Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Mack Pitts was killed in a construction accident at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, his estate and minor children sued the City of Atlanta and several contractors for breaches of contracts concerning the construction project on which Pitts had been working. Although Pitts was not a party to these contracts, his estate and children asserted that he was an intended beneficiary and that they, therefore, had standing to sue for breach of the contracts. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that Pitts was not an intended beneficiary, denied summary judgment to the estate and children, and awarded summary judgment to the City and contractors. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court should have awarded summary judgment on the claims for breach of contract to the estate and children, not to the City and contractors. The Court of Appeals determined that Pitts was, in fact, an intended beneficiary of the contracts, and it found that the evidence was undisputed that the City and contractors had breached the contracts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals misapplied or failed to apply several fundamental principles of contract law in its consideration of these cases. Accordingly, the Court vacated the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Holder Construction Company v. Estate of Pitts" on Justia Law

Appellant Kasaem Toomer challenged his 2009 convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Justin Cox. Appellant contended that the trial court erred in rejecting his "Batson" claim that the prosecutor used three peremptory strikes to exclude prospective jurors solely because of their race, thereby violating his right to equal protection of the law. Appellant also contended that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his repeated mistrial motions after the State played portions of his videotaped police interviews in which he admitted that he was on probation, had been arrested for fighting, and had been convicted of burglary. Furthermore, Appellant asserted that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no merit to Appellant's claims on appeal and affirmed his convictions. View "Toomer v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool (GIIP), Lumpkin County appealed, contending that following the insolvency of the County's regular insurer, GIIP was required to step in and cover the pending workers' compensation claims against the County. Specifically, the County argued that the trial court erred in finding that it was not entitled to coverage under the GIIP because the County's net worth exceeded $25 million. Alternatively, the County argued OCGA 33-36-3 unconstitutionally violated the County's due process rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "The County contend[ed] that this ruling was erroneous because the term 'net worth' is inapplicable to government entities, and, instead, the applicability of the twenty-five million dollar exemption under the Act should be assessed based on the County's 'net assets.' The County argue[d] that the bulk of its assets, including land, roads, bridges, and government buildings are restricted from use and are thus unavailable to meet its obligations or satisfy liabilities. Based on the County's calculation of its own net assets, it only has $5.6 million dollars with which to meet these obligations. As a result, the County maintain[ed] that it should receive coverage for its claims from the GIIP. This argument is misplaced." Therefore, the Court held that the trial court did not err in excluding the County from GIIP protection based on the net worth exemption. Furthermore, the County does not possess due process rights by which to challenge the constitutionality of the Act, and its argument premised on any such right necessarily failed. View "Lumpkin Co. v. Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool" on Justia Law

Eugene Hammond appealed the trial court's denial of his motion in arrest of judgment. In 2000, Hammond was convicted superior court on charges of the felony murder of his son, the aggravated assault of his wife, and of making terroristic threats toward his wife. On March 10, 2000, he was sentenced to life in prison, and an additional prison term of ten years, to be served consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. On August 11, 2011, Hammond filed a motion in arrest of judgment, claiming that his indictment was void because it had failed to allege venue, and that he was improperly convicted of more than one crime arising from the same conduct. On November 1, 2011, the trial court denied the motion, finding that it was without jurisdiction to consider it because it was untimely, and expressly stating that the allegations in the motion were without merit. As "a trial court's ruling on a motion in arrest of judgment is normally directly appealable to whichever appellate court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case," Hammond appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding that Hammond's motion in arrest of judgment was not filed in the term at which the judgment was obtained, but more than eleven years later, and was thus untimely, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Hammond v. Georgia" on Justia Law

