Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Lecester "Buddy" Woodall, Jr., was convicted of felony murder and armed robbery in connection with the September 4, 2000 shooting deaths of his uncle John Lavelle Lynn and Robert Van Allen. Appellant raised various claims of error at trial on appeal to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction. View "Woodall v. Georgia" on Justia Law

After this divorce proceeding returned to the trial court on remand from "Horn I," the Husband filed a motion to recuse the assigned trial judge, and another judge from the circuit was assigned to hear the recusal motion. After a hearing on the recusal motion, but prior to the entry of a written order, the new judge held a hearing on a contempt motion that had been filed in the case before the recusal motion. The new judge issued an order holding the Husband in contempt. The judge later entered an order recusing the judge originally assigned to the case. The Supreme Court granted the Husband's application to appeal the contempt order, and it vacated that order because the judge assigned to decide the recusal motion lacked authority to act on unrelated matters in the case. View "Horn v. Shepherd" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over title to a 7.63 acre parcel of land located in Bacon County. The parcel was originally part of a 95-acre parcel owned by H.S. Carter that was taken by Bacon County via eminent domain proceedings commenced in 1973. As a result of the condemnation proceedings, Bacon County acquired over 2500 acres for creating a public recreation project known as Lake Alma and the Carter parcel was just one of the parcels condemned for that purpose. The proposed Lake Alma was part of a larger urban development project so that the City of Alma and Bacon County could execute a development plan that included, among other things, an industrial park, a waste water treatment plant, and improvement of the local airport, in addition to construction of Lake Alma. The other projects were completed but the Lake Alma project was abandoned and never constructed. After the project was abandoned, at the request of the city and county, the General Assembly passed an amendment to OCGA 36-9-3 that permitted counties to sell back to the original owners land that had been acquired for development, but the legislation failed to provide for repurchase of land by the heirs of the original owners. By that time, H.S. Carter was deceased and his original parcel was one of the only parcels condemned for construction that was not repurchased by the original owner. In 2010, OCGA 36-9-3 was amended again to grant the heirs of the original landowners the right to repurchase the land. Heirs of H. S. Carter sought to repurchase the original 95-acre parcel. The City of Alma executed a quit claim deed to Bacon County conveying its undivided interest in the 95 acres and, that same day, Bacon County executed a quit claim deed conveying all of its undivided interest in the property to the heirs. The heirs then filed a petition to quiet title and for ejectment against Darling and Southeastern Maintenance with respect to the 7.63 acres. Darling asserted it was entitled to summary judgment with respect to the quiet title and claim for ejection because, as a result of the county’s previous conveyance of the disputed property to the Development Authority and the subsequent chain of conveyances by which Darling ultimately obtained title, the heirs did not have title to that property. Without addressing Darling’s bona fide purchaser argument, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the heirs along with a decree that title to the property vested in them and was superior to Darling’s claim of title. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in concluding that the heirs’ title was superior to that of Darling’s as a result of Bacon County’s failure to comply with the requirements of OCGA 36-9-2 with respect to a 2003 conveyance of its interest in the property to the Bacon County Development Authority. Furthermore, the trial court erred in finding the 2003 conveyance to Southeastern Maintenance was invalid as a result of the governing authorities’ failure to formulate a new economic development plan. The trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the Carter heirs was reversed and the decree establishing title was vacated. View "Darling International, Inc. v Carter" on Justia Law

Appellant Stanquise Ramon Bell was sentenced to life imprisonment plus five years upon the jury's verdict finding him guilty of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the 2010 shooting death of Anthony Carter. Bell appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's sentence. View "Bell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in this case to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the public duty doctrine insulated the City of Doraville from liability arising from the response of a Doraville Police Department ("DPD") officer to a vehicle emergency on an interstate highway which culminated in a multi-vehicle accident injuring Kenyatta Stevenson. Stevenson sued the City and a DPD Officer, asserting that the officer was negligent in failing to redirect traffic away from Stevenson's disabled car and in causing traffic to move in Stevenson's direction by engaging his vehicle's blue emergency lights while stopped near the outer lane of the highway behind and to the right of Stevenson. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants, finding official immunity shielded the officer from liability and that the public duty doctrine precluded Stevenson's claims against the City. Stevenson appealed, arguing that the public duty doctrine did not apply to his case because he alleged affirmative acts of negligence and that, even if the doctrine did apply, he fell within the special relationship exception identified in "City of Rome v. Jordan," (426 SE2d 861) (1993)). The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding Stevenson's arguments lacked merit. Although it appeared that the appellate court based its rejection of Stevenson's first argument on a finding that "there [was] nothing in the record . . . showing any active negligence on the part of the officer," the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but wrote to clarify the public duty doctrine. The doctrine "does not apply to limit liability where a claim of active negligence (misfeasance), rather than a mere failure to act (nonfeasance) is alleged." View "Stevenson v. City of Doraville" on Justia Law

