Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following the fracture of an underground gas pipeline owned and operated by Atmos Energy Corporation, a subsequent fire and explosion damaged a building owned by Woodcraft by Macdonald, Inc. d/b/a Coachcraft. Coachcraft's insurer, Georgia Casualty and Surety Co., paid Coachcraft $1,675,169 under two policies and then pursued its own subrogation rights against Atmos in federal court where Coachcraft and its owner, intervened as plaintiffs. After more than two years of discovery and preparation for trial, Georgia Casualty decided to settle its claims against Atmos for $950,000. Coachcraft filed an objection to the settlement, arguing Georgia Casualty was prohibited from settling its subrogation claims until Coachcraft was "made whole." The federal court denied the objection. In lieu of continuing its own federal case, Coachcraft also settled its claims against Atmos for $125,000. Following the settlements, Coachcraft demanded Georgia Casualty pay, from its settlement, the remaining amount it claimed was necessary to make it whole from the damage to its building ($179,130.59). Georgia Casualty refused the demand, and Coachcraft brought a breach of contract action. The trial court denied Georgia Casualty's motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, but granted summary judgment on the bad faith claim. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals found that summary judgment for Georgia Casualty was warranted on both the breach of contract and bad faith claims. The Supreme Court granted Coachcraft's petition for certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment to Georgia Casualty on the breach of contract claim. Upon review, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals' ultimate conclusion that the "made whole" doctrine did not require Georgia Casualty to demonstrate that Coachcraft had been fully compensated prior to exercising its subrogation rights under the insurance policy. View "Woodcraft by MacDonald, Inc. v. Georgia Casualty & Surety Co." on Justia Law

Following the death of his wife, appellee James Jordan initiated this medical malpractice action against appellants Wellstar Health System, Inc. and Dr. James Sutherland (collectively "Wellstar"). As part of its discovery plan, Wellstar sought to conduct informal ex parte interviews of certain non-party health care providers who previously had treated Jordan's spouse. Wellstar moved the trial court for a protective order. After a hearing, the trial court issued a qualified protective order authorizing Wellstar to conduct ex parte interviews of named health care providers for the limited purpose of questioning them about the "development of, diagnosis of, and treatment of the cancerous condition which caused or contributed to the death of Marilyn Kay Adams Jordan." Although the trial court determined that the circumstances did not require Wellstar's counsel to provide Jordan with prior notice of or an opportunity to appear at the interviews, it did require that "the interviews be transcribed by a court reporter should Jordan make a written request for transcription." Jordan asked that the interviews be transcribed and subsequently sought their production. Wellstar objected to production of the transcripts, claiming they were not subject to discovery because they constituted protected work product. Jordan filed a motion to compel, which the trial court granted without conducting an in-camera review in an order summarily rejecting Wellstar's work product claim. The Court of Appeals denied Wellstar's application for interlocutory appeal, and the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to determine the propriety of the trial court's production order. The Court found that production of such material was not required by the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") or the language of the protective order entered in this case, but the Court vacated the trial court's judgment. "HIPAA . . .does not require the production of the transcripts at issue. Because no findings have been made with regard to waiver or the second criteria for production of the transcripts and the trial court sits as the trier of fact in discovery disputes, the case must be remanded to the trial court." View "Wellstar Health System, Inc. v. Jordan" on Justia Law

In 2010, appellant Calvin Sessions unsuccessfully sought an out-of-time appeal on appellant's petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Upon considering the evidence presented at the hearing, the underlying trial record, and the habeas corpus record, the trial court denied the motion finding that after his conviction, appellant told his trial counsel he did not want any Dougherty County attorneys to represent him and that he and his family would seek representation from other counsel. As such, the trial court concluded appellant had waived his right to appeal through his own conduct. Since the habeas court found that appellant had forfeited his right to appeal through his own inaction and the habeas court decided the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel adversely to appellant, he was precluded under the doctrine of collateral estoppel from re-litigating the merits of the issue. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for out-of-time appeal. View "Sessions v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jamall Mathis appealed his convictions and sentences for felony murder, aggravated battery, cruelty to a child, and battery, all in connection with the death of his infant son, Ja'Mari Myckahi Jones. Mathis asserted that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, contending that the State presented only circumstantial evidence that did not exclude all reasonable hypotheses except that of his guilt. Finding no merit to his arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mathis v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Brandon Donnell Lake was found guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with the shooting death of Jermaine Scurry. On appeal, Lake contended, among other things, that the trial court erred by charging the jury before closing arguments took place and by admitting improper impeachment evidence at trial. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lake v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Helen and Andreas Eversbusch married in June 1985. After marital problems arose in 2001, the couple engaged in counseling and other efforts in an apparent attempt to save their marriage. In January 2002, Helen prepared a six-page document in letter form entitled "Letter of Agreement between Andreas W. Eversbusch and Helene H. Eversbusch" ("Agreement") outlining, behavioral expectations for continuing the marriage, alleged promises between the parties, and "[i]n the unfortunate event of divorce" summary provisions for division of the parties' substantial assets, custody of their children, and alimony and child support. Several years later, marital problems again arose, and in January 2012, Helen filed a complaint for divorce. In May, she filed a motion to enforce the Agreement, requesting that the superior court enter an order finding that the Agreement was legally valid, and therefore, that it resolved "all issues regarding equitable division of property and permanent alimony." The Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal from a Superior Court order that denied Helen's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court did not err in denying the motion, and affirmed. View "Eversbusch v. Eversbuch" on Justia Law

Woodard & Curran, Inc. ("W&C") sued the City of Baldwin seeking damages on claims of breach of contract and quantum meruit. After a trial, a jury awarded W&C $203,000 in a general verdict that did not specify the basis for the damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that quantum meruit was an available remedy against a municipality when the claim is based on a municipal contract that is ultra vires; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the jury was properly allowed to consider the breach of contract claim based on an agreement the parties entered in May 2009. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in both respects, and therefore reversed its judgment. View "City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc." on Justia Law

Derrick Brock was convicted of the murder of James Lockett, who died from injuries sustained in a fire at his rooming house. On appeal, Brock contended that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert the speedy trial claim. Because the trial court properly concluded Brock was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial and trial counsel was not deficient for failing to raise the issue prior to trial, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Brock v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Baugh was tried and convicted by a jury for felony murder, aggravated assault, attempt to commit armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and cruelty to children. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding the evidence sufficient, and no ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Baugh v. Georgia" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from appellee Bank of America, N.A.'s attempts to enforce the terms of the promissory note and deed to secure debt executed in its favor by appellant Johnta M. Austin ("Borrower"). The Bank sued to collect the debt it claimed the Borrower owed as a result of default, including attorney fees, and the trial court awarded the Bank summary judgment. The issue came on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court because the constitutionality of the statute at issue was called into question. The Court has long held that "all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature and that before an [a]ct of the legislature can be declared unconstitutional, the conflict between it and the fundamental law must be clear and palpable and [the] Court must be clearly satisfied of its unconstitutionality." The Court found that the statute in this case bore a rational relation to the purpose for which the statute was intended, namely to provide debtors with the opportunity to avoid the contractual obligation to pay the creditor’s attorney fees by allowing the debtor a last chance to pay the balance of the debt and avoid litigation. Further, the Court concluded that the application of OCGA 13-1-11 to arrive at the amount of the award of attorney fees in this case was neither punitive nor violative of Borrowers’ due process rights, nor was the award contrary to the intent of the statute. View "Austin v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law