Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tony Williams appealed his convictions and sentences for malice murder, armed robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, tampering with evidence, and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer. On appeal, Williams challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of certain evidence, and the alleged improper impeachment of State's witnesses. The Supreme Court found Appellant's challenges to be without merit and affirmed. View "Williams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Macques Antonio Walker was found guilty of the felony murder, two counts of homicide by vehicle, one based on reckless driving and one based on the failure to stop and render aid to after being involved in an automobile accident; failure to stop and render aid; aggravated assault of another; and driving with no proof of insurance. The trial court treated the guilty verdicts on both counts of homicide by vehicle and the failure to stop and render aid count as merged into the felony murder conviction and entered judgment of convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and no proof of insurance. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions for aggravated assault and driving with no proof of insurance. However, because the guilty verdicts for felony murder based on aggravated assault and homicide by vehicle based on reckless driving are mutually exclusive under established precedent, the Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction for felony murder, set aside the guilty verdicts for felony murder and homicide by vehicle based on reckless driving, and remand the case for a possible new trial on those charges. Furthermore, the Court concluded there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict for homicide by vehicle based on the failure to stop and render aid. View "Walker v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the constitutionality of the Local Option Sales Tax Act ("LOST"), OCGA 48-8-80 et seq., or a provision of it. This case represented the fourth time the matter has come before the Court. The parties to this appeal, and those that have filed amicus curiae briefs, have shown that problems have arisen when the governing entities cannot agree to changes in the distribution formula for purposes of renewing certificates pursuant to the Act. Appellant Turner County and appellees, who are the qualified municipalities within the special taxing district involved in this dispute, reached an impasse in their negotiations for renewing the LOST certificate that authorizes them to collect and distribute tax, which certificate was required to be filed no later than December 30, 2012. Pursuant to the 2010 amendment to the statute, appellee municipalities timely filed a petition with the Turner County Superior Court seeking resolution of the dispute. Turner County filed a motion to dismiss the petition in which it raised various constitutional challenges to the 2010 amendment and its process for submitting the distribution dispute for judicial resolution. The trial court denied Turner County's motion to dismiss and sustained the constitutionality of the 2010 amendment. The court also entered a final order adopting the final and best offer of the municipalities and finding that the municipalities' offer more closely comported with the requirements of the statute and the intent and criteria set forth in the Act. The Supreme Court granted Turner County's application for discretionary appeal to challenge the constitutionality of the 2010 amendment. Upon careful consideration of Turner County's claims of error, the Supreme Court found one dispositive issue: whether the procedure for judicial resolution set forth in OCGA 48-8-89 (d) (4) violated the separation of powers doctrine of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III. The Court concluded this procedure did violate the separation of powers doctrine, and declared that portion of the statute to be void. View "Turner County v. City of Ashburn" on Justia Law

Appellant Emory Teasley and his brothers Christopher ("Chris") and Tyrone were indicted and tried together and found guilty of malice murder, felony murder, and the aggravated assault of James Riden; the aggravated assault of Markez Jones; possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; and tampering with evidence. The Supreme Court previously affirmed Chris's convictions; and in this case affirmed Appellant's convictions too. During the trial, at which Chris did not testify, the court admitted into evidence statements that Chris and Appellant had made to the police shortly after the shootings. Each statement was redacted to eliminate any mention of co-defendants. Appellant contends that because Chris's statement was inconsistent with his own statement, the jury could not possibly follow the court's limiting instruction to consider Chris's statement only against Chris, resulting in a violation of Appellant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Appellant also complains that the prosecutor's comment during his opening statement that Chris and Appellant gave separate statements that did not match improperly asked the jury to consider Chris's statement directly against Appellant, undoing the effect of the trial court's later limiting instruction. Appellant also contended that the trial court erred in admitting his statement into evidence, asserting that he was in police custody at the time he made it but was not advised of his constitutional rights as required by Miranda. Finding no error in the trial court's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Teasley v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Patrick Sullivan's certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. Because the Court agreed with Sullivan that his appellate counsel's performance was deficient and there was a reasonable probability that counsel's error prejudiced the defense, the habeas court's ruling was reversed. View "Sullivan v. Kemp" on Justia Law