Julian Rigby and other members of the Board of Directors of the Satilla Rural Electric Membership Corporation appealed a trial court's order granting a writ of mandamus to Jerry Boatright, acting individually and derivatively on behalf of the members of the Satilla Rural Electric Membership Corporation. Boatright was a member of the Satilla Rural Electric Membership Corporation. Boatright submitted to Satilla's Credentials and Elections Committee a petition that nominated him as a candidate for election to Satilla's Board of Directors for the seat that Rigby held. Rigby challenged Boatright's qualifications to be a member of the Board, based upon Boatright's financial interest in Pike Electric, LLC. Satilla's Credentials and Elections Committee formally ruled that Boatright was not qualified to serve on the Board, citing the financial interest provision of the bylaws. Boatright filed what the parties stipulate was a second petition for nomination as a candidate for a seat on the Board. The Credentials and Elections Committee declined to have a meeting to address this petition and considered its earlier decision regarding Boatright's qualifications based on the earlier petition to be final. Boatright then brought this action, naming Satilla, members of the Board of Directors, and members of the Credentials and Elections Committee as defendants. Boatright asked for a temporary restraining order, interlocutory and permanent injunctions preventing the election for the Board position from proceeding without Boatright's appearance on the ballot, and a writ of mandamus compelling the defendants to consider his second petition for nomination, determine that he was qualified to serve on the Board, and proceed accordingly with the election for Rigby's Board seat. The trial court concluded that the decision of the Credentials and Elections Committee was arbitrary and capricious, and granted Boatright a writ of mandamus. Rigby and other Board members then brought this appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of mandamus relief: mandamus is not a remedy available to enforce the purely private right that Boatright was asserting. The right Boatright sought to enforce could be addressed by a court of equity. Boatright requested in his pleadings temporary and permanent injunctive relief, but the trial court's order did not rule upon these requests. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for consideration of Boatright's requests for injunctive relief. View "Rigby v. Boatright" on Justia Law

Deloris Gaulden died in the emergency department of Liberty Regional Medical Center. Her daughter sued Bobby Herrington, M.D., the medical director of the emergency department, alleging that Gaulden could have been saved, if only her treating physician and nurse had promptly and properly implemented a chest pain protocol that the hospital had adopted. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Dr. Herrington, but the Court of Appeals reversed to the extent that the claim against him sounded in professional negligence. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in its reversal of the trial court. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Herrington v. Gaulden" on Justia Law

Appellant Alvando Givens, Sr., was convicted of malice murder for the death of Voncetta Render. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, and that the trial court erred in its jury charge and arriving at his eventual sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court indeed erred in calculating appellant's sentence: it sentenced appellant to serve, concurrently to his life sentence on malice murder, life sentences on counts two through ten which were "merged" by the trial court. Since the charges of felony murder were vacated as a matter of law and the remaining charges merged as a matter of fact, there was no reason for the trial court to sentence appellant on any conviction other than malice murder. Accordingly, the life sentences on counts two through ten were vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in ll other respects. View "Givens v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the limitation period for a claim of pain and suffering in this wrongful death action could be tolled for fraud under OCGA 9-3-96. The victim, Sparkle Reid and Rajeeve Rai, the son of appellant Chiman Rai, married when their daughter was five months old. Within a month of the wedding, the victim was murdered in their apartment in the presence of the daughter. Rajeeve was at work at the time. The victim's father, Bennet Reid and his wife took custody of the child and later adopted her. Rajeeve abandoned the child, and never challenged the adoption nor the consequent termination of his parental rights. The crime went into cold case status until 2004 when, while investigating an unrelated matter, police spoke to a woman who said she was present at the murder and identified the hired killers. This information led eventually to appellant. Appellant was convicted of the murder. Reid filed a complaint and subsequently an amended complaint for wrongful death as the minor child's next friend and for pain and suffering as administrator of the victim's estate. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, awarded $2.5 million to the child on the wrongful death claim and $100,000 to Reid as estate administrator for the victim's pain and suffering. Appellant's motion for new trial was denied. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals divided evenly by a vote of six to six on the issue of whether appellant had committed fraud that would trigger the tolling provisions of OCGA 9-3-96, and thus, prevent the estate's claim for pain and suffering from being time-barred by the statute of limitation for personal injury actions. The appellate court ultimately reversed those portions of the trial court's judgment relating to the tolling of the limitation period for the pain and suffering claim, but affirmed the remainder of the judgment, finding that actual fraud was the gravamen of Reid's claim for pain and suffering and was not supported by the record or the law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with much of the position advocated by the appellate court. That portion of the final judgment entered on the jury's verdict against appellant and in favor of Reid, as administrator of the victim's estate, for pain and suffering was reversed, but the remainder of the final judgment entered on the jury's verdict for wrongful death against appellant and in favor of Reid, as next friend of the victim's minor child, was affirmed. View "Rai v. Reid" on Justia Law

Mary Jane Nelson and other litigants appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to the Georgia Sheriffs Youth Homes and other entities in a quiet title action. In their sole contention of error in this appeal, Nelson argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment without the final report of the special master being filed. As the Georgia Supreme Court has recognized, "[i]f no demand for a jury trial is filed prior to the time he hears the case, the special master is the arbiter of law and fact and decides all issues in the case." And, as in this case, there was a demand for a jury trial filed before the special master holds a hearing, the trial court had jurisdiction to proceed to trial. The fact that a demand for a jury trial was filed pursuant to OCGA 23-3-66 does not mean that the trial court cannot grant summary judgment when warranted. Accordingly, Nelsons did not show an error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment. View "Nelson v. Georgia Sheriffs Youth Homes, Inc." on Justia Law