Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Tammy Poole was convicted in April 2007 for the malice murder of her husband Robert Michael Poole, possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony and while a convicted felon, simple battery/family violence, and making a false statement. After reviewing her contentions of ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions, and erroneous evidentiary rulings, the Supreme Court affirmed her conviction. View "Poole v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Tamarkus Lekeith Wright was found guilty of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery and burglary in connection with the robbing and shooting of Joseph Ray. On appeal Wright contended that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial court erred in allowing improper testimony at trial. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wright v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Paul Franklin Blevins was tried by a jury and convicted of the murder of Danny Jones, armed robbery, arson in the first degree, and several misdemeanor traffic offenses. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Blevins appealed, contending only that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his felony convictions. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed Blevins' convictions. View "Blevins v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In May 1999, a jury found Derrick Brown guilty of kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated assault upon a person 65 years or older, robbery by force, and burglary in connection with the beating and robbing of Margaret Logan. Brown’s convictions were upheld on appeal. In December 2008, Brown sought habeas relief based on the Supreme Court’s then-controlling decision in "Garza v. State," (670 SE2d 73)(2008)), which established new factors for assessing the asportation element as required for kidnapping. Brown also sought habeas relief based on "Brodes v. State," (614 SE2d 766)(2005)), alleging error in the jury instructions for the reliability of Logan’s identification. Analyzing the Garza factors, the habeas court granted relief and set aside the conviction and sentence for kidnapping. The habeas court denied relief on Brodes grounds, finding that Brodes announced a new procedural rule that did not apply retroactively. The warden appealed the habeas court’s ruling on the Garza issue, and Brown appealed the habeas court’s ruling on the Brodes issue. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the habeas court in the warden's appeal, and affirmed the lower court in Brown's appeal on the Brodes issue. View "Chatman v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2004, Allen Ehlers signed a contract to sell certain property to Keith Sharp, the owner of Upper West Side, LLC. Allen had acquired the property in question pursuant to a 1995 deed of assent that identified the land as “Parcel Two,” and described the property as a strip of land 25 feet wide and 200 feet long. Although the deed of assent described the land as a 25' x 200' strip, Upper West Side believed that it would be purchasing the entire eight acre tract of land at the time that it entered the February 2004 contract with Allen. Eventually, in 2008, Allen deeded the property in the deed of assent to Upper West Side, and Upper West Side filed an action in the Fulton County Superior Court seeking to reform the deed of assent and asking the court to declare that, as reformed, the deed conveyed the entire eight acre tract of Parcel Two, and not just the 25' x 200' strip described in the deed. Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Upper West Side, and issued a certificate of immediate review. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, agreeing with the trial court's conclusion that Upper West Side’s action to reform the deed of assent was not barred by the seven-year statute of limitations applicable to reformation actions. View "Ehlers v. Upper West Side, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Carl Higdon was charged with a total of eight criminal offenses in three accusations filed in the Catoosa County Superior Court and one indictment returned in the Walker County Superior Court, each of which was assigned its own case number. On November 23, 2010, Appellant entered guilty pleas to all four charging instruments during a hearing in the Catoosa County Superior Court, and he asked the trial court to sentence him as a first offender as to all eight crimes in the four charging instruments. The trial court ruled that it had no authority to treat Appellant as a first offender on all eight crimes, because he was pleading to different offenses separated by time and place and charged in separate indictments and accusations. Although the court offered Appellant first offender status on the crime or crimes alleged in any one of the charging instruments, he declined the offer as providing him no benefit. The trial court then entered four separate sentences and judgments, three in Catoosa County Superior Court and one in Walker County Superior Court. Appellant filed four separate appeals in the four cases, which the Court of Appeals resolved in a single opinion, affirming the trial court’s ruling on the first offender issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly construed the last sentence of the "First Offender Statute." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not err in declining to grant Appellant first offender treatment on all the crimes in the four separate charging instruments to which he pleaded guilty. View "Higdon v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Todd Jarvis (“Husband”) and appellee Tracy Dorminy Jarvis(“Wife”) were married in March 1997. Husband filed for divorce in 2009. After a five-day bench trial in March 2011, the trial court granted the parties a divorce by final judgment. The trial court gave Wife primary physical custody of the couple’s three children and required Husband to pay child support. In addition to child support, the trial court ordered Husband to pay alimony for thirty-six months or until Wife’s remarriage or death, or until Husband’s death, whichever occurred first. The trial court reserved the matter of attorney’s fees for later disposition upon motion made by the parties. Wife subsequently moved for an award of attorney’s fees, the trial court held a hearing, and the trial court later awarded Wife attorney's fees. On appeal, Husband contended that the trial court abused its discretion when it considered evidence that Husband received financial support from his mother when considering the financial circumstances of the parties for the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees.1 Husband also contended that the trial court erred when it ordered that his estate continue to pay his support obligations temporarily in the event there is any delay in the disbursement of proceeds from his life insurance policy. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jarvis v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

Appellant Haskell Johnson was jointly indicted with Derek Willingham and Franklin Frails for malice murder, felony murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime after the shooting death of Ritchard Lewis. Willingham and Frails were also indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Appellant was tried first and convicted of all counts. Appellant contended on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a similar transaction, in charging the jury that it was permitted but not required to infer that a person in possession of a vehicle possesses the contents of that vehicle, and in ruling against his claim that the State was collaterally estopped from admitting evidence that he possessed the gun used to kill the victim. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected those claims and affirmed all of the judgment except for Appellant’s life sentence for felony murder, which the Court vacated. View "Johnson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Billy D. Nicely was tried by a jury and convicted of the murder of Tayore Wright, a one-year-old girl. On appeal, Nicely contended that his father was denied equal protection when the father was excluded from portions of the trial pursuant to the rule of witness sequestration, OCGA 24-9-61, while the mother of Tayore was permitted to attend the trial pursuant to a statutory exemption to the rule of sequestration contained in the Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights, OCGA 17-17-9 (b). Nicely also claimed that the trial court erred when it denied his pretrial demurrer, when it limited his cross-examination of an expert witness at trial, and when it refused to instruct the jury as Nicely requested. Upon review of the record and briefs, the Supreme Court found no error, and affirmed. View "Nicely v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Richard Odom (husband) and appellee Sherri Odom (wife) were divorced in 2007. The decree, which incorporated the parties’ settlement agreement, awarded wife primary custody of the parties’ three minor children and ordered husband to pay child support. The decree also required husband to pay private school tuition for the 2008-2009 academic year and provided that he “shall not be responsible for any expense for private school other than set out in [the parties’ settlement agreement].” In 2008, husband filed a petition to modify visitation and to hold wife in contempt of the final decree. Wife answered and filed a counterclaim for modification of child support. Following a hearing attended by both parties and their counsel, the trial court entered an order denying husband’s motions and granting wife’s motion for an upward modification of child support. The court determined there had been a substantial change in husband’s income and financial status sufficient to warrant an increase in child support, and after conducting the calculations required for determining child support under the child support guidelines, ordered an increase in husband’s monthly child support to cover the expenses of private school for the children. The trial court deviated from the presumptive child support award based on its conclusion that the “presumptive award would be unjust and/or inappropriate because the educational needs of the children of the parties could not be met with an award of the presumptive amount.” Husband appealed that portion of the trial court’s order granting wife’s motion for modification of child support. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no abuse of the trial court's discretion and affirmed the judgment. View "Odom v. Odom" on Justia Law