Monica and Martin Strunk were married in 1996 and had three children before divorcing in 2008. The husband sought a downward modification of child support in 2009, which the trial court granted. The wife challenged five of the trial court's findings related to child support. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings, with one exception: the Court reversed the trial court's grant of a $200 travel deviation to the husband due to its failure to enter the required written findings. View " Strunk v. Strunk" on Justia Law

Spectera is a vision care insurer that provides eye care benefits coverage to Georgia residents. Appellee Steven M. Wilson is a licensed optometrist who provides eye care services in Lowndes County as Wilson Eye Center ("WEC"). Appellees Cynthia McMurray, Jodie E. Summers, and David Price are also licensed optometrists that work for WEC. Prior to 2010, Spectera had entered provider contracts ("Patriot contracts") with Wilson and McMurray and they became members of Spectera's panel of eye care providers. In 2010, Spectera decided to terminate its Patriot contracts and replace them with independent participating provider (IPP) agreements. Under the new agreement "[appellees] would no longer receive the reimbursement for materials from Spectera and would no longer be entitled to retain the materials co[-]pays from Spectera insureds." Appellees sued Spectera contending that Spectera's proposed IPP agreement violated various subsections of Georgia's Patient Access to Eye Care Act. While the case was pending, the trial court issued a temporary injunction prohibiting Spectera from forcing its panel of independent participating providers in Georgia to abide by the IPP agreement. After the trial court temporarily enjoined Spectera from enforcing its IPP agreement, Spectera sought to remove appellees Wilson, Summers, and McMurray from its approved panel of providers altogether; but the trial court enjoined Spectera from taking such action. Although appellee Price was not on Spectera's provider panel, he alleged Spectera violated the Act by denying him membership on its panel because of his refusal to sign the IPP agreement. The trial court granted the appellees' motions for summary judgment, denied Spectera's motion for summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction precluding Spectera from enforcing the restrictions contained in the IPP agreement as to "any other licensed eye care provider on [Spectera's] provider panel" or those who had applied to be on the panel. Spectera appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Appeals found that the covered materials requirement in the IPP agreement violated subsections (c)(2) and (c)(5) of the Act in regard to independent optometrists. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed OCGA 33-24-59.12 (c) of the Act. Because the IPP agreement did not create the type of impermissible discrimination between classes of licensed eye care providers contemplated by subsection (c)(5), the Court of Appeals was incorrect in its conclusion that the IPP agreement violated that subsection of the Act. Accordingly, the Court reversed that portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Act does not preclude insurers from terminating contracts with its existing eye care providers. "While Spectera's terminating its contracts with appellees Wilson, McMurray, and Summers may be an unpopular or ill-advised course of action, it cannot be said such action violates the Act." Therefore, that portion of the permanent injunction against Spectera was vacated. View "Spectera, Inc. v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Stacy Rutter surreptitiously installed several video surveillance devices in the marital home. Prior to divorce proceedings, Stacy's husband, Charles, moved to exclude any video recordings derived from the use of the surveillance devices on the ground they were made in violation of OCGA 16-11-62 (2). The trial court denied the motion to exclude, relying upon the "curtilage" exception set forth in the statute, but certified its ruling for immediate review. The Court of Appeals granted husband's application for interlocutory review and affirmed, holding subparagraph (2) (C), set forth in House Bill 1576, survived the subsequent enactment and approval of Senate Bill 316, which did not contain a similar subparagraph. In so doing, the appellate court reasoned that the two pieces of legislation were not repugnant. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine which of the two pieces of legislation survived to become law. The Court concluded that subparagraph (2) (C) did not survive the subsequent amendment to OCGA 16-11-62 and therefore the Court of Appeals' judgment should have been reversed. View "Rutter v. Rutter" on Justia Law

Appellant Jonathan Redding was convicted of felony murder, participation in criminal street gang activity, and other crimes arising from a series of gang-related armed robberies. On appeal, he contended the trial court erred in instructing the jury. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Redding v. Georgia" on Justia Law

A jury found Christopher Phillips guilty of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer. On appeal, Phillips contended he received ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to object to the admission of certain evidence at trial. Finding that in light of the overwhelming evidence of Phillips' guilt on the other counts upon which he was found guilty, the Supreme Court concluded there was no reasonable probability the outcome in this case would have been more favorable had counsel objected to State's evidence in the manner that Phillips claimed he should have. View "Phillips v. Georgia" on Justia Law