We, the Taxpayers, an unincorporated association of individual taxpayer residents of Effingham County ("Taxpayers"), appealed the trial court's order dismissing Taxpayers's complaint against the Board of Tax Assessors of Effingham County ("Board"). In a separate case, the Board appealed the superior court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. Former OCGA 48-5B-1 became law in 2009, and was effective until January 2011. It placed a moratorium on increases in the assessed value of property subject to ad valorem taxation for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2009, and continuing through January 9, 2011, but provided an exception from the moratorium for any county which performed or had performed on its behalf a comprehensive county-wide revaluation of all properties in the county in 2008 or any county which in 2009 was under contract prior to February 28, 2009, to have performed on its behalf a comprehensive county-wide revaluation of all properties in the county. The Board, believing that Effingham County met the exception set forth in former OCGA 48-5B-1 (c), did not impose a moratorium on increases in assessed values in the 2009 tax year, but in fact, increased assessed values of certain property. Taxpayers, believing that the exception did not apply and that the moratorium should have been imposed, filed a complaint under OCGA 48-5-296 seeking the removal of Board members. Taxpayers amended the complaint to include the equitable relief of eliminating the 2009 assessed values and imposing instead the 2008 tax year figures; by later amendment, Taxpayers dropped the request to remove Board members, and added a request for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to act in accordance with Taxpayers's interpretation of OCGA 48-5B-1. Taxpayers moved for summary judgment, contending that the undisputed evidence showed that the exception to the moratorium did not apply; the Board also moved for summary judgment, asserting that OCGA 48-5B-1 was unconstitutional, and, alternatively, that the undisputed facts showed that the statutory exception applied. The trial court denied both motions. The Board then filed its motion to dismiss, asserting that the Taxpayers property owners were obligated to appeal their 2009 ad valorem assessments to the county Board of Equalization, or otherwise in the manner set forth in OCGA 48-5-311, and that the failure to do so precluded the trial court's addressing the equitable and mandamus claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in denying Taxpayers's motion, and vacated the court's decision denying the Board's motion. View "We, The Taxpayers v. Bd. of Tax Assessors Effingham Cty." on Justia Law

In early 2012, the trial court entered a final judgment in the divorce action filed by appellee Jeffrey Rymuza (Husband) against appellant Andreana Rymuza (Wife). Husband filed for divorce in Houston County. The complaint sought a divorce on the grounds of Wife's cruel treatment and that the marriage was irretrievably broken, and requested equitable division of the parties' assets and liabilities, the return of certain property, attorney fees, and a restraining order preventing Wife from disposing of assets or entering the marital residence. Nine days after the final hearing but before a written order was entered, Wife's attorney filed on Wife's behalf an answer and counterclaim and a premature motion to set aside the order. In the answer and counterclaim, Wife disputed that venue was proper in Houston County, sought a divorce on the grounds of adultery and cruel treatment and asked to be awarded, among other things, the marital residence in Houston County and "all monetary assets held by" Husband. In the motion to set aside, Wife claimed that the court prevented her at the final hearing from presenting evidence and cross-examining Husband on the merit's of his complaint and that she was not allowed to address the appropriateness of the notice by publication or the veracity of Husband's allegations in support thereof. Finding that Wife failed to carry her burden to show the errors alleged, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and final decree. View "Rymuza v. Rymuza" on Justia Law

The State appealed the superior court's grant of a new trial to Xavier Harris, who was found guilty of felony murder and related crimes in connection with the August 1, 2005 fatal shooting of Ron Strozier and the conspiracy to commit aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of an individual known only as "DBone." For the reasons that follow, we affirm. In March 2006, a grand jury returned a 17-count indictment against Harris and four other men: Michael Grissom; Markell Dorsey; Rico Sims; and Darnell Amaker. Harris was named in all but four of the counts, which included charges of malice and felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, conspiracy, criminal damage to property, and firearms possession. The defendants were all tried together, and the State argued that the crimes were related and part and parcel of the same conspiracy. The jury found Harris guilty of Strozier's felony murder predicated on the conspiracy to commit aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against Strozier, conspiracy to commit aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against D-Bone, and conspiracy to commit criminal damage to property in the first degree; voluntary manslaughter; involuntary manslaughter based upon reckless conduct; and reckless conduct. Harris was also found guilty of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault against D-Bone, conspiracy to commit criminal damage to property in the first degree, and possession of a firearm during the commission of multiple crimes against D-Bone. Harris was either found not guilty of the remaining charges or they were resolved by directed verdicts of acquittal. Harris moved to vacate his convictions and for a new trial; however, by that time the judge who presided over the trial had retired, and a different judge considered the motion for a new trial. This judge granted Harris a new trial on the general grounds, expressly finding that the verdicts were decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence, contrary to the law and principles of equity and justice, and that the evidence warranted the court exercising its discretion to grant Harris a new trial. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court found no abuse of the successor court's discretion in granting Harris a new trial on the general grounds. View "Georgia v. Harris" on Justia Law

