Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Darrell Crowder sought review of his convictions for murder and related crimes for the shooting death of his estranged wife Catcilia Crowder. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, and argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction, and that he did not make a showing he received ineffective assistance, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's convictions. View "Crowder v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Alex Cowart and John Adams appealed their convictions for felony murder and other crimes related to the armed robbery of Sean Giroir, Michael Levi, John Silcox, and Miles Antle, and the subsequent shootings that killed Giroir and injured Levi. The Supreme Court affirmed Cowart's convictions but remanded his case for resentencing because he was improperly sentenced for two felony murder convictions based on the death of a single victim. The Court reversed Adams's convictions due to the erroneous and harmful admission of evidence bolstering the testimony of the key witness against him. View "Cowart v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, Maria Colon and Gwendolyn Warren filed separate lawsuits against their employer, Fulton County, pursuant to Georgia's whistleblower statute, OCGA 45-1-4. Colon and Warren alleged that they were retaliated against after they jointly disclosed to their supervisors and refused to cover up that County employees were violating laws, rules, and regulations, thereby wasting and abusing County funds and public money. The County moved to dismiss the actions based on sovereign immunity and moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the retaliation claims under the statute could not proceed against the County because the complaints did not relate to a "state program or operation." The trial court denied both motions. The Court of Appeals held that the cause of action set forth in OCGA 45-1-4 unambiguously expressed a specific waiver of sovereign immunity and the extent of such waiver, even though the statute does not expressly state that sovereign immunity is waived. Furthermore, the appellate court interpreted "state programs or operations" under the facts of this case and held that where an employer qualifies as a "public employer" under the statute only because it received funds from the state, the statute provides protection from retaliation only if the employee's complaints related to a "state-funded program or operation under the jurisdiction of the public employer." In Case No. S12G1905, Colon and Warren argued that the Court of Appeals erred in construing OCGA 45-1-4 such that employees of governmental entities may maintain an action under subsection (d) of the statute only if their complaints relate to "programs or operations" that are "funded at least in part by the state." In Case Nos. S12G1911 and S12G1912, Fulton County contended that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that OCGA 45-1-4 expressed a specific waiver of the County's sovereign immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decisions in Case Nos. S12G1911 and S12G1912, but reversed in Case No. S12G1905. View "Colon v. Fulton County" on Justia Law

Appellant Melvin Browder appealed his conviction and sentence for the murder of Eboni Galloway, aggravated assault of two other victims by discharging a firearm from within a motor vehicle toward a person, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, he argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of murder or aggravated assault; (2) the trial court erred by failing to give requested charges on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of the murder charge; (3) the trial court erred by admitting out of court statements made by the co-defendant; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "Browder v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Rashad Bester appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes relating to the strangulation death of Shawna Webber. He claimed that the trial court erred in denying his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and his claim that the prosecutor violated his equal protection rights by the use of a peremptory strike in selecting the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed Bester's convictions for malice murder and sodomy, but vacated his conviction and sentence for aggravated assault, because that conviction merged with malice murder. View "Bester v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Alexander was sentenced to life without parole for the felony murder of two-year-old Diamone Wilson. He appealed his conviction and the denial of his motion for new trial in which he asserted the trial court erred by limiting the scope of voir dire and improperly commenting on the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alexander v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Thelma Johnson took her 15-year-old son Shaquille to the emergency department at Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital; a week earlier, Shaquille had undergone arthroscopic knee surgery. Shaquille complained of chest pain; was first seen by a nurse; and then examined by Dr. Price Omondi. The doctor noted that Shaquille had undergone surgery a week earlier; he inquired about Shaquille's medical history and family history and conducted a physical examination. Dr. Omondi ruled out multiple ailments, specifically, pulmonary embolism as causes of Shaquille's pain. Dr. Omondi diagnosed Shaquille with pleurisy and discharged him from the hospital with a prescription for an anti-inflammatory pain reliever, and instructions to return to the emergency department if his symptoms continued. Two weeks later, Shaquille returned to the emergency department, and died of a bilateral pulmonary embolism. Thelma Johnson and her husband sued Dr. Omondi and Southwest Emergency Physicians, P.C., for medical malpractice. Dr. Omondi moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in to determine whether the appellate court properly applied the standards for a medical malpractice claim in a hospital emergency department as found in OCGA 51-1-29.5 (c). Finding that the plurality opinion of the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Omondi" on Justia Law

