reversed. View "Pollard v. Pollard" on Justia Law

In two cases, Joseph Neal, Jr. appealed the trial court’s orders modifying child custody and child support as they pertain to his two children by two different marriages. Neal and Allyson Hibbard were divorced in 2000. They had one child together, a son who was fifteen at the time of this initial action. Under the final judgment and decree of divorce, the parties had joint legal and physical custody of their son, who spent half of his time with each parent. In the divorce decree, Neal was ordered to pay child support to Hibbard in the amount of $660.00 per month, as well as certain expenses of the child. Neal and Jennifer Neal ("Jennifer"), Neal’s second wife, were divorced in 2006, remarried in 2009, and divorced again in 2010. They had one child together, a daughter who was seven at the time of the bench trial in this case. Under the 2010 final judgment and decree of divorce, the parties had joint legal and physical custody of the child, and again, the child’s time was split equally between the two parents, and Neal was ordered to pay Jennifer $1,000.00 per month in child support, as well as certain expenses of the child. In late 2011, Neal was involved with a "sexual incident" with his then-wife and their eighteen-year-old babysitter. As a result of the incident, Neal was charged with rape and other crimes; the rape charge was dismissed in 2012, although Neal was sentenced for possession of marijuana and furnishing alcohol to an underage person. Neal was a personal injury attorney in Augusta; his criminal prosecution received extensive negative media coverage; his income was negatively impacted; and he was suspended from the practice of law in South Carolina and the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Neal then moved to Atlanta in an effort to restore his practice. Both Hibbard and Jennifer sought modification of their divorce decrees as to child custody and support. As to both cases, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. Common to both cases on remand, the Supreme Court found that temporary support judgments of both trial courts had to be reversed because they did not comply with OCGA 19-6-15. View "Neal v. Hibbard" on Justia Law

Husband-appellee Rex Reynolds filed for divorce from appellant-Wife Dorothy Reynolds, alleging that she was a non-resident of Georgia, and that she could be served by publication. Husband subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and served Wife with this motion at her last known address in Barnesville. Thereafter, the court granted Husband’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered a final judgment and decree of divorce between the parties. Several months later, Wife, proceeding pro se, filed a verified motion to set aside the final judgment and decree of divorce, contending that Husband did not practice due diligence for service by publication; Husband knew at the time he filed his complaint that Wife resided within Georgia; and Husband committed a fraud upon the court by alleging that Wife was a non-resident. Husband, proceeding pro se, filed a response, in which he stated that Wife was located “mostly in Jones County,” and her non-resident status in his complaint and affidavit was a “typo.” He further questioned how Wife could be deemed a non-resident when her address was in Barnesville. Wife appeared pro se for a hearing on her motion to set aside and was instructed by the court to seek the assistance of counsel. Wife subsequently appeared with counsel for a hearing on her motion to set aside, but no hearing was held. Instead, the court issued an order denying Wife’s motion to set aside. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting Husband's judgment of divorce based on an insufficient affidavit of service. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Reynolds v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Husband and wife were married in July 2003. Together they had four children, all of whom were minors and resided with their mother in Georgia. In May 2012, wife filed a complaint for divorce alleging that husband was a resident of the State of California and had moved from the marital residence in Butts County within the six months preceding the filing of the divorce action, thus subjecting husband to the jurisdiction and venue of the Butts County Superior Court. She also averred that husband could be personally served at a specific address in California. In order to serve the summons and complaint, wife retained a private legal service company which attempted on several occasions to personally serve husband at the California address. After several failed attempts at personal service, a process server returned an affidavit of service indicating he served husband by substitute service at the California address by leaving the complaint “with or in the presence of: Maria Schiemm, Occupant” who was a “[p]erson of suitable age and discretion.” A final hearing was scheduled for December 3, 2012, but no notice of the hearing was provided to husband because of his failure to file responsive pleadings. Husband did not appear at the hearing, and the following day, the trial court entered a final decree granting a divorce and awarding wife sole physical and legal custody of the minor children, in addition to child support. Husband was awarded visitation with the children at such times and dates as agreed by the parties. Upon learning that a final judgment had been entered, husband hired counsel and filed a motion for new trial asserting, among other things, that he had not been properly served. In support of his motion, husband presented the affidavit of his California landlord, Janice Graber, in which Graber stated that the prior tenant of the California property was a woman named Marianne Schenk. Graber speculated that the process server had misspelled Marianne Schenk’s name by spelling it “Maria Schiemm.” Husband submitted no other evidence to support his claim of improper service, although he argued in his brief and through counsel that Maria Schiemm did not reside at his residence and he did not know who she was. The trial court rejected husband’s claim of improper service and denied the motion for new trial. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Husband's discretionary application under Rule 34 (4) to determine whether the trial court erred in its denial of a motion for new trial in this divorce and child support action. After reviewing the record, the Georgia Court found that husband was not properly served with the summons and complaint, and therefore, reversed the trial court’s order denying husband’s motion for new trial. View "Guerrero v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

