Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ward Brockman was convicted by jury of felony murder and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. The jury recommended the death sentence for the murder after finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed during the commission of another capital felony. Brockman appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial. Finding that the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict and sentence, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial. View "Brockman v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Derrick Ashley Blake was convicted of felony murder and related charges in connection with the December 2008 shooting death of Marion Turner. Blake appealed the denial of his motion for new trial, asserting error in the trial court's instructions to the jury and in his sentence. Although the Supreme Court found no error in Blake's convictions, the Court did find error in his sentence, which was vacated. The Court affirmed Blake's convictions, but remanded the case for recalculation of his sentence. View "Blake v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Marcus DeWayne Huff was convicted of malice murder for the 2010 stabbing death of Daniel Aftowski. He appealed, asserting the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Huff v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Margaret Hunt, a teacher, sued her former employer, the Richmond County Board of Education for breach of her employment contract. The parties stipulated to the amount of damages, and after a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in the stipulated amount plus prejudgment interest. The Board cut two checks, one reflecting the interest and fees, and another intended to reflect the damages award. The award was treated as wage income, with various sums withheld to comply with state and federal tax laws. Hunt objected to that treatment of the damages award, contending that the second check prepared by the Board should have been for the full amount of the damages, and that the payment should be reported for tax purposes using an IRS Form 1099. The parties could not agree on the tax treatment of the damages award. As a result, the Board filed suit seeking an injunction against Hunt in the event she resorted to certain collection methods (such as garnishment of the Board's assets). The superior court grated a temporary restraining order. Hunt appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court reversed: "the mere apprehension of injury does not support the grant of an injunction." View "Hunt v. Richmond County Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court granted an application for certiorari from the Court of Appeals' decision in "In re: W.L.H.," (723 SE2d 478 (2012)) to determine whether a child in a deprivation action had standing to appeal when the child was represented by counsel and the child's guardian ad litem chose not to appeal. "Because the guardian ad litem is the legal protector of a child's best interests in deprivation proceedings, we find that a child lacks standing to appeal a deprivation ruling except through a guardian ad litem." View "In the Interest of W.L.H." on Justia Law

Rodney Reaves was convicted of the felony murder of his 11-year-old daughter and other related crimes. He appealed the denial of his motion for new trial, asserting that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of certain witnesses and failing to properly instruct the jury and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Reaves v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Thomas Vines appealed a trial court's order that denied his motion to modify the terms of his visitation rights with his daughter and that granted Anita Vines' counterclaim for contempt and request for attorney fees. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vines v. Vines" on Justia Law

In 2009, a grand jury indicted Appellant Lance Thomas, Jr., along with Robert Robinson, James Prothro, and Tony Smith for: (1) malice murder of David Nixon, (2) felony murder of David Nixon (based on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon), (3) malice murder of Michael Cruver, (4) felony murder of Cruver (based on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon), (5) aggravated assault of Reginald Nixon ("Nixon") with a deadly weapon, (6) burglary, (7) aggravated assault of Cruver with intent to rob, and (8) aggravated assault of Nixon with intent to rob. The charges arose from a 2008 home invasion. Robinson pled guilty to the two counts of felony murder; Prothro pled guilty to burglary and aggravated assault; and Smith pled guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery. They all testified for the State at Appellant's trial, where Appellant was found not guilty of the malice murder counts but guilty of all the other charges. On appeal, he contended that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his burglary conviction, that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a vehicle search and his custodial statement to the police, and that the trial court should have merged several convictions for sentencing. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thomas v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2006, debtor Denise Codrington executed a security deed with appellant Wells Fargo that was recorded with the Clerk of the Superior Court of Fulton County on October 13, 2006. The deed provided: "[i]f one or more riders are executed by Borrower and recorded together with this Security Instrument, the covenants of each such rider shall be incorporated into ...this Security Instrument as if the rider(s) were a part of this Security Instrument." The security deed specifically identified the "ARM Rider" as being incorporated. The last page of the deed was signed by the debtor, the co-debtor (Alvina Codrington), and a notary, but the signature line for an "Unofficial Witness" was left blank. Contemporaneously recorded with the security deed were a number of other exhibits, including a "Waiver of Borrower's Rights." The waiver provided that "the provisions hereof are incorporated into and made a part of the security deed." The parties agreed that the waiver was signed by the debtor, the co-debtor, an unofficial witness, and a notary. In June 2008, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Appellee Neil Gordon, Trustee for the debtor's bankruptcy estate, commenced an adversary proceeding against Wells Fargo seeking to avoid Wells Fargo's interest in the property. Appellee asserted that because the security deed lacked the signature of an unofficial witness, it was not duly recorded and it did not provide constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser, rendering the security deed avoidable per 11 U.S.C. 544. Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court denied the motion, and the bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of appellee. Wells Fargo appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals which certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court: (1) whether a security deed that lacks the signature of an unofficial witness should be considered "duly filed, recorded, and indexed" as required by OCGA 44-14-33; and (2) if no, whether such a situation would nonetheless put a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice. Upon review, the Supreme Court answered both certified questions in the negative. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Gordon" on Justia Law

In a previous case, the Supreme Court determined that Robert Emory White (Robert), Myron James White (Myron), and Gary Gerrard, Robert's attorney, were entitled to a writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to allow them to file notices of appeal in this case regarding the administration of the estates of Robert L. White and Florence L. White, who were once married. This appeal was the result of the grant of that mandamus relief. The primary issue on appeal in this case was whether the trial court correctly found that the proceeds from the sale of certain real property held by a trust created by Robert L. White should have been distributed wholly to Marvin Terry White (Terry). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "Through various arguments in these related appeals, Robert and Myron [argued] that [the trustee] violated her fiduciary duties by asking the trial court to ratify the distribution of any Trust property to Terry and that, by doing so, the trial court misinterpreted the Trust. An analysis of the facts of this case and the language of the Trust indicate that the trial court did not err. Robert and Myron contend, nonetheless, that, because the Trust refers only to three named children at certain points and the surviving children at others with the use of different articles of speech, the Trust evinces an unequivocal intent by Robert L. White that only his three older children take under the Trust. It does not. At best, it creates an ambiguity, and, as pointed out above and in the trial court's order, the law favors the ascertainment of class members at the death of the settlor." With regard to any remaining claims, the Court found no error in the trial court's rulings. View "White v. Call" on Justia Law