Appellee Steven Wilson is a licensed optometrist, providing eye care services in Lowndes County as Wilson Eye Center (“WEC”). Appellees Cynthia McMurray, Jodie E. Summers, and David Price are also licensed optometrists employed by WEC. Prior to 2010, Spectera, Inc. had entered provider contracts ("Patriot contracts") with Wilson and McMurray and they became members of Spectera's panel of eye care providers. Summers was already on Spectera's panel of eye care providers. Under the Patriot contract, Spectera would reimburse appellees for the materials Spectera insureds used from WEC's inventory by paying appellees a fee for their materials' costs and by having Spectera insureds remit a materials copayment to appellees. Spectera decided to terminate its Patriot contracts and replace them with independent participating provider (IPP) agreements. After the trial court temporarily enjoined Spectera from enforcing its IPP agreement, Spectera sought to remove appellees Wilson, Summers, and McMurray from its approved panel of providers. The trial court enjoined Spectera from taking such action. Although Price was not on Spectera's provider panel, he alleged Spectera violated Georgia law by denying him membership on its panel because of his refusal to sign the IPP agreement. Upon considering the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted issued a permanent injunction precluding Spectera from enforcing the restrictions contained in the IPP agreement as to "any other licensed eye care provider on [Spectera's] provider panel" or those who had applied for admittance to the panel. Spectera appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in part and reversed in part. Upon review of Spectera's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded a portion of the IPP agreement violated Georgia law, and therefore sustained the Court of Appeals in one respect. However, because the IPP agreement did create the type of impermissible discrimination between classes of licensed eye care providers contemplated by the applicable law, the Court of Appeals was incorrect in concluding that the IPP agreement violated that particular subsection of the applicable law. Furthermore, the termination of any outstanding contracts with appellees Wilson, McMurray, and Summers should have been based on the lawful terms stated in the contracts and not based on a permanent court injunction. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Spectera, Inc. v. Wilson" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an effort by Mortgage Alliance Corporation (“MAC”) a residential subdivision called "Silverstone." In August 2008, MAC sued the county and various county officials alleging, among other things, that an August 2006 letter to MAC from the county's sole commissioner, which said that the county's position was that any proposal to develop MAC's property as a subdivision would need to comply with a recent amendment to the county's land use ordinances, resulted in a taking of MAC's property without just compensation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that MAC's complaint was untimely. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted MAC's petition for certiorari. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this case was resolved on the ground that the August 2006 Letter was not a “decision” within the meaning of the applicable statute, and the county never made a final decision on MAC's Silverstone proposal. Consequently, MAC's inverse condemnation claim never ripened for judicial review, and the trial court should have granted summary judgment to the defendants on this ground. Although the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding there was an appealable decision, they reached the right result, and therefore the Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Mortgage Alliance Corp. v. Pickens County" on Justia Law

The remainder beneficiaries of the revocable marital trust created by the wife of Charles Howard Candler III sued Reliance Trust Company, co-trustee of the trust, for breach of trust. They alleged that after the death of the settlor, Reliance made improper distributions from the corpus of the trust to Mr. Candler, who was the life beneficiary. The remainder beneficiaries alleged these improper distributions significantly diminished the value of the trust and thereby damaged them in an amount equal to the improper distributions. The case was tried and the jury found that while Reliance did not act in bad faith, it otherwise found in favor of the remainder beneficiaries. The trial court entered final judgment on the verdict and also awarded the remainder beneficiaries pre-judgment interest, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Reliance petitioned for certiorari, contending that the Court of Appeals erred when it upheld the jury's verdict in favor of the remainder beneficiaries and when it affirmed the trial court's award of interest. Finding only that the remainder beneficiaries were entitled to interest on the damages awarded only from the state of the life beneficiary's death, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's award of interest. The case was remanded for recalculation of interest on damages, but otherwise affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Reliance Trust Co. v. Candler" on Justia Law