At the final hearing in the case, the parties to this divorce action, through counsel, indicated they had reached an agreement to all terms of the divorce, property settlement, and child custody issues, and that the only matter the parties were submitting to the court for final resolution was the issue of appellee Husband’s visitation with respect to the two-year old child of the marriage. The parties agreed that Wife would have primary physical custody of the child, and a the fact that Husband had substance abuse problems and was, at that time, in a residential rehabilitation facility for treatment. Further, Wife had concerns about Husband’s ability to ensure the child’s safety during his visits with her. Counsel for Wife stated that he understood the paternal grandparents would like visitation with the child, and informed the trial judge that Wife had several concerns about whether the grandparents would be able to prevent improper conduct by Husband while the child was visiting the grandparents. The judge asked the parties to draw up a parenting plan that addressed the issues resolved at the hearing. The resultant parenting plan was signed by counsel to each party, and it was attached to and became a part of the final judgment and decree of divorce. The terms of the final judgment also contained an award of visitation to the grandparents. Both the parenting plan and the final judgment provided that the paternal grandparents could exercise visitation with the child as a substitute for the father. The signature of Wife’s counsel indicated he approved the final judgment as to form. On appeal, Wife challenged the order’s grant of visitation rights to the paternal grandparents. Having approved the order as to form, the Supreme Court concluded Wife was estopped from asserting on appeal that the form of the order was deficient because it did not include findings of fact. The trial court's judgment was affirmed. View "Grove v. Grove" on Justia Law

Teresa Wallace ("Mother") was granted a discretionary appeal of the superior court's final judgment and decree of divorce. Mother and Christopher Wallace ("Father," an active duty serviceman in the United States Navy) were married in 2002, and had three minor children. In late, 2012, Mother filed a complaint for divorce. The parties agreed that they would have joint legal custody of the children, and that Mother would have primary physical custody; agreement was not reached on certain other matters, including child support. At the beginning of the final hearing, both parties agreed to waive findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court announced that it intended to set Father's child support amount at $1,300.00 per month, and to award him a deviation from that amount for travel expenses of $400.00 per month to see the children once a month, resulting in a total monthly support obligation on Father's part of $900.00 for the couple's three children. After the court's pronouncement, Mother orally requested that the court make findings of fact and conclusions of law "only as it pertained to child support." The court said it would do so if Mother furnished a transcript of the hearing. Approximately two months later, the court issued its final decree and judgment of divorce. Mother had not provided a transcript to the trial court before the court issued its final decree and judgment of divorce. Mother argued on appeal that the trial court's erred by failing to enter required written findings to support its travel deviation from the presumptive amount of child support. Mother also argued the trial court failed to properly calculate the gross income attributable to Father. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Mother was able to show the trial court erred in its calculation with regard to child support, but because Mother did not contest the calculation of the income attributable to Father, she did not show error on the income issue. As such, the Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wallace v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Husband James Spies and Wife Cynthia Carpenter were married in California in 2000. They had two minor children, both of whom were born in that state. Husband was a movie and television producer and consultant. The family moved to Tennessee for a film project in 2006, and then to the metropolitan Atlanta area in 2011. The parties separated in 2013. Wife returned to California with the children and enrolled them in school. In the meantime, husband relocated to Virginia for another film project. On October 17, 2013, wife filed suit in Superior Court of California for legal separation from husband, and he was personally served in Virginia. Thereafter, the California court entered an order temporarily awarding wife sole custody of the children. That same day, husband filed a petition for divorce in Fulton County Superior Court, in which he requested, among other things, primary child custody. Wife entered a special appearance and moved to dismiss husband’s petition on the ground that, inter alia, the trial court was an inconvenient forum under OCGA 19-9-67 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). After consulting with the California court pursuant to the UCCJEA, the Fulton County trial court granted wife’s motion and dismissed husband’s entire case on the basis of forum non-conveniens. The Georgia Supreme Court granted husband’s application for a discretionary appeal and posed this question: "did the trial court err in dismissing husband’s entire divorce petition under OCGA 19-9-67 (a), instead of dismissing only the child custody portion of the case?" The Georgia Court answered this question affirmatively. View "Spies v. Carpenter" on Justia Law