Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved the trial court's attempts to compel appellant Ronald Massey to comply with the terms of the parties' 2005 divorce decree and a series of later contempt orders obtained by appellee Angela Massey. In this appeal, Husband challenged the last two 2012 contempt orders; Husband's claims regarding a June 27 contempt order were barred by the dismissal of his previous appeal from that order. However, Husband was correct that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an October 16 contempt order because his previous appeal was still pending with the Supreme Court on that date. Therefore the Supreme Court dismissed Husband's attempted second appeal of the June 27 contempt order and vacated the October 16 contempt order. View "Massey v. Massey" on Justia Law

Judy Chatfield Terrell and Dale Terrell were divorced in 2010. Husband was awarded primary physical custody of the parties' minor daughter and Wife was awarded visitation rights. The Supreme Court granted Wife's application for appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 34 (4), arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Husband primary custody. Finding no reversible error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Terrell v. Terrell" on Justia Law

In 1993, Demarcus Sears was convicted of kidnapping with bodily injury and armed robbery in connection with the death of Gloria Wilbur, who was kidnapped and robbed of her automobile in Georgia, raped in Tennessee, and murdered in Kentucky. The jury recommended a death sentence for the kidnapping with bodily injury after finding multiple statutory aggravating circumstances, including that the kidnapping with bodily injury was committed while Sears was engaged in the commission of the capital felony of murder. After affirming each of his convictions and the life sentence for the armed robbery, the Supreme Court remanded the case for proceedings related to Sears' claim of jury misconduct at the sentencing phase. In 2000, Sears filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging among other claims, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. In an order filed in early 2008, the habeas court denied Sears' petition, and the Supreme Court denied Sears' application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal upon concluding that it lacked “arguable merit.” However, in a per curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court granted Sears' petition for a writ of certiorari and held that, with regard to Sears' ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the habeas court failed to conduct a proper prejudice analysis under "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U. S. 668 (1984)). The federal Supreme Court then vacated the Georgia Court's order denying Sears' application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. In 2011, after a new habeas judge was assigned to the case and after a hearing, the habeas court entered a new order which adopted the 2008 Order with regard to all of Sears' claims except for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, once again denying him relief on those claims. With regard to the ineffective assistance claim, the habeas court concluded that, even if he could prove that trial counsel rendered deficient performance, Sears had failed to prove that he was constitutionally prejudiced as a result. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Sears' application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal from the 2011 Order. After review of the 2011 order, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Sears' habeas petition. View "Sears v. Humphrey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Greenway v. Northside Hosp., Inc." (730 SE2d 742) (2012)), to determine if the appellate court erred in its evaluation of Deputy Sheriff Terry Roper's claim that he was entitled to official immunity from liability in connection with the euthanization of two dogs. Greenway was taken by ambulance from his home to a hospital; two dogs remained at the home. While Greenway was in the hospital's emergency department, and uncertain whether he would live, he was pressured to sign an “Owner Release Form” regarding his dogs; the form was given to him by Roper and authorized Forsyth County Animal Control to destroy the dogs. At the time he signed the form, Greenway was unable to read it without his eyeglasses and understood that his dogs were going to the Humane Society; the dogs were euthanized before Greenway was able to recover from his illness and take further action. Greenway sued Roper, the hospital, the Sheriff, and the County's animal shelter provider. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed as to Roper, the hospital, and the animal shelter operator. As to Roper, the Court of Appeals found that the doctrine of official immunity insulated him from liability from his decision to ask Greenway to sign the form, but not from his execution of that decision. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed that court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Roper v. Greenway" on Justia Law

A jury acquitted Christopher Roesser of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault, but was unable to reach a verdict on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. When the State sought to retry Roesser for voluntary manslaughter, he filed a plea in bar asserting double jeopardy based on collateral estoppel. The trial court denied the plea, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibited the State from retrying Roesser for voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, the Court reversed. View "Roesser v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Warden sought review of the grant of habeas relief to appellee Ryan Smith. Appellee was convicted of malice murder and sentenced to life in prison in 2002. Appellee subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging his trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State's proof of venue, allowing an un-redacted indictment to go out with the jury, and for failing to challenge the seating of an alternate juror. The habeas court granted appellee relief on all of his claims, set aside appellant's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case to the trial court. After its review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the habeas court's decision and reversed that decision in its entirety. View "O'Donnell v. Smith" on Justia Law

Elisha Franklin and Elijah Franklin were divorced in 2011. Husband was awarded primary custody , and Wife was awarded visitation. Wife was ordered to pay $1,518 per month in child support, and found that the parties had agreed to a final division of marital assets prior to the final divorce hearing. Husband filed a Motion for Disposition of Real Property, representing that, although the parties had previously agreed to sell their marital residence, the parties had been unable to agree on a date upon which Wife would move out of the residence in order to allow for the house to be sold. Wife filed a motion for new trial, and Husband filed a contempt motion based on Wife's failure to pay child support. Later, Wife filed a motion for reconsideration and a contempt motion based on Husband's alleged violation of the visitation provisions of the trial court's Final Decree. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Wife's contempt motion and granted Husband's contempt motion, requiring Wife to pay $4,555 in child support. In a separate ruling, the trial court ordered that the proceeds of the sale of Husband and Wife's house be equally divided between them. The Supreme Court granted Wife's application to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 34 (4), and after careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's finding as to Wife's gross monthly income and remand the case to the trial court to make a proper finding based on the evidence. The Court affirmed the remainder of the trial court's challenged rulings on appeal. View "Franklin v. Franklin" on Justia Law

This case concerned one of the exceptions to the Georgia Tort Claims Act known as the "discretionary function" exception. The guardians of two infant boys sued the Department of Human Services (DHS), alleging that the Clayton County Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS) was negligent in several respects in its investigation of a report that the boys were neglected by their parents. On motion of DHS, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the “discretionary function” exception properly applied, but the Court of Appeals disagreed, and it reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether the "discretionary function" exception applied in this case, and concluding that it did, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Georgia Dep't. of Human Svcs. v. Spruill" on Justia Law

Grant Murphy Ensley appealed his convictions and sentences for the malice murder of his father, possession of a firearm during the commission of felonies, and the unlawful handling of an explosive device. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but remanded for recalculation of Ensley's sentence. View "Ensley v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Kia Motors Manufacturing Georgia, Inc. instituted a "Quick Start Program" run in conjunction with the Technical College System of Georgia. Krystal Coleman, Sabrina Robinson Bolston, Tim Durden, and Darrell Strawbridge each submitted a request to the Technical College System pursuant to the Open Records Act, seeking to inspect certain records concerning Kia's hiring practices. The College System refused on several grounds to make the requested records available for inspection, and Coleman, Bolston, Durden, and Strawbridge filed suit to compel their production. In 2012, while the lawsuit was pending, the General Assembly amended the Open Records Act, and among other revisions, it added an exemption for certain records concerning the Quick Start program from public inspection. The Technical College System and Kia then moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that exemption from the revised Act. Without deciding the extent to which paragraph of the revised Act applied to the requested records, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss, concluding that it would be unconstitutional in any event to apply the revision in a pending lawsuit. The Technical College System and Kia appealed, and after review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded in this case the applicable revised parts of the Act applied and that its application was constitutional. The trial court's decision was reversed, and on remand, the trial court was mandated to determine which of the pertinent records were subject to the revised Act. View "Deal v. Coleman" on Justia Law