Norma Fitzpatrick, Barry Fitzpatrick and George Elrod, (taxpayers), own parcels of land in Madison County. Following a valuation of those properties for tax purposes by the Madison County Board of Assessors, the taxpayers appealed the valuation to the Madison County Board of Equalization. The Board of Equalization denied the appeal. Subsequently, the taxpayers filed an appeal in superior court, but the Board of Assessors refused to certify the appeal to the superior court unless the taxpayers first paid the filing fee to the superior court clerk. Thereafter, the taxpayers contended that, except for appeals to an arbitrator pursuant to OCGA 48-5-311(f), a taxpayer is not required to pay any fee at all for an appeal. Based on this argument, the taxpayers filed a declaratory action seeking a ruling to this effect. The trial court issued an order finding that the taxpayers are responsible for paying the filing fee, which prompted the taxpayers to appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the applicable statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Fitzpatrick v. Madison Co. Bd. of Tax Assessors" on Justia Law

Robert Hamilton (husband) and Janell Hamilton (wife) were divorced in 2008, after approximately 23 years of marriage. At the time of their divorce, they had one minor child. The final divorce decree ordered husband to pay, in addition to other alimony to wife, the sum of $6,000 per month until 2013, provided that the child was enrolled in a full time student at an accredited higher education institution. If the child was not enrolled in good standing, then on the first month following the child not being enrolled, husband would pay $4,000.00 until 2013. The decree further required wife to immediately inform husband of any change in the child's enrollment status which could trigger a change in husband's alimony obligation. In the event wife knowingly failed to inform husband of a change in status and husband overpaid, the overpayment was fully reimbursable plus a ten percent interest penalty. The child attended Georgia Southern University beginning in Fall 2009, but in his first three semesters, struggled academically. the child switched schools and for the spring semester, achieved a 4.0 grade point average. Husband paid $6,000 per month in alimony to wife through January 2011. In February 2011, after learning of the change in schools, husband reduced his alimony payments to $4,000 per month and simultaneously filed a petition to hold wife in contempt of the final decree arguing she failed to notify him that the child had lost "good standing" at Georgia Southern University. The trial court concluded wife was not in contempt of the final decree; but construing the decree, the trial court determined husband's alimony obligation for the 13-month period from January 2010 through May 2011 was $4,000 per month, resulting in a $26,000 overpayment to wife. The trial court further concluded, however, that the child regained his status as a full-time student in good standing in June 2011, thereby reinstating husband's $6,000 per month alimony obligation for June through October 2011. Because husband paid only $4,000 per month in those five months, the court held husband owed wife a deficiency of $10,000. Deducting the amount husband owed wife from the amount he was owed for his overpayment, the trial court relieved husband from paying alimony to wife until the $16,000 balance was paid. Husband's request for attorney fees and his request for an interest penalty on the overpayment were denied, and he appealed. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Hamilton v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant Clayton Jerrod Ellington of murdering his wife Berna Ellington and their twin two-year-old sons, Cameron and Christian. The jury found two statutory aggravating circumstances related to each of the three murders and recommended three death sentences, which the trial court imposed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Ellington's convictions. As to his death sentences, however, the Court held hold that the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting Ellington from asking prospective jurors in voir dire whether they would consider all three sentencing options (death, life without parole, and life with the possibility of parole) in a case involving the murder of young children, where that was clearly a critical fact in this case, as shown by, among other things, the responses of prospective jurors who knew or inferred that fact from other sources and by the way the prosecutor tried and argued the case. "We cannot say that this error was harmless, so we must reverse Ellington’s death sentences and remand the case for further proceedings." View "Ellington v. Georgia" on Justia Law