Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Harold Hall of malice murder and robbery in connection with the beating death of 78-year-old Rachel Posey. On appeal he argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hall v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Jamon Jackson was convicted and sentenced to life in prison plus 20 years for fatally shooting his girlfriend Ashley White and burning her body inside her vehicle to conceal her death. After review of his arguments made on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that though the evidence was sufficient to authorize appellant's conviction for tampering with evidence, appellant committed misdemeanor tampering rather than felony tampering because he tampered with evidence in his own case. Accordingly, the ten-year sentence imposed on appellant for tampering was vacated and the case was remanded for imposition of a sentence for a misdemeanor. View "Jackson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Tchywaskie Lamar Jones was tried by a Dougherty County jury and convicted of aggravated assault and a violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act in connection with a shooting at a public pool in Albany in which a bystander was wounded. Jones appealed and raised several claims of error, including that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court failed to respond as required when the prosecuting attorney spoke in his closing argument of facts outside the record. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for violation of the Street Gang Act, and agreed that the trial court failed to fulfill its obligations under OCGA 17-8-75. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Robert Mesteller brought suit to challenge Gwinnett County and its Board of Commissioners' (County) Solid Waste Ordinance. He appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County. Relying upon the Home Rule provision of the Georgia Constitution (among others), the County adopted the Solid Waste Collection and Disposal Ordinance of 2010. Under the Ordinance, the County was divided into five zones, each to be serviced by a private waste management company. The County collected fees for the waste collection services through annual tax assessment notices, which it then remits to the five service providers, minus the service fee. Mesteller received a property tax bill that showed a fee for solid waste collection services. Acting pro se, he sued the County and the members of its Board of Commissioners, individually and as members of the Board, alleging the assessment and collection of the fee violated the Georgia Constitution. After notice and a hearing, the superior court granted the County's motion for summary judgment. Mesteller contended on appeal that the County was without authority to use the annual property tax bill to assess or collect fees for solid waste services because by contracting with private waste management companies to collect solid waste, the County was not, in fact, "provid[ing] solid waste collection services" within the meaning of OCGA 12-8-39.3 (a), and therefore not authorized to place the collection fee on the tax bill of a property owner or to enforce the collection of the fee as set forth in the statute. The Supreme Court concluded that Mestellar's argument "reveal[ed] a misunderstanding of the precedents of [the] Court." As such, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County. View "Mestellar v. Gwinnett County" on Justia Law

Jeff Dulcio appealed his convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and co-defendant Michelle Morrison appealed her convictions for felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, all in connection with the fatal shooting of Keith Brown. Dulcio challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and Morrison challenged the admission into evidence of certain testimony at trial; both claimed that their respective trial attorneys were ineffective. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that both parties' challenges were without merit, and the convictions of both were affirmed. View "Dulcio v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Maurice Charleston and Scott Walker were indicted for malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Edric Finney. Following a joint trial, a jury found both defendants guilty on all counts. The Supreme Court had previously affirmed Walker's convictions. Because the issues raised by Appellant Charleston lacked merit, the Court affirmed his convictions too. View "Charleston v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Appellant Fernando Castillo-Solis's application for interlocutory appeal to challenge the trial court's ruling that OCGA 40-5-20(a), which prohibits driving in Georgia without a valid driver's license, was constitutional as applied to him. "Many of Appellant's constitutional challenges were premised on his incorrect interpretation of 40-5-20 (a) as including a 'retroactive amnesty' provision;" the Court concluded that the trial court properly construed that the statute does not allow a person who has been cited for driving without a valid license to avoid guilt by later obtaining a Georgia driver's license. Therefore the Court concluded that 40-5-20 (a) did not violate due process or equal protection as applied to Appellant, that the statute did not impair his right to defend himself in court, and that he failed to show that the Georgia statute was preempted by federal law. View "Castillo-Solis v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Aaron and Michelle Black were married in 1996, and later divorced in Houston County. Michelle appealed the final divorce decree, contending that the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant a divorce, that it erred when it refused to stay its proceedings in favor of pending divorce proceedings in New York, and that it erred in its final decree with respect to an equitable division of marital property, child support, and a provision that was intended to enable Michelle to retain her health insurance. Upon review of the decree and the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred with respect to a deviation from the presumptive amount of child support to account for the payment of life insurance premiums, and the Court also agreed that the trial court erred in its framing of the provision to enable Michelle to retain her health insurance, so it vacated those portions of the decree and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found no other error and otherwise affirmed the final decree of divorce. View "Black v. Black" on Justia Law

Sandra M. Singh (Wife) and Zachary Hammond (Husband) were divorced in 2005. The parties had two children together, and pursuant to the final divorce decree, were awarded joint legal custody of the children, with Husband being awarded primary physical custody. In 2009, Wife filed an action seeking child support and a modification of custody. The parties eventually agreed to allow Wife to have primary physical custody of the children, and in late 2011, the Superior Court ruled that Wife should be awarded child support. However, as part of its order, the trial court also ruled that, "[a]s long as [Wife] receives child support payments from [Husband], she shall not apply for any financial assistance for the children from the government." Wife appealed to the Supreme Court, asking whether the trial court erred in ruling that as long as Wife received child support payments from Husband, she should not apply for any financial assistance for the children from the government. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling with respect to its calculation of Husband’s gross monthly income, but reversed the trial court’s ruling with respect to its calculation of Wife’s gross monthly income and its prohibition against Wife’s application for financial assistance as long as she received child support. View "Singh v. Hammond" on Justia Law

Leon East and Donia Stephens divorced in 2002. They entered a settlement which was incorporated into their divorce decree. By their settlement, East and Stephens agreed that Stephens would have custody of their two children, and East would pay weekly child support and would reimburse Stephens for certain miscellaneous expenses that she incurred for the benefit of the children, including "one-half of the minor children’s school expenses. East later petitioned for a modification of the decree, and the trial court granted that petition in part in March 2011. The order of modification said nothing expressly about miscellaneous expenses, but it specified that any and all other provisions of the incorporated settlement "not modified herein shall remain in full force and effect." Following the modification, Stephens moved to have East held in contempt for, among other things, his failure to pay half of miscellaneous expenses that she incurred on behalf of the children. The trial court held East in contempt for that failure, as well as other failures to meet his court-ordered obligations. The court specifically rejected East’s contention that the March 2011 modification discontinued and superseded his obligation in the 2002 decree and incorporated settlement to pay half of the miscellaneous expenses. East appealed the trial court's contempt order, contending that he could not be held in contempt for failing to pay miscellaneous expenses for the children when the modification order directed him to pay the presumptive child support amount and made no deviation for miscellaneous expenses. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with East and reversed the final contempt order to the extent that East was held in contempt for failure to pay a portion of the miscellaneous expenses that Stephens incurred for the benefit of the children. View "East v. Stephens" on Justia Law