Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Paris Leroy Johnson, Jr. was tried by jury and convicted of the murder of Antonio Milton. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Johnson appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it failed to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense, when it allowed the State to cross-examine him about his failure to come forward and make a statement, and when it admitted testimony that impermissibly placed his character into evidence. Upon its review of the record and briefs, the Supreme Court saw no error and affirmed. View "Johnson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

John Dodson, Jr. was tried by jury and convicted of the murder of his 82-year-old neighbor, Willie Wright, Sr. Dodson appealed, contending that the State failed to show at trial that Wright died as a result of Dodson assaulting him. Upon its review of the record and briefs, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dodson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Randall Craig Driver (Husband) contended that the trial court erred in its equitable division of the marital property, in its lump-sum alimony award to appellee Andria Elizabeth Driver (Wife), in making certain findings that affected the equitable division and the alimony award, and in denying his motion to reopen the proof. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Driver v. Driver" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Darnell Harvey was convicted of malice murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated assault in connection with the strangulation death of Valerie Payton. He appealed the denial of his motion for new trial in which he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and asserted that the trial court erred in the admission of similar transaction evidence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Harvey v. Georgia" on Justia Law

After his jury trial had begun, William James Henderson pled guilty to two counts of murder and additional counts of attempted murder, rape, burglary, and numerous lesser offenses. Henderson appealed pro se, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his out-of-time appeal. Upon review of the record and briefs, the Supreme Court saw no error and affirmed. View "Henderson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Manoucher Jahanbin (husband) appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside the final judgment and decree in a divorce action brought by Zahra Rafieishad (wife). Husband contended that the trial court erred in finding service upon him was perfected. The parties met in their native Iran, but were married in Atlanta, Georgia, shortly after moving here in 2007. After living together in Georgia for several years, husband began traveling internationally and spending time in Iran while wife remained in the marital residence in Atlanta. Wife filed for divorce; after attempts to have husband served personally in Iran were unsuccessful, the trial court entered an instructing wife to utilize the provisions of OCGA 9-11-4 (f)(3)(B)(iii)(II) and deliver the summons and complaint to the clerk of court, who was "directed to mail the correspondence" to husband's residence in Tehran, Iran. However, upon providing the correspondence to the clerk of court, the clerk instructed wife's attorney to complete the registered mail receipt in Farsi and to transact the mailing herself. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the requirements of OCGA 9-11-4 (f)(3)(B)(iii)(II) were not met and reversed: "[w]hile this Court recognizes the difficulties incumbent in the fact that mail sent to a foreign country may require the address to be written in a foreign script, OCGA 9-11-4 (f)(3)(B)(iii)(II) does not permit the clerk of court to direct someone else to address and dispatch the mail for service of process." View "Jahanbin v. Rafieishad" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding the availability and scope of an "appropriation of likeness" claim under Georgia law. In the spring of 2000, fourteen-year-old Lindsay Bullard exposed her breasts to two unknown men in a parking lot in Panama City, Florida. She was aware that the men were videotaping her at the time and expressed no objection to being videotaped. MRA Holding LLC obtained the recording and included it in its "College Girls Gone Wild" video series. MRA also used a still photo of Bullard that was taken from the video clip and placed it in a prominent position on the cover of the video box for the College Girls Gone Wild video that it later marketed and sold nationwide. MRA did not obtain Bullard's permission to use the video footage of her in the video or to use her photo on the video box cover. Television and internet advertisements were aired that incorporated Bullard's image. As a result, Bullard suffered humiliation and injury to her feelings and reputation as a result of the use of her image. Bullard sued MRA for, among other things, appropriation of her likeness. MRA moved for summary judgment. The District Court then certified several questions relating to Georgia law with regard to the appropriation of Bullard's likeness. Taking each in turn, the Supreme Court concluded that Georgia law governed Bullard's claim, and Georgia law gave rise to a cause of action. The Court concluded that Bullard could not have given her consent based on an analysis of the facts in relation to Georgia law, and that the measure of damages for an appropriation of likeness case would not include general damages, but would be measured by the value of the use of the appropriated publicity. View "Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC " on Justia Law

In 1969, the Cities of Atlanta and College Park entered into an agreement for purposes of expanding Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. One of the provisions of the granted Atlanta the exclusive right to collect and levy occupation taxes from businesses located at the Airport that were within the city limits of College Park. In 2007, after commissioning a study for the purpose of reassessing this relationship, College Park informed Atlanta and Airport businesses that it would no longer honor the 1969 Agreement and that it would seek to collect occupation taxes from the Airport businesses including Atlanta's proprietary business operations. Atlanta filed a declaratory action in seeking a judgment that the 1969 Agreement controlled the collection of occupation taxes from businesses operating at the Airport within College Park. Both Atlanta and College Park moved for partial summary judgment, and, in ruling on the cross motions, the trial court found that Atlanta and College Park's 1969 Agreement was unenforceable. The trial court further ruled that OCGA 48-13-13 (5), which prohibited local governments from levying an occupation tax on any "local authority," precluded College Park from levying an occupation tax on Atlanta's proprietary operations because Atlanta met the definition of a "local authority" under the statute. Both parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment invalidating the 1969 Agreement, but reversed the trial court's finding that the term "local authority" as used in OCGA 48-13-13 (5) included smunicipalities. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals was correct in its determination that the City of Atlanta was not a "local authority" as that term is used in the statute. View "City of Atlanta v. City of College Park" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Leon Heywood appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Andrew Wilson. Defendant challenged the trial court's refusal to continue the trial and empanel new prospective jurors based on a remark made during voir dire, his absence from bench conferences, the admission of certain blood spatter testimony, and the constitutionality of his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Finding no error in with the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Heywood v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Judge of the Clayton County Probate Court Pam Ferguson appealed two orders of the Superior Court of Clayton County. Case No. S12A1643 was Ferguson's appeal of the trial court's ruling that Manuel Perry was entitled to a Georgia weapons carry license ("WCL") pursuant to OCGA 16-11-129, and Case No. S12A1645 was her appeal of the trial court's subsequent order issuing a writ of mandamus requiring Ferguson to issue a WCL to Perry. Because the trial court correctly ruled that Perry was entitled to a WCL, the Supreme Court affirmed both of these cases. In Case No. S12X1644, Perry cross-appealed the trial court's ruling that Perry's right to keep and bear arms under the Georgia and United States Constitutions was not violated by the denial of his WCL application. The Supreme Court vacated that ruling, because once the trial court determined that Perry was entitled to a WCL under 16-11-129, his claim that the denial of a weapons carry license violated his right to keep and bear arms lost its premise, and the trial court should not have opined on a moot issue. View "Ferguson v. Perry" on Justia Law